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Viewing cable 09BISHKEK288, KYRGYZ POLITICAL SCIENTIST DESCRIBES OPPOSITION'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BISHKEK288 2009-04-02 10:57 2011-05-25 11:30 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bishkek
VZCZCXRO7539
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHEK #0288/01 0921057
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021057Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2034
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3020
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1317
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3360
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2746
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, DEPT FOR P (WILLIAM BURNS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZ POLITICAL SCIENTIST DESCRIBES OPPOSITION'S 
PLANS 
 
REF: A. A. BISHKEK 245 
     B. B. BISHKEK 226 AND PREVIOUS 
     C. C. BISHKEK 119 
 
BISHKEK 00000288  001.2 OF 002 
 
 

Classified By: Classified By: Amb. Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with long-time Embassy contact 
and political insider Valentin Bogatyrev on March 31 to 
discuss the current political situation in the country. 
Bogatyrev was convinced that former Presidential 
Administration Head Sadyrkulov had been murdered, either 
because he presented a political threat to President Bakiyev 
or because of his personal conflict with the President's 
brother Janysh.  He said the opposition had united around a 
platform of ousting Bakiyev, and they planned to field 
multiple candidates in the July Presidential election, both 
to drain support from Bakiyev in the regions and to avoid 
making any one candidate the target for government 
harassment.  Bogatyrev said that the unpopular Bakiyev was 
re-orienting Kyrgyzstan's foreign policy toward Russia, while 
also moving toward increasing authoritarianism.  END SUMMARY 
 
WHO KILLED SADYRKULOV? 
---------------------- 
 
2. (C) Ambassador met March 31 with Valentin Bogatyrev, a 
political analyst and long-time Embassy contact.  Bogatyrev 
had been close to former Presidential Chief of Staff Medet 
Sadyrkulov and former director of the Kyrgyz International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Sergei Slepchenko, both of 
whom were killed in a suspicious car "accident" March 13 (Ref 
B).  Bogatyrev had no doubt that Sadyrkulov was murdered, but 
was unsure why he was killed.  Bogatyrev said that "everyone" 
was aware of Sadyrkulov's political project to unite the 
opposition around former Vice Prime Minister Elvira Ibraimova 
(Ref C); the Bakiyev regime saw this project as a real 
political threat and therefore may have wanted to take 
Sadrykulov down. 
 
3. (C) Bogatyrev said that a second possibility was that 
Sadyrkulov's death had been ordered by Janysh Bakiyev, 
President Bakiyev's brother and head of the Presidential 
Security Service, because of personal rivalries between them. 
 Bogatyrev conjectured that Janysh may have used a criminal 
group from the south of Kyrgyzstan to carry out the act, 
using explosive "powder" provided by the security services. 
Bogatyrev knew that Ibraimova had been threatened, but did 
not believe that she or other opposition leaders were in 
immediate physical danger since they do not currently present 
a political threat to Bakiyev. 
 
OPPOSITION: GUNNING FOR THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THEY GET GUNNED 
DOWN? 
----------- 
 
4. (C) Bogatyrev claimed to be in regular contact with many 
members of the opposition, though he avoided mentioning any 
personal role in their activities.  Bogatyrev said that 
Sadyrkulov, with his network of contacts and tactical 
abilities, had been indispensable to cobbling together the 
disparate elements of the opposition.  Asked if the 
opposition could pull together without Sadyrkuklov, Bogatyrev 
said that they had essentially united around a platform of 
ousting Bakiyev from power.  He said the opposition planned 
to field multiple candidates for the July Presidential 
election, both to drain support from Bakiyev in the regions 
and to avoid making any one candidate an exclusive target for 
government harassment.  Later in the campaign, at the very 
least by a second round of the election, they would select 
one candidate, likely Ibraimova, but possibly former MP 
Bolotbek Sherniyazov, or former Security Council Chair 
Miroslav Niyazov. 
 
BISHKEK 00000288  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
5. (C) Bogatyrev argued that Bakiyev is actually very weak 
politically right now, with his approval ratings below 10% 
and the country facing a difficult financial situation, and 
Bakiyev would certainly falsify the July election.  Bogatyrev 
said that the opposition hopes that exit polls and observers 
will limit Bakiyev's ability to cheat, but the opposition is 
also preparing to approach election officials at the local 
level in advance of the vote and warn them not to cheat. 
 
6.  (C)  According to Bogatyrev, there are two schools of 
thought within the opposition on how to go about doing that. 
The "light"-oriented opposition would use moral suasion.  The 
"dark"-oriented opposition is discussing threatening election 
officials with "burning down their houses" and "running them 
out of their villages" if they participate in cheating.  The 
"dark" threat would go something like this: "Bakiyev may be 
powerful but he is far away in Bishkek.  You live in our 
village, your house is in our village, your children go to 
our bvillage school.  We will take vengeance on you if you 
cheat and Bakiyev will be too far away to help you." 
 
7.  (C)  Bogatyrev expected the opposition to be successful 
in showing their power in the northern regions of Talas, 
Naryn, and Issyk Kul, but believed the opposition's ultimate 
success would depend on its ability to acquire resources to 
fund their efforts.  Bogatyrev said that potential wealthy 
backers existed, but that they were waiting to see who is 
most likely to win power before getting involved. 
 
THE GEOPOLITICAL SHADOWS BEHIND IT ALL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) President Bakiyev, according to Bogatyrev, was trying 
to re-orient Kyrgyzstan away from a multi-vector foreign 
policy and towards Russia, and away from its relatively 
liberal past towards authoritarianism.  Bakiyev was doing 
this, with some success, by appealing to nostalgia for the 
Soviet Union.  Bogatyrev did not believe that Bakiyev 
intended to break his promise to the Russians and let Manas 
Air Base remain, but at the same time, Bakiyev wanted to 
avoid angering the United States before the July Presidential 
election.  Therefore, Bogatyrev reasoned, Bakiyev would try 
to drag out negotiations over Manas Air Base.  Bogatyrev 
added that his contacts in Moscow believe that Russia is 
having second thoughts about backing the unpopular Bakiyev, 
realizing that doing so could endanger its position in 
Central Asia.  "There are people right now in Moscow dealing 
cards with different faces on them," he said.  "Each card is 
a potential Kyrgyz President and the Russians are trying to 
figure out who to back." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) Over the past couple of years, Bogatyrev has been a 
reliable reporter of Administration thinking and plans. He 
has often been able to accurately presage Bakiyev's actions, 
likely due to his connection to Sadyrkulov.  He remains well 
connected to Kyrgyzstan's political elite, and his 
description of the opposition's current election strategy is 
generally consistent with what opposition figures have told 
us about running multiple candidates.  We still doubt, 
however, that the opposition will be able to unite behind a 
single candidate. 
GFOELLER