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Viewing cable 09ATHENS338, FM BAKOYIANNIS PLANS CALL TO SECRETARY SEEKING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ATHENS338 2009-03-18 17:00 2011-05-26 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
O 181700Z MAR 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3386
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 
NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 
USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L  ATHENS 000338 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, EUR (FITZPATRICK, BRINK) NSC FOR 
GERMANO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR TU OSCE
SUBJECT: FM BAKOYIANNIS PLANS CALL TO SECRETARY SEEKING 
SUPPORT FOR OSCE INFORMAL MINISTERIAL 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL V. SPECKHARD. REASON: 
1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  At a March 17 dinner, Foreign Minister 
Bakoyiannis told Ambassador Speckhard that, in her capacity 
as OSCE Chairperson in Office, she wanted to speak with the 
Secretary to discuss two linked issues:  her plans to move 
forward on OSCE's mission in Georgia and her proposal to host 
an informal OSCE ministerial in July to discuss European 
security architecture.  Bakoyiannis also underscored the 
domestic pressure she is under as a result of the upcoming 
POTUS visit to Turkey; she urged a stopover in Greece or an 
early invitation for the Prime Minister to visit Washington. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
OSCE INFORMAL MINISTERIAL IN JULY? 
 
2.  (C)  Bakoyiannis told the Ambassador that she wanted to 
speak to the Secretary about her plans, as Chairman in 
Office, for dealing with continued Russian resistance to the 
OSCE mission in Georgia.  She was determined to succeed, and 
would be travelling to Georgia the week of March 23. 
However, to be successful, she believed she needed to be able 
to give the Russians something more on the discussion of 
European security architecture. 
 
3.  (C)  Bakoyiannis noted that she had talked to a number of 
her European counterparts and received a positive reaction to 
the idea of an informal Gymnich-style OSCE meeting at the 
ministerial level in early July, either in Corfu or Crete 
(she was considering July 9).  Her idea would be an informal 
exchange of views at the ministerial level that would serve 
as a kick-off for follow-up working level discussions.  These 
in turn would lead to an opportunity for a "Helsinki plus" 
engagement at the formal OSCE ministerial in December. 
Bakoyiannis did not provide further details,  simply noting 
that while the discussion at Helsinki was a good start, her 
proposed informal ministerial would allow participants to 
show their serious willingness to engage in the dialogue -- 
even if there was no commitment to the Russian proposals. 
Bakoyiannis said she was hopeful that, with a commitment by 
 Secretary Clinton to participate in the informal meeting in 
July, she would have enough to get Russian support on Georgia. 
 
POTUS TRIP TO TURKEY RAISES PROBLEMS FOR GREEK POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP 
 
5.  (C)  The Foreign Minister also took the opportunity to 
raise with the Ambassador her frustration over the breaking 
of precedent:  a Presidential visit to Turkey without a visit 
to Greece.  This was causing her and the Government serious 
political problems that they could ill afford at a sensitive 
time in Greek domestic politics.  Bakoyiannis expressed 
concern that it would undermine efforts to renew and 
strengthen Greek-US relations at this new juncture. 
 
6.  (C)  In response, the Ambassador urged Bakoyiannis to see 
the visit in a different light.  Greece stood to benefit 
greatly by the additional attention the new Administration 
was paying to its neighbor and to the Muslim world in 
general.  Bakoyiannis remained unmoved, highlighting the 
renewed Aegean tensions between Greece and Turkey which, she 
said, made it critical that the President consider a 
stop-over on his way to or from Ankara.  Ambassador Speckhard 
told her this was highly unlikely, emphasizing all the ways 
the administration was engaging Greece at a high level:  her 
own visit to Washington, the upcoming Greek Independence Day 
ceremony at the White House, and the Minister of Defense's 
visit in April.  Bakoyiannis nevertheless urged that, at a 
minimum, an invitation be extended soon to the Greek PM to 
visit Washington at some point in the future. 
 
COMMENT 
 
7.  (C)  FM Bakoyiannis was more agitated than we have seen 
her in a long time, with the perceived slight to Greece 
through the upcoming visit causing her serious trouble in 
Greece's highly charged politcial environment.  We believe 
she is sincere in saying she needs the informal ministerial 
to work the Russian angle on the OSCE mission to Georgia (an 
idea that may have been in the works prior to the 
announcement of the POTUS visit).  But clearly an OSCE 
ministerial would also give her some relief in the press, not 
only through the prominent role Greece would play in hosting 
such an event, but also through an early visit to Greece by 
Secretary Clinton. 
 
 
SPECKHARD