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Viewing cable 09COLOMBO359, FRAUD SUMMARY - SRI LANKA
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09COLOMBO359 | 2009-03-30 11:32 | 2011-08-25 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Colombo |
VZCZCXRO3687
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDE RUEHHT RUEHMT RUEHVC
DE RUEHLM #0359/01 0891132
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301132Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9683
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0036
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2834
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 9128
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0162
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 0373
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2463
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 0001
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 6449
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0997
RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER 0007
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0469
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3679
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1486
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8481
RUEHHT/AMCONSUL HAMILTON 0001
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1394
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6711
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0377
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0493
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4829
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0253
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0001
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1259
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0990
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0321
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 5757
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0708
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 COLOMBO 000359
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; ADRESSEE POSTS FOR FRAUD
PREVENTION MANAGERS; BANGKOK FOR RCO WILL LAIDLAW; KUWAIT FOR
WILLIAM DOWERS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CE
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - SRI LANKA
REF: COLOMBO 597
-------------------------
Country Conditions
-------------------------
¶1. Political insecurity, economic and population pressures, and the
lure of earning hard currency put pressure on Sri Lankans of all
ages and classes of society to migrate legally and illegally to the
United States. The violent civil conflict between the Sri Lankan
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) over more
than two decades has created significant instability. Severe lags
in socioeconomic development persist, particularly in the north and
east of the country. Throughout the country, economic conditions
are relatively poor, with high inflation and weak government
spending on social services. Large numbers of Sri Lankans
traditionally migrate for employment to the Middle East, Europe,
East Asia, and North America, through both legal and illegal means.
Early indications are that the global economic slowdown will
strongly impact Sri Lankans working both domestically and abroad.
¶2. The consular section sees medium to high levels of fraud from
all three major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka: Sinhalese, Tamil and
Muslim. (Many Muslims speak the Tamil language but do not identify
with ethnic Tamils and are considered a separate ethnic group in Sri
Lanka.) Despite the country's relatively small population and lack
of direct flights to the U.S., Sri Lankans represent the fourth most
frequently offloaded nationality on U.S.-bound flights, according to
2008 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) statistics.
¶3. The largest Sri Lankan diaspora community is located in Toronto,
Canada, where over 250,000 people of Sri Lankan origin (primarily
ethnic Tamils) live. Severe restrictions imposed by the Canadian
government on Sri Lankan visitor travel results in many mala fide
travelers applying at Embassy Colombo hoping to reach Canada over
the land border. Within the U.S., preferred destinations for both
legal and illegal immigrants are New York and California. Human
smugglers charge as much as $40,000 a person for passage from Sri
Lanka to North America.
-----------------------------------
NIV Fraud - General Trends
-----------------------------------
¶4. Sri Lankan mala fide travelers with an ultimate destination in
North America typically have family or friends waiting with a job
and housing. There are a significant number of human smugglers and
visa fraud facilitators operating in Sri Lanka, charging as much as
$10,000 for false documentation to submit with a U.S. visa
application, and up to $25,000 for a "full service" of documents
plus other facilitation, such as by posing as family members or
business associates of the buyer. Post sees false family
relationships; fictitious marriages and divorces; false financial,
employment and academic documentation; ringers posing as members of
sports and entertainment groups; fraudulent crew applicants; false
religious workers; and even visa fraud rings involving high-level
government officials.
COLOMBO 00000359 002 OF 012
¶5. Post sees significant numbers of seemingly non-qualified host
government officials and their domestic employees applying for A or
G visas. We continue to see problems with the payment of
appropriate wages to A3/G5 applicants working for Sri Lankan and
Middle Eastern diplomats in the United States. Interviews with
returning applicants indicate that domestics working for Sri Lankan
diplomats are rarely paid more than $100 per month while in the
United States. The Sri Lankan government has tried a number of
tactics, ranging from claiming these domestics are actually
government employees (applying for A2 status) to claiming that they
are paid in cash, to avoid paying U.S. minimum or prevailing wages.
Another trend has been for Sri Lankans illegally in the United
States (mostly B2 visa overstays) to adjust to A2 status by
obtaining clerical jobs at foreign embassies in Washington, D.C.;
many of these adjustment of status applications are approved despite
long periods of illegal presence, sometimes more than a decade.
