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Viewing cable 09BRAZZAVILLE79, SBU) IMF, WORLD BANK ON SAME PAGE ON CONGO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRAZZAVILLE79 2009-03-18 16:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Brazzaville
VZCZCXRO2986
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBZ #0079/01 0771607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 181607Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1311
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0407
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 1577
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRAZZAVILLE 000079 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN IMF IBRD
SUBJECT: (SBU) IMF, WORLD BANK ON SAME PAGE ON CONGO 
 
REF: BRAZZAVILLE 0062 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000079  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  At the conclusion March 6 of a mission by 
the IMF to assess Congo's progress with its current PRGF 
(Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) program, mission chief 
Robert York briefed interested diplomatic missions and 
international organizations, along with key financial 
interlocutors, on the mission's findings.  With respect to 
Congo's program to qualify for debt relief under the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, he identified oil 
marketing transparency and government procurement as areas where 
more progress is needed, as did a similar earlier World Bank 
mission (reftel).  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU) Identifying the mission as the first review of the 
PRGF program approved on December 8, 2008, he said that the 
parameters of the examination looked backward, at performance up 
to December 31, and forward, at the ability of the authorities 
to achieve the program's objectives.  In addition, with the 
World Bank, the mission would look at the implementation of the 
HIPC "floating completion point" in light of the Congo 
government's desire to move to completion point as soon as 
possible. 
 
3.  (SBU) With respect to the backward look, as of end-December, 
Congo had met all the quantitative targets, although performance 
on the non-oil primary deficit had been very near the outside 
limit.  With respect to structural targets, on public finance 
management, the Congo target was to achieve quarterly 
certification of audits and to post the audits with government 
comments on the internet.  Though the auditors had completed and 
posted the results, the required comment had not been posted. 
Second, with respect to the requirement to repatriate oil 
proceeds within 45 days of lifting, there had been some 
progress, and the government was close to the target, but there 
had been some slippage.  There were also some (unspecified) 
technical difficulties in the second half of 2008 regarding oil 
marketing. 
 
4.  (SBU) With respect to the "forward" look, discussion with 
the authorities had revolved around the outlook for oil 
revenues, with concerns regarding the fluctuations in exchange 
rates (largely between the euro and the US dollar) and the sharp 
expected decline in revenues in 2009.  That raised concerns 
about how to achieve the program objectives, in light of the 
need to find a balance between the desire for a tight fiscal 
stance and the possible need for a stimulus should growth 
decline sharply.  It would be necessary for the government to 
re-consider low-priority initiatives that were outside the PRSP 
(Poverty Reduction and Support Paper) framework, as well as the 
investment budget.  For example, he said, fuel  subsidies could 
be reduced.  Moreover the government could use more of its HIPC 
resources in priority areas.  With respect to the financial 
crisis, York noted that the Congo economy was not 
well-integrated into the world economy, particular its financial 
sector, which was largely insulated from developments outside 
Congo and which enjoyed strong liquidity.  This, he said, 
contrasted to the timber sector, which was "severely depressed" 
as a result of falling demand for wood.  He characterized the 
outlook for the timber sector as "grim."  Considering all these 
factors, the growth outlook for 2009 had been reduced by half, 
from the earlier-projected 8 percent to 4 percent.  In response 
to a question after the main presentation, York said that 
Congo's average per-barrel price for oil during 2008 was $99.00, 
expected to drop by over half in 2009, to around $40.00 per 
barrel.  He emphasized that with declining oil prices, the 
horizon for high risk for debt distress would move further away 
in time and thus, when oil prices were low, debt relief became 
more important.  He also noted that Congo's oil sector, in terms 
of exports, was still growing, with 2010 expected to be the peak 
production year.  Due to a fire in one production facility, 2008 
had been a little lower than expected, but oil growth was still 
projected at 10%. 
 
5.  (SBU) Thus, he said, there might need to be a fiscal 
adjustment in 2009 to meet changing circumstances.  There was 
the possibility that the Congo authorities would present a 
request in late March/early April, but this, and the first 
review, were contingent on the Congo government providing a 
report to the Paris Club (which York characterized as "very 
important") regarding the status of negotiations with all/all 
creditors, specifically including the "litigating creditors," 
This, he said, was a condition of the Paris Club for the 
December 8 rescheduling to support financing assurances of the 
Club members. 
 
6.  (SBU) With respect to HIPC, York said that there are a large 
number of the "triggers" established in 2006 that have been met, 
mentioning particularly external debt, education, health, and 
public financial management.  Though not yet met, he said there 
were good prospects to meet the triggers in forests, 
telecommunications, and the annual report on PRSP progress. 
 
BRAZZAVILL 00000079  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
However, he said, progress had been "slow" in the areas of 
procurement and oil sector government, in particular the 
requirement for successive successful audits of the national 
petroleum marketing arm (SNPC) and action with respect to the 
commercialization of Congo-owned oil.  He said the IMF and the 
World Bank had provided an action plan, and the "ball is in the 
Congo's court" on the timing of implementation (and thus 
movement closer to completion point).  Of course, he said, 
satisfactory performance under the PRGF was also required. 
 
7.  (SBU) Responding to a question after the presentation, York 
said that from the point of view of IMF staff, the only route to 
stronger performance is stronger implementation of the trigger 
requirements.  There is, he said, no scope to reach completion 
point other than full implementation of those requirements, and 
IMF staff is not prepared to consider or recommend otherwise, 
despite strong external and political pressures to do so. 
 
8. (SBU) He told the Ambassador in a subsequent private 
conversation that "this is not the time to go soft."  Despite an 
unprecedentedly difficult external situation, Congo has its own 
resources to weather the difficulties, and the key point should 
be to maintain discipline, not relaxing on the fiscal situation 
nor on structural reforms. 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT:  We agree.  END COMMENT 
EASTHAM