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Viewing cable 09DHAHRAN8, SHI'A UNREST CONTINUES TO BUILD AFTER THE MEDINA INCIDENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAHRAN8 2009-03-02 16:22 2011-07-02 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL ** Dhahran
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/22/116306/wikileaks-saudi-crackdown-on-shiites.html
P 021622Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0008
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 
IRAN COLLECTIVE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L DHAHRAN 000008 
 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NEA/ARP FOR JOSHUA HARRIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/2/2019 
TAGS: KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER SA IR LE
SUBJECT: SHI'A UNREST CONTINUES TO BUILD AFTER THE MEDINA INCIDENT 
 
REF: 09 RIYADH 346, 09 RIYADH 270 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph Kenny, Consul General, EXEC, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1. (C) Key Points: 
----------------- 
 
-- The Shi'a clashes with Saudi security forces in Medina in 
February have set off a wave of demonstrations, protests, and 
calls on the government for justice. 
 
-- Members of the Shi'a communities from the Eastern Province 
were involved in the Baqi'a cemetery incident (ref A). 
 
-- Several foreign Shi'a personalities from Lebanon, Iraq, and 
Iran have publicly condemned the alleged acts of the Saudi 
religious police and security forces in Medina. 
 
-- Around 150 Shi'a leaders went to Riyadh to meet with the King 
to discuss the growing frustration among the Shi'a of Saudi 
Arabia.  King Abdullah did not meet with them. 
 
-- Several Shi'a leaders warned that tempers are rising in their 
communities and they are concerned that violence may break out. 
 
 
2. (C) Comment: 
--------------- 
 
-- The King's bold cabinet shakeup earlier this year left a sour 
taste with the Shi'a as their calls for more representation in 
the SAG went largely ignored.  The incident in Medina that 
followed has only provoked an already restless population. 
Though post has not found any evidence that Iran or Hezbollah 
orchestrated or instigated the events at Baqi'a cemetery, they 
will almost certainly find a more welcoming audience as Saudi 
Shi'a frustrations mount.  It is evident to post that the calm 
and cool heads of the Shi'a mainstream leadership are losing 
influence over their communities and are scrambling to maintain 
their credibility as legitimate and effective Shi'a 
representatives.  Post agrees with many of our Shi'a 
interlocutors that a meeting between King Abdullah and a number 
of prominent Shi'a would go a long way to easing tensions. 
 
3. (C) THE MEDINA SPARK...  The clashes between Shi'a pilgrims 
and Saudi security forces in Medina that began February 20 (ref 
A) have enraged Shi'a communities across the Kingdom.  Since the 
Medina incident, Shi'a leaders in the Eastern Province (EP) have 
been scrambling to calm their communities and call on the King 
to take action and address the discrimination against Shi'a in 
Saudi Arabia.  The Sunni and Shi'a blogospheres have been more 
active than usual laying strong accusations against each other, 
some more credible than others.  One contact from Qatif who was 
present in Medina at the time of the incident told PolOff how he 
witnessed the harassment and arrest of his teenage nephew by the 
religious police over his manner of prayer, highlighting the 
instigative and exaggerated behavior of the religious police 
towards the Shi'a in Medina. 
 
4. (C) ...STARTS A FIRE IN THE EAST.  Medina has captured the 
attention of the Shi'a across the Kingdom, especially in the 
large Shi'a communities in the EP.  In the Shi'a oasis of Qatif 
and nearby Safwa, small groups of protesters totaling in the 
hundreds took to the streets on Friday, February 27, but were 
quickly dispersed by Saudi security forces.  Several Shi'a 
contacts confirmed reports of gunfire by Saudi security forces 
in Qatif, though the shots were fired in the air in order to 
disperse the crowds.  On Saturday, February 28 some Shi'a 
parents in Qatif and al-Ahsa did not send their children to 
school in protest of the Medina incident.  Participation in this 
boycott was not widespread, but some sources said that at 
certain schools more than 70% of students were absent.  A 
handful of smaller protests took place in the EP over the past 
couple of weeks and more calls for protests this week have been 
made on several blogs.  Several residents of Qatif have told 
PolOff that since the Medina incident the presence of police and 
Saudi security forces has increased in the Shi'a towns of Qatif 
and Safwa. 
 
5. (C) FOREIGN INFLUENCE.  The Medina impact has even reached 
abroad with Lebanon's top Shi'a cleric, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed 
Hussein Fadlallah, calling on the SAG to punish the policemen 
accused of beating pilgrims.  Similar condemnations have been 
made by Shi'a clerics in Iran and on an Iraqi website affiliated 
with Muqtada al-Sadr.  Several prominent Saudi Shi'a have 
dismissed suggestions of Iranian or Hezbollah influence or 
instigation at Baqi'a cemetery as "Wahabbi propaganda." 
However, they welcome the mounting international pressure and 
support from anywhere they can get it. 
 
6. (C) PATIENCE IS RUNNING THIN.  XXXXXXXXXXXX(protect), an 
elected municipal council member and prominent Shi'a leadership 
figure, told PolOff that he and other Shi'a leaders are "trying 
to reduce tempers" in their respective communities.  However, he 
warned that "the root for trouble is there" and that the 
potential for violence in Saudi could be worse than the 
"sectarian violence in Iraq."  XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), a 
high-profile Saudi human rights activist, voiced his concerns 
that the Shi'a youth will resort to violence unless the SAG 
takes action.  XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), a moderately influential 
Shi'a sheikh, told PolOff that if the Shi'a leadership does not 
meet with the King, then their followers will view them as 
having failed.  All of the contacts were especially concerned 
with the stabbing of the Shi'a Sheikh Jawad al-Jaraadi by 
"Wahabbi extremists" in Medina and the fear of future sectarian 
attacks going unpunished.  These warnings echo previous Dhahran 
reporting about increasingly frustrated and restless Shi'a youth 
(ref B). 
 
7. (C) SHI'A LEADERS WANT TO MEET WITH THE KING.  In an 
unprecedented move, about 150 Shi'a community leaders from 
Qatif, al-Ahsa, Medina and Najran went to Riyadh to request a 
meeting with King Abdullah.  They went to discuss the 
deteriorating situation between the Shi'a and Sunni communities 
and communicate the urgency needed to quell rising tensions. 
According to several different high-level Shi'a sources in the 
EP, this delegation would have demanded the following 
deliverables: 1) the immediate release of all Shi'a arrested 
during the events in Medina, 2) a full and independent 
investigation into the incidents in Medina and justice for those 
who broke any laws, and 3) the appointment of Shi'a to 
ministerial positions and the Shura Council.  However, sources 
said that King Abdullah denied a meeting on the evening of March 
1 at which time the delegation departed Riyadh and returned to 
their respective communities.  Shi'a leaders such as Sheikh 
Hassan al-Saffar continue to push to meet with the King. 
 
8. (C) DIVIDED WE STAND.  According to one source who was in 
Medina at the time, shortly after the incident at the Baqi'a 
cemetery, Sheikh Qadim of Medina led a delegation of Shi'a from 
al-Ahsa, Qatif, and Medina to meet with Prince Abdulaziz bin 
Majed bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the provincial governor of Medina. 
The source noted that this was a sign of the Shi'a uniting 
behind this case and believes that this intervention led to the 
release of some detainees.  However, XXXXXXXXXXXX told 
PolOff that in reality the Saudi Shi'a remain divided among 
regional factions and are pursuing competing agendas and 
interests.  He noted that even the delegation that went to 
Riyadh did not speak with one voice, which he remarked is only 
helping the SAG in their efforts to "divide and conquer" the 
Shi'a. 
 
 
KENNY