There are indications that these embassy jobs sometimes do not
exist, and Post suspects active facilitation of this type on the
part of certain foreign embassies, particularly African and other
Asian missions, as well as the Sri Lankan Embassy in Washington,
D.C.
¶6. Sri Lankans use a variety of techniques, from naove and obvious
to complex and convincing, to fraudulently obtain visas. Small-time
document vendors provide fake vital records and business documents
that are relatively easy to spot, while sophisticated human
smugglers provide more convincing identity and financial documents
that are difficult to detect. We have seen several cases where
genuine Sri Lankan entry stamps were purchased at the airport,
usually back-dated to hide overstays in the United States. Post has
seen several instances in which government ministers and Members of
Parliament or their Secretaries have sponsored mala fide applicants
for training or other seemingly legitimate purposes of travel -
including official delegations - after which members of the party
have remained as illegal immigrants. As a result, Embassy Colombo
very carefully interviews all government-related traveling parties
to the U.S. Post has documentary evidence of a Second Secretary
attached to the Sri Lankan mission in the Washington, D.C. who
provided coaching services for her cousin's nonimmigrant visa
application to help her join her illegal alien husband in the United
States.
----------------------------------
NIV Fraud - Student Visas
----------------------------------
¶7. Post has seen a new trend of mala fide travelers increasingly
targeting the F and J visa categories. Over the past six months,
the refusal rate for F1 student visas has surged to over 49%, as
compared to 31% for the same period a year ago and 24% in 2007.
Although the total number of F1 student visa applications rose by
46% from 2007 to 2008, the number of F1 applications approved rose
by only 11%, indicating that the majority of new interest in student
visas is coming from unqualified applicants. Post's assessment is
that most of these students have mala fide immigrant intent, and we
are currently conducting a validation study of student visas which
is expected to result in a standalone cable later this year.
COLOMBO 00000359 003 OF 012
¶8. Both bona fide and mala fide student visa applicants often pay
large sums of money to "agents" or "educational consultants" who
steer them to particular schools and provide interview coaching.
These agents often have exclusive contracts with schools in the U.S.
which pay them based on the number of students recruited, with no
penalty for those who are no-shows, withdraw, or otherwise violate
their student status. Post has also seen examples of Sri Lankan
students already in the U.S. attempting to facilitate other
prospective students after gaining student employment jobs in
college admissions offices.
¶9. Community colleges and language schools seem to be preferred
targets of unqualified and mala fide Sri Lankan applicants. The
results of an initial validation study showed the rate of SEVIS
non-compliance to be distressingly high for students issued visas
for two-year associate degree and standalone language programs.
Perhaps in response to Post's increased scrutiny of community
college applicants, an increasing number of students are applying to
four-year colleges then immediately transferring upon arrival to
language schools or community colleges where the number of classroom
hours is lower and less rigorously enforced; this enables students
to remain nominally enrolled while also working illegally on a full
time basis. In just one example, one university in Texas reported
to the Embassy that a group of 14 Sri Lankan students showed up in
September 2008 demanding to be issued with social security numbers
upon enrollment; when the school refused, the students transferred
en masse to language schools or other community colleges in the New
York area. Post has also seen numerous cases in which students were
clearly not enrolled full-time (based on their transcripts), but
were nonetheless reported by schools as being SEVIS-compliant. Such
instances, which typically involve community colleges or language
schools, and occasionally very small universities, enable Sri Lankan
students to work illegally and still appear to comply with their
student status; these offending institutions are well-known to our
mala fide applicant pool.
¶10. Otherwise-qualified Sri Lankan students also appear to target
schools with generous work-study options. Post recently learned
that one reputable midwestern university long favored by Sri Lankan
applicants ofers students the opportunity to earn academic creits
while working 40 hours a week over multiple semesters anywhere in
the U.S., with no requirement that they attend any classes and very
limited contact with academic faculty. The parent of a graduating
student brought us a newspaper article from her U.S. university in
which her daughter advised prospective international students to
find "anyone" willing to pose as their sponsoring family member for
the visa application, with the assurances that the student would be
able to earn enough money while studying in the U.S. to fully cover
the $20,000+ per year educational costs. Post is baffled that such
liberal work-study arrangements are allowed by SEVP.
