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Viewing cable 09ASTANA597, NEW TIMES REQUIRE NEW METHODS FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASTANA597 2009-04-06 11:50 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Astana
VZCZCXRO0429
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTA #0597/01 0961150
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061150Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5106
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 1459
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0837
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0524
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1540
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1022
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0935
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2585
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2255
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 000597 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S-ALEC ROSS FROM AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOAGLAND 
STATE ALSO FOR R, P, SCA/CEN, SCA/PPD, EUR/RUS, EUR/CARC, 
EUR/UMB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PROP PINR KPAO RS ZK
SUBJECT: NEW TIMES REQUIRE NEW METHODS FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
REF: A. MOSCOW 839 
     B. MOSCOW 835 
     C. 08 ASTANA 2353 
 
1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
2.  (SBU) As the Obama Administration moves to implement the 
policy objectives determined by the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
strategic review, and also works on the U.S.-Russia 
relationship, it would be useful to reconsider public 
diplomacy practices and ask if we are effectively 
communicating our views in the former Soviet Union.  As I 
have reported since at least 2004 when I was Ambassador in 
Tajikistan, I think we are not.  Since the beginning of the 
Putin era, Russia has insisted on zero-sum thinking vis--vis 
the United States, asserting that its "near abroad" (the 
former Soviet republics, especially in Central Asia) is its 
special or privileged sphere of influence.  The great 
majority of the population in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in 
Central Asia receive their news and information from 
television, including to a large degree Russian television. 
Thus, the Russian political world-view, including anti-U.S. 
black propaganda, predominates.  The most recent egregious 
example was the so-called documentary, The Base, that aired 
in prime time on April 5 on Russian national channel 
Rossiya-TV.  The main idea of The Base was that the Americans 
are intent on conquering Kyrgyzstan, or possibly the whole 
region, and treat the local people like dirt. 
 
3.  (SBU) After a decade of falling resources for U.S. public 
diplomacy, the United States has a difficult time making its 
views known in the Russian-speaking world that covers 11 time 
zones for over 200 million people.  The current 
Russian-language Washington File is welcome, but the amount 
of material is much too limited, generalized, and lacks 
up-to-the-minute policy specificity.  While a 
Russian-language service of a respected international 
broadcaster like CNN or the BCC would be ideal, that's not 
likely to happen any time soon. 
 
4.  (SBU) However, the explosion of interactive social media 
provides another option for the United States to tell its 
story and set the record straight in the Russian-speaking 
world.  Admittedly, Internet penetration, especially in 
Central Asia, is still relatively low.  However, government 
officials (including close monitoring by intelligence 
agencies), journalists, civil society and other opinion 
leaders, and the younger generation in particular, are 
Internet savvy.  For example, the Kazakhstan National Public 
Opinion Survey of February 2009 shows that the Internet has 
grown to be the primary source of political news and 
information for 22% of the population (61% cite Russian TV 
stations).  You-Tube, FaceBook, and their Russian-language 
equivalents are increasingly popular.  Almost every 
Kazakhstani media outlet has its own web site and encourages 
readers' comments.  Prime Minister Karim Masimov has 
established his own blog (journalists frequently report the 
current issues being discussed) and has instructed the other 
ministers to establish their own blogs.  Text messaging and 
even Twittering are increasingly popular among the young. 
 
5.  (SBU) Embassy Moscow reports it is on the eve of 
launching its own networking sites, www.openamerica.ru that 
will be linked to LiveJournal on which the Embassy will post 
videoblogs and short features on educational and cultural 
events of the Embassy.  This is a welcome development. 
Moscow also reports it monitors the Russian blogosphere and 
sees much discussion of U.S. policies and issues, but rarely 
any response or participation from us. 
 
6.  (SBU) It seems to be an opportune moment for the 
Department to establish a full-fledged, multi-(new)media 
Russian-language web site.  While the focus would be on the 
 
ASTANA 00000597  002 OF 002 
 
 
U.S.-Russia relationship and developments in Afghanistan, 
other key policy issues, including U.S. economic leadership, 
should be highlighted.  To attract more users, especially the 
young, daily "soft-power" features should be included.  While 
this would take some investment, we believe that the enhanced 
policy bang for the buck would be well worth it. 
 
7.  (SBU) Such a web site would accomplish a number of 
purposes.  It would, in part, provide the transparency the 
Government of Russia says it wants from us, it would 
communicate broadly with government officials and private 
individuals, and it would have a real multiplier effect, 
since journalists through the former Soviet Union would 
likely quote from it. 
 
8.  (SBU) To establish a pilot project, Embassy Astana would 
be pleased to host a public diplomacy FSO for one year 
over-complement to coordinate closely with the other Missions 
in the region to develop a public-diplomacy strategy for this 
kind of new web site and, war-room-like, to monitor closely 
the Russian-language web sites available and the other mass 
media.  We would envision this officer feeding 
Central-Asia-specific content advice and analysis to the 
Department-based web site. 
 
9.  (U) Embassies Ashgabat, Bishkek, Dushanbe, Moscow, and 
Tashkent have approved this proposal. 
HOAGLAND