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Viewing cable 09BAMAKO267, MALI'S ONLY ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTY FALLS ON HARD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAMAKO267 2009-04-30 12:28 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bamako
VZCZCXRO3210
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0267/01 1201228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301228Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0285
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0632
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 000267 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KISL KDEM KIRF ML
SUBJECT: MALI'S ONLY ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTY FALLS ON HARD 
TIMES 
 
REF: A. 07 BAMAKO 01336 
     B. 08 BAMAKO 01357 
     C. 08 BAMAKO 00237 
     D. 07 BAMAKO 01223 
 
1.(SBU) On April 17 the Embassy met with National Union for 
Rebirth (UNPR) president Modibo Sangare to discuss Mali's 
April 26 local elections.  The UNPR is Mali's only Islamic 
political party and Sangare is the only political leader 
openly seeking to transform Mali into an Islamic Republic. 
Although the UNPR's platform is seemingly at odds with laws 
prohibiting non-secular political parties, Sangare and the 
UNPR continue to hover along the fringes of the Malian 
political spectrum, presumably because the party is so small 
that Malian officials simply prefer to leave well enough 
alone.   As UNPR president and an outspoken member of Mali's 
al-Sunna or "wahhabi" community, Sangare is also on the 
fringes of Mali's religious spectrum.  Any tendency toward 
religious extremism in the broader sense, however, is 
tempered by Malian traditions of tolerance, openness, and 
consensus, and Sangare remains effusive in his praise of the 
United States.  During his meeting with the Embassy, Sangare 
described funding shortfalls that left the UNPR unable to 
register virtually any candidates for the local elections, 
and rehashed his on going feud with fellow al-Sunna leader 
and High Council of Islam president Mahmoud Dicko.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Modibo Sangare and the UNPR 
--------------------------- 
 
2.(SBU)  With no representation at any level within the 
Malian government and almost no resources, the UNPR would be 
indistinguishable from Mali's estimated 100 other 
micro-parties were it not for the UNPR's outspoken president, 
Modibo Sangare.  In 2002 Sangare was one of 24 presidential 
candidates seeking to replace former President Alpha Oumar 
Konare.  Although Sangare garnered only 11,600 of the 1.5 
million votes cast, he finished as well or better than others 
with more resources and more mainstream messages.  Sangare 
tried to run for president again in 2007 but was unable to 
muster the USD 20,000 registration fee. 
 
3.(SBU)  In 2007 and 2008 Sangare helped organize protests by 
Muslim groups against President Amadou Toumani Toure's still 
unrealized attempt to abolish the death penalty and revise 
Mali's Family Code in order to provide more equal rights for 
women (Ref. A).  In November 2008 security forces used tear 
gas to break up one UNPR rally (Ref B).  In addition to his 
vocal position against death penalty abolition, greater 
inheritance rights for women, or attempts by human rights 
groups to eliminate the practice of excision, Sangare openly 
advocates for transforming the secular Malian state into a 
Islamic Republic and the incorporation of certain aspects of 
Sharia law. 
 
4.(SBU)  Sangare's ideas on secularism and Sharia 
significantly differentiate him from other al-Sunna leaders 
like High Council of Islam president Mahmoud Dicko.  Although 
Dicko and other mainstream Muslim leaders, whether al-Sunna 
or Sufi, would like to see more religious instruction in 
Malian schools, they have no interest in altering the secular 
nature of the Malian state or legal system (Ref. C and D). 
The UNPR's opposition to the secular nature of the Malian 
State also appears to place the party and Sangare on the 
wrong side of the Malian Constitution - which requires 
political parties to respect the principles of national 
sovereignty, democracy, territorial integrity, national 
unity, and secularism - and a 2005 law prohibiting 
non-secular political parties. 
 
5.(SBU)  Sangare has told the Embassy, "if it were up to me, 
Mali would be an Islamic country, but one open to the West." 
Sangare advocated for the establishment of an Islamic yet 
still democratic Republic, that would be governed by Sharia 
law while still respecting all human rights as outlined by 
the United Nations as the bases for "each of these rights is 
also found in the Koran."  Sangare supported his argument by 
claiming that Mali had tried socialism from 1960 to 1968, a 
planned economy and military dictatorship from 1968 to 1991, 
and democracy from 1991 to the present, all without success. 
His plan for transforming Mali into an Islamic Republic 
therefore seems part process of elimination, part religious 
conviction. 
 
