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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD770, ERBIL RRT: KURDISTAN REGIONAL POLITICS THROUGH THE EYES OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD770 2009-03-21 07:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0770/01 0800710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD44C567 MSI3848 538)
P 210710Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2312
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000770 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y  (TEXT) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV IZ SOCI
SUBJECT:  ERBIL RRT: KURDISTAN REGIONAL POLITICS THROUGH THE EYES OF 
ITS YOUTH 
 
1.  (U) SUMMARY:  Students in the Kurdistan Region (KR) uniformly 
stress that the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) dominate both the political and 
private spheres of the KR.  But their opinions differ on whether 
these political parties have advanced the democratic process in the 
KRG.  With few exceptions, students are dissatisfied with the 
current political status quo and seek greater participation in the 
socio-political development of the KR.  END SUMMARY 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES: TRAILBLAZERS OR ROADBLOCKS? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
2.  (U) Since the creation of the modern autonomous region, the 
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) have held heretofore unchallenged dominance of the 
political sphere in the Kurdistan Region (KR).  Over the course of 
history, their influence over the private sector, civil society, and 
media has also grown.  Students say that political party connections 
are now more essential than actual qualifications when applying for 
jobs in either the public or private sector.  But while students 
agree on the power of political parties, their opinions vary greatly 
on the degree to which political parties represent the interests of 
their constituencies and have advanced the democratic process. 
Regional Reconstruction Team Officer (RRTOff) met with small groups 
of students and the youth leagues of the three largest political 
parties in the KR to ascertain their views on the roles that 
political parties play in KR politics. 
 
3.  (U) During interviews with RRTOff, students' opinions on 
political parties' effectiveness in serving the interests of the 
people seemed to depend on students' proximity to party 
decision-makers and the degree to which their personal interests 
were gratified by party membership.  Those who were leaders of 
political party youth leagues, very much the "inner circle," 
obviously identified most strongly with party ideology.  Students in 
the Dohuk and Sulaimaniyah branches of youth leagues of the two 
dominant political parties, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) 
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), offered rousing support 
for their respective parent parties and gratitude for all that the 
party founders had "sacrificed on behalf of the people of 
Kurdistan."  They were also the most forgiving of the degree to 
which the two parties have monopolized the political debate since 
the creation of the modern Kurdistan Region.  "Neither party is 
perfect," said a member of the KDP Youth League in Dohuk, "but for 
now, we two are better than the others." 
 
4.  (U)  Members of the youth league of the Kurdistan Islamic Union 
(KIU) were equally supportive of their parent party.  However, they 
were extremely critical of dominant party control of all political 
and socio-economic developments in the Kurdistan Region. They 
accused those parties of closing the larger political process to 
anyone not affiliated with the KDP or PUK and using any means 
necessary to prevent the development of a proper opposition party 
within the government. (Note:  The KIU is the third largest 
political party in the KR, and received seven percent of the Kurdish 
vote in 2005.  Although KIU influence is slowly growing, it does not 
constitute a threat to either of the two major parties.) 
 
5.  (U) Political party youth leagues are also extremely vocal on 
the issue of a future independent Kurdistan.  Said a 23-year-old 
member of the KDP Youth League in Dohuk of the Iraqi federal system, 
"This union is a compulsory marriage and we want a divorce!" Some 
Q"This union is a compulsory marriage and we want a divorce!" Some 
went so far as to suggest that those who call for additional steps 
toward decentralization (such as a plethora of strong political 
parties rather than the current two-party monopoly) are insensitive 
to the fact that the Kurds must remain unified if they will ever be 
able to secure an independent Kurdistan.  Said another member of the 
KDP Youth League, "The most important goal is to be recognized as an 
independent nation.  Once we are independent, we will be able to 
have more parties.  But for now, we must unify against external 
threats instead of fighting against one another." 
 
6.  (U) The most critical students were those  either not affiliated 
with political parties or affiliated in name only as a sort of 
"insurance policy."  The variance in their opinions was reflected in 
the responses of the different groups to similar questions. 
Unaffiliated students cited unemployment, the lack of essential 
services and corruption as the issues of greatest significance, 
while political party youth league students replied Article 140 
implementation, Kurdish independence and the upcoming legislative 
elections.  (Note:  Responses from the unaffiliated group track 
popular opinion more closely.  During a recent youth-focused radio 
program on which RRTOff is a regular guest, 90% of callers' 
questions and comments were about fears of unemployment.  End Note) 
Many youth admitted that they were members of political parties not 
because of ideological affinity, but rather to bolster their chances 
of financial security. 
 
7.  (U) However, even within the "inner circle," there are signs of 
discontent.  Some members of PUK Youth League in Sulaimaniyah 
expressed frustration with the political parties' obstructionism in 
fostering political and economic development in the KR.  "The 
 
parties are run by old revolutionaries with tribal mentalities." 
said one youth league member. Still another said, "The role of the 
youth league is marginalized.  If we have ideas for projects and our 
leaders disagree, the project goes nowhere."  Some members of the 
KIU Youth League were also frustrated.  "Civil society organizations 
and the media are important for exposing problems in society, but 
here, neither are free from political party domination." 
 
8.  (U) For many, dissatisfaction with all the political parties' 
failure to place the interests of the common people over their own 
personal gain has led to a general malaise with the political 
process.  "We do not believe in political parties anymore," said a 
fourth-year Information Technology student at the University of 
Sulaimaniyah.  "The parties have been unable to carry the interests 
of the youth into the government."  Said one second-year biology 
major at the University of Dohuk, "The government exists to serve 
the political parties.  The political parties exist to serve 
themselves."  Said another Engineering student at the University of 
Sulaimaniyah, "The political parties do not really care for the 
problems and concerns of youth.  The parties are struggling to 
maintain their influence in society and we are caught in the middle. 
 Youth are used as tools in the party."  Others believe that vested 
interests in the KRG are actively working against democratization 
and are incapable of moving democracy any further, since to do so 
would jeopardize the influence that politicians' have over 
socio-economic and political issues. (Note:  RRT local staff persons 
remark that previously, students were much more receptive of 
political party ideology. RRT local staff believe that the change 
reflects the degree to which elected KRG officials have failed to 
keep campaign promises. End Note) 
 
9.  (U) COMMENT:  Conversations at universities in Kurdistan can 
sound very similar to those at schools in developed countries. 
Youth here, like elsewhere, are eager to participate in a modern 
life that suits a youthful perspective, and take their place in 
society.  Recent changes in the Kurdistan Region indicate that 
students may soon have a greater chance to do so.  On February 11, 
the Kurdistan National Assembly lowered the minimum age of 
parliamentary officials from 30 to 25 and there is already 
competition for those seats.  Whether these young people will be 
able to affect change from within the system remains to be seen. END 
COMMENT 
 
BUTENIS