¶11. Other Western missions in Colombo have shared similar concerns
regarding student visa applications to their countries from Sri
Lankan nationals. In September 2008, Australia upgraded Sri Lanka
to its strictest category for prospective students, highlighting Sri
Lanka as one of the worst violators of its student visa program
worldwide. In order to qualify under the tough new conditions,
prospective Sri Lankan undergraduate students must now show that
COLOMBO 00000359 004 OF 012
they have had three full years of tuition and living expenses
on-hand in an earmarked savings account for at least six months
before they can qualify for a student visa. Anecdotal reports from
local Fulbright Commission staff and others suggest that interest in
U.S. student visas from both well- and poorly-qualified students is
increasing as a result of these strict new Australian requirements,
which the local media have described as "humiliating."
¶12. Post has also seen mala fide applicants increasingly targeting
the J1 visa category, often with the involvement of local agents.
In one case, an Israeli national B1/B2 visa holder with a business
card listing his U.S. residential address came to the Embassy to
complain after Post refused a large group of prospective Sri Lankan
J1 hospitality industry workers he was attempting to facilitate in
connivance with a local "agent." Most of these J1 applicants, who
earned an average of $50/month in hotels and restaurants in Sri
Lanka, had borrowed thousands of dollars to pay for flights and the
$1000 agent fee, in return for the promise of menial hospitality
industry work in the U.S.
¶13. Of particular concern across all sections of the Embassy is the
fact that a number of U.S. Government-sponsored exchange visitors
have failed to return to Sri Lanka over the past few years. These
travelers entered the U.S. as part of the International Visitor
Program (IVP) or similar USG-funded exchange programs, and made
successful asylum claims. Post learns of these cases only when the
asylum claimant's family members later apply for Visas 92 FTJ
status. In order to reach out to ethnic minority Sri Lankans and
those from less-developed parts of the country, Post attempts to
allocate many of its visitor slots to individuals from these
categories. However, general NIV trends in Sri Lanka show that
ethnic minorities and those from conflict-affected areas also
represent the greatest overstay and asylum claim risk. Efforts are
being made to address these competing concerns; beginning with this
year's IVP cycle, Post will work more closely with the nominating
committee to take into account factors that make nominees not only
good candidates for an IVP, but also likely to qualify for visas
under INA 214b in their consular interview.
---------------------------------
IV Fraud - General Trends
---------------------------------
¶14. Colombo's IV fraud mostly involves false marriages and family
relationships. While marriages based on love affairs are increasing,
arranged marriages are still the norm in Sri Lanka, especially in
more rural areas. Even with field visits, verifying the validity of
relationships is often difficult. Post is particularly cautious
with K fiance visas. On many occasions post has found that a
relationship is not genuine, especially when the age gap between the
spouses is significant. In one case, Post found that an American
citizen had filed a K1 petition to marry the younger sister of his
current wife, whom he had not divorced. In another, Post recently
detected a twice-divorced U.S. citizen of Sri Lankan origin
petitioning for her own brother as her newly married husband with a
fraudulently obtained local marriage certificate. A surprise
neighborhood check on a Sri Lankan man who claimed to have divorced
his wife a few years before to marry an American woman recently
COLOMBO 00000359 005 OF 012
revealed that he still lives with his previous wife and four
children, including the eldest, who has also been petitioned by the
American. Post has also encountered several cases in which the
wives and/or children of Sri Lankans living illegally in the U.S.
are petitioned under K1, K3 or IR1 categories by American citizens
they have either never seen, met at internet chat-rooms, or married
after surprisingly short visits to Sri Lanka. Although Post returns
such petitions to USCIS for revocation, the lack of consequences for
American citizens filing fraudulent immigration petitions means this
trend will likely continue unabated.
--------------------------
Diversity Visa Fraud
--------------------------
¶15. Sri Lanka now ranks as the fourth largest recipient of
Diversity Visas (DVs) in Asia, with 792 provisional winners notified
for 2009, a rapid increase from 383 in 2008. As Sri Lankans have
discovered the DV, they are also learning the rules and increasingly
applying well-honed NIV fraud techniques on behalf of DV winners,
often through certificates with falsified education examination
results. To counter this trend, Post obtains examination results
directly from the Sri Lankan Department of Examinations, and we
require this official certificate for any DV applicant applying
under their academic credentials. This approach has resulted in
detecting two such fraud cases in DV 2008 program, including
attempted falsification of the 'One-Day Collection Cards' - a tool
innovated by the Embassy Colombo and the Sri Lanka Examination
Department to deter fraud. In late February 2009, post saw its first
fraud in DV 2009 program with a fraudulent examination results sheet
from a school. A significant number of Sri Lankan DV winners are
resident outside of the country, often as guest workers in the
Middle East or Europe. Colombo encourages other posts to contact us
to assist with verification of all documents related to Sri Lankan
DV winners. Two Sri Lankan DV winners working in the Middle East
were refused visas last year after Post determined that their
examination results had been forged; Post strongly suspects that
additional Sri Lankan DV winners have been able to take advantage of
the fact that U.S. Embassies elsewhere are unfamiliar with standard
Sri Lankan educational certificates.
-------------------------------
ACS and Passport Fraud
-------------------------------
¶16. Although Post does not see much fraud in passport and
citizenship applications, Canadian and British Airport Liaison
Officers, who assist Sri Lankan authorities in identifying mala-fide
travelers at the airport, occasionally ask for assistance in
verifying suspect U.S. passport and/or U.S. identity documents. Mala
fide Sri Lankan, Indian and Chinese travelers are often intercepted
during screening at the airport and are either in possession of
photo substituted U.S. passports or are imposters. Several such
offenders, mostly of Chinese origin, were detained in remand prison
during 2008 and have since been deported to their countries of
origin. A dual American and Canadian citizen of Sri Lanka minority
origin was detained in November 2008 after Colombo airport
authorities determined that his U.S. passport had been tampered
COLOMBO 00000359 006 OF 012
with. Diplomatic Security subsequently opened an investigation,
which is ongoing, after a suspicious travel pattern and his
employment information suggested that the individual may be involved
with human smuggling. This individual has since disappeared,
abandoning his application for a new U.S. passport.
--------------------
Adoption Fraud
--------------------
¶17. The Immigrant Visa Unit issued 2 adoption visas during the
fiscal year 2008, the same number issued in 2007. The Sri Lankan
government does not favor foreign adoptions. Sri Lanka is a
signatory to the Hague Convention; adoptions are governed by the
Department of Child Care and Probation Service. Foreign prospective
adoptive parents are not allowed to locate children for adoption
themselves, and adoption by single persons is not permitted. To
date Post has not uncovered any fraud in our adoption processing.
--------------------------
Use of DNA Testing
--------------------------
¶18. In cases in which Post cannot sufficiently establish a bona
fide relationship due to a lack of documentary evidence (mostly IV
and Asylum cases), applicants are given the option of taking a DNA
test. The process takes 2 - 3 weeks and costs around $1000. Post
has not encountered any negative DNA results so far, but on occasion
applicants will refuse DNA testing and abandon applications,
indicating that testing acts as a deterrent in applications
involving false relationships.
--------------------------------------------- --
Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud
--------------------------------------------- --
¶19. Post would welcome the opportunity to work more closely with
DHS in looking at ways to make the processing and assessment of
asylum claims more robust. There is a disturbingly high level of
fraud seen in Sri Lankan Visas 92 cases. In most asylum Follow To
Join (FTJ) cases, establishing relationships to the petitioner is
very difficult. Asylum FTJ beneficiaries are typically coached to
provide as little information as possible, sometimes making it
difficult to determine whether the beneficiary even knows the
petitioner, much less is their spouse or child. Post attempts to
verify all birth and marriage documents, but occasionally applicants
have no identity documents available. In addition to the usual
problems associated with arranged marriages, we often see applicants
who present fraudulent identity documents but have positive DNA
tests results, leaving us to deal with a genuine biological
relationship but no idea what anyone's true identity is.
¶20. Of greatest concern is that the overwhelming majority of
successful asylum claims made by Sri Lankan petitioners appear to be
based on bogus stories of persecution. This is particularly
worrisome given that, according to official statistics from the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of
asylum applications made by Sri Lankans worldwide rose 24 percent in
COLOMBO 00000359 007 OF 012
2008, making it the fifth most rapidly increasing source of new
asylum claims.