--------------------------- 
The UNPR's Financial Crisis 
--------------------------- 
 
BAMAKO 00000267  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
6.(SBU)  The UNPR's conspicuous lack of representation at any 
level of Malian government, to include the roughly 11,000 
local councilors up for election on April 26, may explain why 
Malian officials have absolved Sangare and the UNPR for 
breaking the vow of secularism that binds political parties 
in Mali.  Pursuing the UNPR for its political sins would also 
likely backfire, bringing Sangare much more attention and 
support that he would otherwise receive.  Incentives for this 
sort of inquiry are even fewer now, as Sangare remains a 
political sideshow with almost no money to organize party 
members or support political campaigns. 
 
7.(SBU)  Sangare said the UNPR received CFA 2 million (USD 
4,000) in public campaign finance funds from the Malian 
government for the 2007 presidential and legislative election 
cycle, and spent USD 3,000 more of its own money collected 
through party member contributions.  Sangare said Malian 
officials refused the UNPR's application for public funds for 
the 2009 local elections due to discrepancies in receipts 
accounting for the public funds received in 2007, and accused 
Malian election officials of instructing him to produce 
fabricated receipts for small payments to local religious 
leaders and party members.  His refusal - both on logistical 
and moral grounds - meant that the UNPR received nothing from 
the government in advance of the April 26 local elections. 
As a result, the UNPR ran candidates in just one Malian town 
- the city of Mopti in central Mali - on April 26, and 
preliminary election results indicate that they faired 
poorly. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
The U.S., AQIM, and the High Council of Islam 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8.(SBU) Sangare was once again effusive in his praise for the 
U.S., citing everything from American respect for religious 
freedoms to open container laws governing the public 
consumption of alcohol.  Sangare said he believed the U.S. 
defends the rights of Muslims more than any other country. 
"Americans," said Sangare, "are a tolerant people, a people 
who respect Islam."  Comparing the U.S. to France, Sangare 
noted that Muslim women in the U.S. can wear head scarves or 
veils without fear of harassment or retribution.  Sangare 
said that certain aspects of U.S. policy toward the Middle 
East, however, had recently introduced what he described as 
an element of "schizophrenia" in to his admiration for 
American values and freedom.  Sangare said he was "marveled" 
by the recent election of President Obama. 
 
9.(SBU) On AQIM, Sangare said he rejected all forms of 
terrorism and killing.  He said the form of Salafism 
practiced by AQIM was at odds with Malian culture, Malian 
traditions of tolerance, and Malian values.  Sangare also 
recounted his running feud with the Malian High Council of 
Islam (HCIM) and its president, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, whose 
2008 election Sangare refused to accept, claiming that Dicko 
and other HCIM members had violated HCIM by-laws.  A 
subsequent court challenge filed by Sangare has gone no 
where, contributing to the division within Mali's al-Sunna or 
"wahhabi" community over Sangare's refusal to recognize Imam 
Dicko as HCIM president. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Comment: Fringe? Yes. Lunatic? No. 
---------------------------------- 
 
10.(SBU)  In March the Embassy helped set up meetings with 
local Muslim leaders for a Canadian Embassy political officer 
dispatched to Mali to help manage the AQIM hostage crisis. 
After meeting with several al-Sunna leaders, including one 
senior "wahhabi" Imam who spent more than twenty years 
working for Embassy Bamako as a motor pool driver, the 
Canadian told us he was stunned to discover that even those 
at the absolute end of the religious spectrum in Mali were 
what he labeled as "Islam light."  Although we might have 
selected a different phrase, this description also applies to 
Sangare and his UNPR, which is about as extreme as one can 
get in Mali.  While Sangare's opposition to a revised Family 
Code, rather convoluted attempts to justify what he described 
as the least invasive form of excision, and vision of an 
Islamic Republic of Mali governed by some form of Sharia law 
are unsettling, Sangare still reveres Malians' traditional 
respect for tolerance and moderation.  Sangare's tempered 
form of political Islam, coupled with the general public and 
Malian government's apparent disinterest in the UNPR 
platform, indicates that neither the UNPR nor Sangare pose 
any threat to these traditions. 
MILOVANOVIC