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Viewing cable 09CARACAS418, CHAVEZ GOES AFTER OPPOSITION LEADER ROSALES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CARACAS418 2009-03-31 21:42 2011-08-15 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Caracas
Appears in these articles:
http://www.semana.com/mundo/wikileaks-venezuela-como-veia-eeuu-exilio-manuel-rosales/159846-3.aspx
VZCZCXRO5635
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCV #0418/01 0902142
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 312142Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2842
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000418

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2029
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ GOES AFTER OPPOSITION LEADER ROSALES

REF: CARACAS 000322
CARACAS 00000418 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
FOR REASON 1.4(D)

1. (C) Summary: The Government of the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela (GBRV) continues to go after emblematic targets
among the democratic opposition, including Maracaibo Mayor
and 2006 opposition presidential candidate Manuel Rosales.
As of March 31, rumors abound regarding whether Rosales, who
is being tried on politically-motivated corruption charges,
has fled Venezuela to seek political asylum. Opposition
contacts have made informal inquiries about USG asylum
policy, ostensibly on Rosales' behalf. Rosales' flight or
arrest would be damaging to an opposition already suffering
from infighting and an ongoing campaign by the GBRV to harass
and undermine opposition state and local governments elected
in November 2008. End Summary.

--------------------------------
ROSALES READY TO FLEE VENEZUELA?
--------------------------------

2. (C) As of mid-day March 31, rumors were swirling that
Rosales had fled the country and may be planning to seek
political asylum. United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
National Assembly Deputy Carlos Escarra announced late on
March 30 that Rosales had fled to Panama by sea, and PAO
received similar information from opposition-oriented
Globovision media outlet the following day. However,
Globovision owner Alberto Federico Ravell told PAO March 31
that Rosales had not, in fact, left Venezuela. A Zulia State
government official confirmed the same privately to Poloff,
and Zulia Governor Pablo Perez publicly rejected the rumor,
telling Union Radio March 31 that "Manuel is working and of
course meeting with his defense lawyers, awaiting the judge
to fix his preliminary (court) hearing."

3. (C) Ravell had previously contacted PAO March 29 and
raised the possibility of Rosales seeking asylum in the
United States. He presumably would enter the United States
on his recently renewed B1/B2 visa. PAO emphasized that DHS
adjudicates asylum cases. Ravell said that Rosales'
political advisors had counseled him to remain in Venezuela
and take a stand against Chavez's intimidation tactics, but
his friends and family were advising him not to be a
political martyr. Ravell personally favored Rosales staying,
but noted that there was no unity within the opposition and
nobody was willing to sacrifice themselves on Rosales'
behalf. He added that Rosales' chief political strategist,
Timoteo Zambrano, may contact WHA A/S Shannon directly to
discuss the issue further.

4. (C) Globovision foreign policy commentator Julio Cesar
Pineda pressed the Charge late on March 30 at a public event
for information on U.S. asylum policy and visas. Charge
stressed that the Embassy does not offer asylum and referred
him to the DHS for more information on how those in the U.S.
may claim asylum. Pineda then turned his attention to the
Austrian Ambassador, also asking about political asylum. The
Ambassador finally conceded that he was unaware of European
Union law that automatically grants asylum, but said that if
someone showed up in the Austrian Embassy, he would have to
seek guidance from Vienna on how to proceed. Pineda appeared
to be seeking information in a professional rather than
personal capacity, and could be intending to use it for his
popular daily show on Globovision, "Brujula Internacional."

-----------
THE CHARGES
-----------

5. (C) After months of threats from Chavez, a prosecutor
issued a request for an arrest warrant for Rosales March 19
for allegations of illicit enrichment during his tenure as
governor of Zulia State (2000-2008). (Note: To the best of
our knowledge, no judge has yet acted on this request. In
fact the head of CICPC, the Venezuelan equivalent of the FBI,
announced March 31 that he had not received an arrest warrant
but would proceed with the arrest once he receives it. End
Note.) Even if the charges are valid, the GBRV's selective
prosecution of Rosales appears to be strictly politically
motivated. Rosales' Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) party has called
the warrant request "political persecution" and criticized
the movement of the court proceedings from Maracaibo to
Caracas -- on the grounds that Rosales and his supporters
would be able to influence local judges in his home state of
Zulia. In an interview with state-owned Venezolana de TV,
PSUV National Assembly Deputy Mario Isea announced March 27
that Rosales was seeking to "victimize" himself in order to
justify his hiding or flight from the country. The same day,
Chavez called Rosales' opposition supporters "immoral" and
"mafiosos" and asserted that Rosales "is an example of the
degradation of ethical values."

6. (C) Finger-pointing within the opposition continues to
undermine its efforts to unify. UNT foreign policy advisor
Yenny De Freitas privately complained March 25 that Carabobo
Governor Henrique Salas Feo had not stepped up to support
Rosales and was hurting efforts to form cohesion within the
broader opposition movement. Other political pundits have
similarly questioned the extent of Nueva Esparta Governor
Morel Rodriguez's solidarity. He is widely perceived as an
outlier within the opposition who may be seeking some
accommodation with the central government.

-------
COMMENT
-------

7. (C) The political opposition looks particularly
vulnerable right now, and the flight of opposition leader
Rosales -- if it happens -- will make him look both guilty
and extremely weak. His absence, be it from flight or
arrest, would greatly undercut Zulia State Governor Pablo
Perez, who is widely perceived to be a stand-in for Rosales
(who was ineligible to run for a third gubernatorial term).
Chavez could also decide to issue arrest warrants for other
prominent members of the opposition to keep them cowed,
including reinitiating the legal proceedings against Miranda
State Governor Henrique Capriles Radonski for charges that he
was involved in inciting violence outside of the Cuban
Embassy during the April 2002 coup.
CAULFIELD