Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09ANKARA619, AMBASSADOR MEETS MHP LEADER BAHCELI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09ANKARA619.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ANKARA619 2009-04-29 14:57 2011-04-20 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO2814
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHAK #0619/01 1191457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291457Z APR 09 ZDK CITING RUEHZC #4431 1191815
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9530
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 1356
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 5680
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUETIAA/NSACSS FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019 
TAGS: OSCE PGOV TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS MHP LEADER BAHCELI 
 
ANKARA 00000619  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Three points stood out during Ambassador's 
April 24 discussion with Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 
Chairman Devlet Bahceli.  First, Bahceli is clearly still 
concerned about the image the US holds of the MHP, going out 
of his way to portray the party as mainstream and moderate. 
Second, the MHP is cautiously optimistic about relations with 
the US, wanting a more concrete understanding of what the 
Turkish-US "strategic partnership" entails.  Finally, and 
surprisingly, Bahceli opened up on the issue of the Armenian 
diaspora, practically challenging President Obama to 
recognize the genocide.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Ambassador paid a courtesy call visit to MHP Chairman 
Devlet Bahceli at the party headquarters building on April 
24.  This was Ambassador's first tete-a-tete with Bahceli, 
though they had met twice previously, once in the context of 
President Obama's visit to Ankara.  In attendance were Party 
Secretary General Cihan Pacaci and Istanbul MP Ambassador 
Deniz Bolukbasi. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador congratulated Bahceli on his party's 
success in the March nation-wide local elections.  He 
expressed US support for Turkey's democratic system and 
reinforced President Obama's message of support for Turkish 
EU membership.  Ambassador praised MHP's support for both of 
these goals, both as junior partner in the reform-minded 
coalition government of 1999-2002, and as an active and 
constructive opposition party in Parliament. 
 
4. (C) Bahceli emphasized the MHP's role as a constructive, 
nonconfrontational player in the political system.  And 
lamented that the media has not been kind to it.  He thanked 
the Ambassador for his praise and noted that many of the 
economic reforms that the MHP had undertaken while in 
government have acted as bulwarks against the current global 
financial crisis.  He was careful to point out that though 
the MHP is a nationalist party, it is not racist; the 
nationalism it espouses is one of bringing the people of 
Turkey together, not of driving them apart.  In evaluating 
MHP's success in local elections, he noted that the MHP 
deliberately pulled its punches in the largely Kurdish 
Southeast, for fear of sparking conflict:  "We will never let 
tension prevail, even if it causes us to lose elections."  He 
argued that a hostile media and "certain think tanks" have 
given the US administration an incorrect understanding of the 
MHP, which is detrimental to Turkish-US relations. 
 
5. (C) Bahceli went to great lengths to praise the history of 
Turkish-US friendship, noting that despite a number of 
"sensitive points" the relationship is strong and important. 
He touched upon some of the uncertainty that MHP (and a large 
sector of Turkish society) feels about the relationship in 
calling for a stronger definition of what it is that 
constitutes the "strategic partnership" Turkey and the US 
enjoy.  He asserted that both sides need to be honest and 
open with each other in order to optimize their interests in 
a balanced manner.  In this way mutual confidence will build 
and carry the countries past their sensitivities. 
 
6. (C) This wider discussion served as an entree for Bahceli 
to address the issue of US political debate concerning the 
Armenian genocide issue.  In strong, emotional, but not angry 
terms, Bahceli said that the US and Turkey were on a 
mutually-detrimental cycle, in which the months leading up to 
the April 24 Day of Remembrance fuel debate over whether it 
will be this year that the US president will utter the word 
"genocide."  According to him, this foments an atmosphere of 
anti-Americanism, particularly among the youngest generation 
of voters who have experienced this political tension every 
year of their lives.  "Whatever the US is going to say, let 
it be said now," pleaded Bahceli, rather than let the issue 
continue to be a festering sore in Turkish-American relations. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  Bahceli's message underscores fundamental 
assumptions by the Turkish polity as a whole.  Bahceli has 
made it his career goal to transform the MHP from the 
thuggish band of nationalist brutes it was in the 1970s into 
a disciplined, respectable member of the political system. 
He has largely succeeded in this goal, but this conversation 
and others we have had at lower levels of the party once 
 
ANKARA 00000619  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
again emphasize that the MHP is still sensitive about its 
public image.  Bahceli's comments on Turkish-US relations 
come from a perspective that, despite his praise, "strategic 
partnership" does not live up to its name from the Turkish 
perspective.  Many Turks perceive a double standard by which 
strategic partnerships with Britain, Israel, Japan, and 
Australia are codified and work flawlessly but their own is 
intentionally defined in vague terms and fraught with 
difficulty.  His challenge to the US to finally put the 
Armenian genocide issue to rest reflects a wide perception 
that genocide is being used as a political tool:  a large 
swathe of Turkish society believes that the US intends 
eventually to declare the events of 1915 to constitute 
genocide, but maintains the fiction of debate as leverage in 
negotiations with the Turkish government.  Bahceli's 
challenge is also undeniably self-serving; the MHP stands to 
benefit most at the polls from the emotional reaction that a 
US recognition of an Armenian genocide would bring.  He would 
lead the charge to trash relations with the US were we to use 
the term "genocide."  He has been trying to make political 
hay, claiming the President's use of "Meds Yeghern" equates 
to "genocide" ever since the President's Armenian Remembrance 
Day message.  End comment. 
 
8. (C) Leadership note:  Devlet Bahceli is an incredibly 
soft-spoken man in private conversation, so much so that he 
often is speaking in a whisper.  He is also not a natural 
politician, often coming across as awkward, unfocused, or 
confused.  On heartfelt issues, such as the Armenian genocide 
issue in this meeting, he can be impressive, however.  At 
such times, he conjures up his voice -- literally speaking 
from his core -- and speaks eloquently, fluidly, and with 
deep emotion.  End note. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey