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Viewing cable 09ASHGABAT284, IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: ENERGY WAS THE FOCUS OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ASHGABAT284 2009-03-02 13:10 2011-06-26 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Ashgabat
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/17/112290/state-department-cables-reveal.html
VZCZCXRO6719
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAH #0284/01 0611310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021310Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2390
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4879
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3123
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000283 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, NEA/IR AND INL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2019 
TAGS: IR PGOV PREL SNAR TX
SUBJECT: IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: ENERGY WAS THE FOCUS OF 
BERDIMUHAMEDOV'S TEHRAN VISIT 
 
REF: ASHGABAT 0033 
 
Classified By: Charge Richard Miles, per reasons  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  Ashgabat-based diplomats with close ties to 
the Iranian Embassy say that increased energy cooperation was 
the focus of talks between President Berdimuhamedov and 
Iranian leaders during a February 13-15 visit to Tehran.  In 
addition to an energy pact, in which Iran reportedly agreed 
to pay USD 300 per bcm for Turkmen gas, the two sides agreed 
to the establishment of an intergovernmental economic 
commission, an accord on the exchange of prisoners, and a 
framework agreement on Iran's role in developing 
Turkmenistan's Yolatan gas field.  Berdimuhamedov is also 
expected to attend the regional Economic Cooperation 
Organization (ECO -- currently chaired by Iran) meeting in 
Tehran on March 11th.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Diplomatic sources in Ashgabat who meet regularly with 
Iranian Embassy diplomats told Iran Watcher this week that 
energy cooperation between Iran and Turkmenistan topped the 
agenda in President Berdimuhamedov's 13-15 February visit to 
Iran, when he met with President Ahmadinejad and Supreme 
Leader Khamenei.  Michael Wilson, the EU-TACIS representative 
in Turkmenistan for the past ten years and a close friend of 
Iranian Ambassador Forqani, said that Berdimuhamedov and 
Khamenei held a three-hour meeting during the visit in which 
the Supreme Leader is said to have made clear that Iran sees 
itself as the "key player" for the region's energy security, 
a paramount concern for Turkmenistan.  In Wilson's view, both 
Berdimuhamedov and Khamenei operate on a "much higher 
intellectual plane than people give them credit for" when it 
comes to discussions of global energy security.  He said that 
Turkmenistan, uncomfortable dealing with private businesses, 
prefers working directly with governments such as Iran, which 
it increasingly sees as the "third way" as it moves away from 
the risks of exporting gas through just one major pipeline 
(to Russia). 
 
3. (C) According to Hakan Chengiz, the Turkish DCM, who meets 
regularly with diplomats from the Iranian Embassy and was 
briefed by them on the visit, Berdimuhamdov and Ahmadinejad 
signed three separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and 
one more preliminary framework agreement:  The first provides 
for the creation of a Turkmenistan intergovernmental economic 
commission.  The new commission is expected to operate in the 
same fashion as a similar commission in place between 
Turkmenistan and Turkey.  While it will probably be headed 
officially on the Turkmen side by President Berdimuhamdov, 
Chengiz anticipates that the President will delegate that 
role to either FM Meredov or DFM Hajiev.  (NOTE: Hajiev, a 
Farsi speaker, was in Tehran in December to represent 
Turkmenistan at the regional ECO meeting and entered into 
several agreements with Iran at that time.  Meredov 
traditionally represents the Turkmen on the 
Turkey-Turkmenistan Commission.  END NOTE.) 
 
 
TURKMENISTAN TO PAY LESS FOR GAS THAN RUSSIA, BUT MORE OVER 
THE LONG RUN 
 
4. (C) In the second MOU, according to Chengiz, Iran has 
reportedly agreed to pay USD 300 per bcm for Turkmen gas for 
the first six months of 2009.  Chengiz noted that he learned 
most of the details (including the price) of the second MOU 
from the Turkmen, not the Iranians.  Although Iran had been 
pushing for more than a year for Turkmenistan to increase its 
gas exports to them from eight to 14 bcma, the Turkmen will 
continue to hold them to eight, but have agreed to allow Iran 
to participate in developing a portion of the Yolatan gas 
field.  The Iranians told Chengiz that they are hopeful that 
Iran will ultimately be able to increase their gas imports 
once gas from that field becomes available.  He noted that 
the Yolatan deal has been part of a framework agreement only, 
with details to be set forth in a later, more formal 
agreement.  The framework agreement reportedly mentions a 
goal of yearly exports to Iran reaching 14 bcma. 
 
5. (C) Chengiz said that although Russia will initially pay 
more than USD 300 per bcm during the first six months of 
2009, their agreement with the Turkmen is per quarter of 
2009, and set to decrease progressively throughout the year, 
so that, on average, Iran will ultimately pay more than 
Russia for Turkmen gas.  According to Chengiz, the Iranians 
he spoke with acknowledged that Russia was getting a better 
deal and were "not happy about it."  He said that Iran would 
like to continue negotiations in the area of energy 
cooperation with a view to increasing its role in 
Turkmenistan's energy sector, and particularly increasing 
sales of gas to Iran. 
 
PRISONER EXCHANGE 
 
6. (C) The third agreement signed in Tehran reportedly 
relates to the exchange of prisoners between Iran and 
Turkmenistan.  Chengiz understands that this is more an issue 
for Iran, as there are apparently a number (he did not know 
how many) of Iranian citizens currently in Turkmenistan for 
drug-related offenses.  (NOTE:  As reported reftel, consular 
issues, including the status of Iranians detained in 
Turkmenistan, was the subject of an MOU that DFM Hajiev and 
Ahmadinejad signed in Tehran in December.  Not only have a 
number of Iranian truck drivers been detained in Turkmenistan 
for alleged narcotics smuggling, the drivers continue to 
complain about visa reciprocity problems and poor facilities 
for their use in Turkmenistan.  In addition, there have 
reportedly been problems in the border villages on both 
sides, including an incident two years ago when an Iranian 
sheepherder inadvertently crossed into Turkmenistan and was 
shot and killed.  END NOTE.) 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: From all accounts, the Iranians were anxious 
for Berdimuhamedov to visit and are delighted that he plans 
to be at the ECO summit later this month.  It is Iran, after 
all, that has the greatest stake in promoting closer ties 
with Turkmenistan, particularly in the energy sector, but 
also in ensuring that economic and cultural ties with its 
northern neighbor, with which it shares its longest border, 
are enhanced.  This is a prospect that can only help Iran as 
it works to boost its influence in Central Asia.  END 
COMMENT. 
MILES