Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BRASILIA364, U) 2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (C-AL9-00153)

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA364.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA364 2009-03-24 20:05 2011-07-11 00:00 SECRET Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO8646
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHBR #0364/01 0832005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 242005Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3881
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/ AND WHA/BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019 
TAGS: BR PINR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: (U)  2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (C-AL9-00153) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 20677 
     B. BRASILIA 273 
     C. 08 BRASILIA 1636 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason 1.5(d) 
 
1. (C)  Ref B reports on Summit of the Americas (SOA) 
Coordinator Ambassador Hector Morales meetings with Brazilian 
officials, notably the increased Brazilian focus on the SOA. 
According to Brazilian Ministry for External Relations (MRE) 
Undersecretary Vera Machado, Brazil views the SOA as 
complementary to the Bahia Summit of Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) heads of state and government (Ref C) and an 
important means of communication for all Western Hemisphere 
governments.  Brazil, like most other Summit participants, 
has high expectations for the Obama Presidency and looks to 
the President for a positive signal as to the importance of 
the Western Hemisphere in U.S. policy considerations. 
Speaking at a Wall Street Journal-sponsored seminar in New 
York March 17, President Lula said the Summit would be "an 
ideal scenario (for the U.S.) to reestablish a policy of 
democratic and peaceful coexistence with the region."  For 
the Summit, Brazil will focus on the economic crisis, food 
security and energy, looking to avoid linkages between the 
latter two of these issues.  Although the GOB may agree to or 
actively devote resources to major new initiatives under the 
Summit process, it will seek to create a positive tone for 
the SOA, mediate differences among the participants, and use 
the SOA to launch a productive dialogue between the United 
States and LAC.  Answers to questions raised in ref a, are 
contained in paragraph 2 below. 
 
2.  (S/NF) 
 
A1) Brazilian Presidential Advisor Marcel Biato told 
Ambassador Morales that Brazil hoped the U.S. would not enter 
the SOA with a series of new initiatives to push on Latin 
American governments and that the U.S. would do better to 
listen to the concerns of its neighbors.  In general, Brazil 
downplays substantive results from presidential summits.  The 
December Bahia Summit, for example, was more notable as a 
demonstration of Brazil's ability to convene its neighbors 
than for any result (ref C).  The Brazilian Government 
considers it important to agree on a Summit Declaration but 
may be less concerned about its specific content as long as 
consensus is achieved.  Human prosperity, social inclusion, 
job creation, and addressing the global economic crisis have 
emerged as the broad themes for which Brazil's priorities 
more closely match those of the United States.  Should the 
United States choose to pursue a regional energy initiative, 
Brazil will likely be much more supportive of a proposal 
which offers each country the choice of opting in or out of 
each element of the program.  There is significant opposition 
in Brazil to the idea of a "one size fits all" agreement on 
energy, or in general. 
 
2) It is highly unlikely that Brazil will use the SOA 
criticize the U.S. publicly, although the view that U.S. 
policies are to blame for other nations' economic 
difficulties is a common one in Brazil.  President Lula wants 
a good relationship with President Obama and will seek to 
avoid controversy and encourage Brazil's neighbors to do 
likewise.  There is potential for disagreement on Cuba as the 
Brazilians have become increasingly officious in their advice 
to us that a good relationship with the region depends on our 
unilateral concessions to an aggrieved Cuba.  President Lula 
has promised Raul Castro that he will do what he can to 
facilitate a better relationship with the U.S., and he will 
need to be able to demonstrate credibly that he has acted on 
this promise.  Brazil will prefer that the Cuba discussion 
avoid center stage and take place in private, but in this 
context will join, and may even lead, the bandwagon of 
governments trying to change U.S. Cuba policy. 
 
3) As noted in ref c, Brazil was the force behind the Bahia 
Summit and is looking for avenues to assert its leadership in 
the region, and especially in South America.  Brazil posited 
the Bahia Summit as the "first ever" meeting only of Latin 
American and Caribbean heads of state and government without 
"external" powers.  Indeed, the Bahia Summit appears to have 
successfully shifted the dynamic of the SOA from that of a 
"regional" meeting to an "inter-regional"  U.S.-Latin America 
meeting, along the lines of the Ibero-American Summit, the 
EU-Latin America Summit, and the Arab States-South America 
Summit.  For Lula, the SOA will provide an opportunity to 
carry the region's messages to President Obama and 
demonstrate leadership.  The Brazilian MRE and Presidency 
have assured us that Brazil believes that the new regional 
summit fora should be complementary to the OAS and SOA, and 
Brazil is unlikely to act in such a way as to undercut the 
SOA. 
 
BRASILIA 00000364  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
4) As noted above, Brazil is interested in a harmonious 
Summit and would prefer to avoid controversy.  It is likely 
that President Lula will attempt to moderate Chavez without 
coming out into blatant opposition to the Venezuelan 
President.  It is possible that, as a way of doing this, he 
will take a tougher rhetorical stance on some issues than he 
might in a bilateral setting. 
 
5) We have no evidence that Brazil would favor any measure 
that would jeopardize the Inter-American Human Rights System. 
 
B1) While we do not expect Brazil to agree with the U.S. on 
all issues, we believe the Brazil government will take a 
constructive approach to the Summit and seek consensus on a 
Summit Declaration.  Even where it agrees to broad language 
in the declaration in support of SOA themes, Brazil may 
resist concrete initiatives on topics that it perceives as 
potentially divisive in the region, such as democratic 
governance, energy, trade, and public security.  Brazil is 
unlikely to press issues that it knows will put the United 
States on the defensive, and is likely to try to mediate any 
such disputes that arise.  Brazilian Summit Coordinator 
Duarte has told us that Brazil has "high expectations for the 
Summit"  and would like to maintain "positive momentum" in 
U.S. relations with the region. 
SOBEL