¶21. Although Post believes that there is persecution in Sri Lanka
which is significant enough for favorable asylum findings, in our
experience the vast majority of individuals who are experiencing
true persecution within Sri Lanka simply do not have the means to
get out of the country in the first place. In many cases, local
government administrative structures prevent truly persecuted
minorities from obtaining valid international travel documents; the
alternative of using a human smuggler or document vendor is
incredibly expensive by Sri Lankan standards, often up to $40,000 to
convey one person to North America. A Sri Lankan who is able to
make it to the U.S. or elsewhere to file an asylum claim typically
has significant financial and social resources that are simply not
consistent with their asylum claim. For example, a large number of
successful Sri Lankan gem merchants with extensive U.S. and European
travel to participate in international gem exhibitions recently
attempted to claim asylum in Canada. In another case, a well-off
employee of Sri Lankan Airlines admitted to us that he sent his wife
and children to the U.S. to make an asylum claim so that they would
have a better standard of living; he continues to work here, making
regular trips back and forth for the children's birthdays (although
his tourist visa was cancelled following this admission).
¶22. Other gross misstatements range from petitioners claiming to be
a members of a persecuted ethnic minority when they are not in fact
of that ethnicity, to stories of harassment that contradict known
facts. Unfortunately, the stories of prospective asylum claimants
seem to be taken at face value when asylum claims are adjudicated in
the U.S. Contributing to our doubts about many claims is the fact
that successful asylum claimants often later return to Sri Lanka to
wed other Sri Lankans or for regular tourist visits, casting serious
doubt on any "credible fear" claim. We also often see asylee
claimants who have spent many months living in otherwise-safe second
countries such as Canada, East Asia or the Middle East before
deciding to make their claim in the U.S., where they felt economic
opportunities would be greatest.
¶23. Many occasions of aliens of Sri Lankan origin in possession of
counterfeit US Legal Permanent Resident Cards (widely known as
'Green Cards') have been reported in the recent past. Some of them
have been caught at the airport and have paid as much as $9000 per
card. Two such mala-fide travelers of Sri Lankan origin who tried
to fly to the US with fake LPR cards were intercepted and deported
from Singapore in 2008.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶24. Post experiences a very high level of cooperation from many Sri
Lankan government agencies. Post receives positive assistance on
matters ranging from simple document verification to complex
cooperation on fraud cases over long time periods. Good
relationships are maintained through regular outreach and meetings
with key officials. Additionally, Post's full-time FSN fraud
investigator's excellent range of contacts has proven invaluable in
COLOMBO 00000359 008 OF 012
advancing our goals in fraud management. Cooperation with local law
enforcement has proved essential in maintaining Post's successful
"zero-tolerance" policy towards false and fraudulent documentation.
Nearly all applicants turned over to Sri Lankan authorities are
charged and prosecuted under Sri Lankan law. Post regularly works
together with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and its
Anti-Human Smuggling Investigation Bureau, as well as the Colombo
Fraud Investigation Bureau (CFIB). Furthermore, Post cooperates with
the Immigration & Emigration Department, State Intelligence Service,
the Registrar General's Department, and the Attorney General's
Department.
-------------------
Arrest Protocol
-------------------
¶25. Post has implemented an arrest program in cooperation with
local immigration authorities and police. When Post encounters
forged documents in the course of an NIV interview, we contact the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or the Colombo Fraud
Investigations Department (CFIB) of the Sri Lanka Police, and
applicants are taken into custody, often on the same day as the visa
interview. Most are successfully convicted of felony crimes under
Sri Lankan law. This policy, and the arrests it generates, has
proven very effective in combating prospective fraudsters. The
program was introduced in late 2002, and the number of arrests
peaked with 84 in 2004. Since then, the number of arrests has
fallen steadily each year, with 37 in 2007 and only 10 in 2008.
Other Western missions without similar arrest programs anecdotally
report that they see a much higher level of document fraud,
demonstrating that this program is a clear deterrent.
¶26. Post's arrest program has led to a number of high level arrests
and prosecutions. In early 2008, the discovery of a page
substitution intended hide a previous visa refusal by another
diplomatic mission led to the arrest by the CID of an important
document forger linked to a terrorism ring of more than fifty
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leaders, cadres and
supporters (Reftel). In July 2008, a passport fraudster who
attempted to hide a previous deportation from the U.S. was
successfully convicted with enhanced punitive jail terms and fines.
In late 2008, Post determined that the head of a local NGO for the
handicapped was in fact a visa facilitator who had already assisted
three individuals in obtaining Canadian visas for $18,000 each; he
was arrested by the CID along with five clients posing as NGO
supporters going to the U.S. for training. In February 2009, Post
discovered a set of forged Maldivian and Sri Lankan immigration
entry / exit stamps on the passport of a Sri Lankan claiming that
his fictitious Maldivian employer was sending him for training to
the U.S.
¶27. Though Post sees an increasing level of fraud in its IV cases,
this typically does not rise to the level of an arrestable offense
under Sri Lankan law. Instead, these cases are simply sent back for
revocation. In early 2009, a Diversity Visa applicant was arrested
with fraudulent documents, Post's first DV arrest in over five
years.
COLOMBO 00000359 009 OF 012
--------------------------------------------- -----
Applicable Local Laws and Punishments
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶28. If an applicant submits a forged document as part of their
application, they are charged with tendering or forging a fraudulent
document under Sections 452-459 of the Sri Lankan Penal Code. The
maximum sentence is up to seven years in jail with hard or light
labor and a Rs. 5,000 fine (USD $50 equivalent). Depending on the
seriousness of the fraud attempted, someone who submits fake
documents can commonly expect a jail term of 6 months to 2 years,
suspended for 2-5 years, with a $25-$50 fine. Fraud involving
passports or visas carries stricter penalties under Section 45 of
the Sri Lankan Immigration & Emigration Act of 1948, as amended by
Acts in 1998 and 2006. The maximum punishment for passport fraud is
five years in jail and a fine of Rs. 500,000 (nearly USD $5,000).
Recent amendments to Sri Lankan law have relaxed the bail
provisions. Most offenders can now post bail immediately after
appearing before the courts, whereas in the past such offenders were
required to spend from a few weeks to several months in remand
prison before being allowed to post bail. Local law enforcement
authorities report that passport and visa fraud have increased as
result, and they expect such trends to further escalate in 2009.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorist Travel
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶29. The trend of increased numbers of Sri Lankans and other
third-country nationals, such as Indians and Chinese, using
fraudulent or altered documents for travel to Europe and North
America continues. Sri Lankan nationals mostly target travel
documents of third-countries like Malaysia, Singapore, the U.K.,
Germany and Caribbean countries. The number of Sri Lankan
deportees from Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and the UAE has increased
significantly and irregular Malaysian travel documents have become
the preferred documents of mala fide Sri Lankan passengers, while
their hub port has shifted from Bangkok to Kuala Lumpur. Human
smugglers charge as much as $40,000 a person for passage from Sri
Lanka to North America.
------------------------------------------
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations
------------------------------------------
¶30. Post does not have an ARSO-I. However, consular officers often
consult the RSO FSN Investigator during the course of routine
investigations on visa cases, a partnership which has proven
fruitful in dealing with Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities.
During November 2008, the Consular Section worked closely with DS on
the investigation of a U.S. passport tampering case with suspected
links to U.S. and Canadian companies.
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry
--------------------------------------------- ---------
COLOMBO 00000359 010 OF 012
¶31. Fraudulent civil documentation is quite common in Sri Lanka
and can be easily acquired. For instance, anyone can fraudulently
obtain a genuine passport with falsified details by paying about
$250 to a peddler. Other civil documents, identity documents, court
documents and counterfeit entry/exit stamps can be easily purchased.
A few years ago the country's National Identity issuing
department's chief was arrested for selling National Identity Cards
to fraudsters, including terrorism suspects. Civil registry
functions are inefficient due to a lack of automation; all documents
are kept on file in countless stacks of paper that must be
hand-checked and are often missing or incomplete. Because document
fraud is rampant, document verification is a routine part of all IV,
DV and Asylee Follow to Join petition processing. A staff member
must physically go to the Registrar's office to check documents,
making the verification process extremely time consuming. Other
Western missions in Sri Lanka require petitioners in suspect cases
to pay a $500-$1000 "verification fee," then contract with local
agents to conduct the legwork with the government.
----------------------------------
Areas of Particular Concern
---------------------------------
¶32. Post experiences positive and consistent collaboration with
other Embassis, particularly the Canadian and British High
Commissions in Colombo. Canada has the largest Sri Lankan Diaspora
population in world, and our close cooperation with the Canadian and
British Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) has proven effective in
spotting trends and mala-fide applicants. Further, our three
missions have co-hosted airline and airport staff training seminars
on our countries' proper travel documents, their basic security
features, and applicable visa categories.
¶33. From our close collaboration with the Canadian and British
ALOs, Post is aware of major security concerns at Sri Lanka's single
international airport, Bandaranaiyke International Airport, located
near the capital, Colombo. The ALOs tell us that, despite extensive
and repeated training, check-in staff and immigration authorities
regularly accept obvious forgeries and fraudulent documents.
Practically no screening is conducted of travelers with non-Sri
Lankan passports; instead, airline staff assume that a final
decision will be taken by other airline staff in the hub city once
the passengers reach their transit point. Passengers who have
checked in and gone through immigration regularly disappear once
they see that an ALO is on duty at their gate; somehow, they are
secreted out through three layers of airport security. Very often
these passengers will return to make successful attempts a few days
later when no ALO is on duty. Although the airport has multiple
closed circuit television (CCTV) systems, the CCTV systems are often
turned off or critical segments unavailable (or erased) when
requested. A lack of separation between arriving and departing
passengers makes boarding card and identity document swaps simple.
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that Sri Lankans represent
the fourth most frequently offloaded nationality on U.S.-bound
flights worldwide, according to 2008 U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) statistics, despite the lack of direct flights from
Colombo to the U.S. The ALOs report that Sri Lanka's poor airport
controls are well known throughout the region; in addition to Sri
COLOMBO 00000359 011 OF 012
Lankans, other nationalities such as Indians, Iranians, Pakistanis,
Somalis, and Russians have been increasingly taking advantage of
Bandaranaiyke Airport's weaknesses.
¶34. The Consular section has also worked closely with ticketing
agents regarding questionable visa cases, even conducting a
successful "sting" operation to catch would-be mala fide travelers
to the U.S. The trend of unsuspecting applicants falling prey to
unscrupulous human smugglers and traffickers who promise visas and
jobs overseas in exchange for thousands of dollars prevails in Sri
Lanka. Despite several press releases re-iterating the U.S.
Embassy's role as the sole visa issuing authority in the country and
warning the public of any claims by other parties to facilitate
visas, some people continue to pay large sums of money to them and
become litigants in lengthy court cases.
¶35. Post has discovered evidence that relatively large numbers of
Sri Lankans are entering the United States without inspection across
the U.S.-Mexico border. This information has come to light from
both IDENT hits showing arrests at the border and from information
provided by the Canadian High Commission in Colombo about Sri
Lankans making asylum claims at the U.S.-Canada border. One NIV
applicant whose IDENT results showed had been apprehended in
Brownsville, Texas in 2006 told us that connections between Sri
Lankan smugglers and Mexican coyotes are well established. In June
2008, the Canadian mission provided a list of more than 100 Sri
Lankans who claimed asylum at the U.S.-Canada border who had no
records in CCD, and we strongly suspect that all of them entered the
U.S. without inspection from Mexico. Post expects this trend to
accelerate as several South American countries have dropped visa
requirements for Sri Lankans in recent years, making it even easier
to reach Latin America and enter the smuggling pipeline.
---------------------------
Staffing and Training
---------------------------
¶36. Colombo's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) consists of one part-time
officer Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM), and one full-time Fraud
Prevention Foreign Service National (FSN) investigator. Both of the
other officers have also completed fraud training at FSI. A second
FSN, the NIV supervisor, has completed fraud training but has no
specific FPU role.
Titles and training history are as follows:
Christopher R. Green (departs 5/09; to be replaced by William
Dowers, 8/09)
Consul
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 5/08
Emily Hicks
Vice Consul and Fraud Prevention Manager (part-time)
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 12/08
Joel T. Wiegert
Vice Consul
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 8/08
COLOMBO 00000359 012 OF 012
PC-126 Advanced Consular Name Checking, Washington, 8/08
Sanjeeva Gammanpila
FPU FSN Investigator (full-time)
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 4/02
DHS Document Fraud Detection and Recognition, Colombo, 2002
Anusha Fernandez
FSN NIV Supervisor
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/05
BLAKE