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Viewing cable 09DARESSALAAM129, ZANZIBAR: OPPOSITION CUF THINKING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DARESSALAAM129 2009-02-27 07:26 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dar Es Salaam
VZCZCXRO4286
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHDR #0129/01 0580726
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 270726Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8308
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2832
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3348
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1276
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0030
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1186
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA//J3
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000129 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AF/E JLIDDLE, INR/RAA FEHRENREICH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PREL TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: OPPOSITION CUF THINKING 
 
REFS: (A) Dar es Salaam 75 (B) Dar es Salaam 09 and previous 
 
This is a re-transmission Dar es Salaam 123 with a new title and 
reformatting. 
 
 1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Once supportive of President Kikwete because of 
his stated desire for reconciliation, opposition party Civic United 
Front (CUF) is now disappointed that he failed to fulfill his 
commitment to Zanzibar.  CUF has concluded that the upcoming 2010 
elections in Zanzibar will not be different from the previous, 
failed ones.  CUF Foreign Affairs Advisor Ismail Jusa claimed he and 
Zanzibar SYG Seif Hamad are the only moderates left in a party that 
is growing frustrated with ruling party CCM perceived duplicity. 
Jusa said he was sympathetic to solving the ongoing CUF and CCM 
stalemate in the near term through some kind of power sharing deal. 
The trick to make that happen was to create some kind of mechanism 
to make government officials assume a neutral role.  For now, CUF 
focus will be on the upcoming by-election in Magogoni, expected in 
May.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) In early February, the Zanzibar Affairs Office and Washington 
analysts met with Ismail Jusa, CUF Foreign Affairs Advisor at the 
USG Zanzibar residence "Pettersen House."  Jusa, a U.S. 
International Visitor Program alumnus, began by saying that at the 
outset of the current national administration, "CUF had great 
confidence in Kikwete, especially when he admitted polarization on 
Zanzibar and promised that he would work towards finding the 
solution."  (COMMENT: President Kikwete promised to resolve the 
CUF-CCM conflict when he delivered his maiden speech at the Union 
Parliament in December 2005. END COMMENT). 
 
3. (SBU) Jusa said that recently Kikwete has changed his tune.  Jusa 
cited speeches Kikwete made in January 2009 while on Pemba -- not 
just on Revolution Day when he gave short shrift to the subject of 
reconciliation -- but especially during CCM rallies around the 
island in the days afterward.  In speeches at those rallies, Jusa 
claimed that Kikwete deliberately used inflammatory rhetoric that 
"recalled the hardline era." According to Jusa, when Kikwete said 
lines like "the revolution must be upheld," he was echoing the 
battle cry of those revolutionaries who carried out violent punitive 
actions on Pemba like rape and murder in retaliation for the Pemban 
Party's support of the first Independent Sultanate government of 
Zanzibar.  When Kikwete said lines like "I can't even imagine a CUF 
government in 2010 - nor in 2015 for that matter," he was echoing 
President Karume's first international press conference in 1964, 
well known to Zanzibaris, when he called for a "50-year Revolution." 
 
 
4. (SBU) Jusa expressed disappointment that Kikwete had failed to 
fulfill his commitment to Zanzibar.  He concluded that the upcoming 
2010 elections in Zanzibar would not be different from the previous 
ones (i.e. violent, oppressive and not credible).  Jusa claimed that 
the present delay in voter registration (septel) was because CCM 
couldn't duplicate the numbers it had invented in 2005, so it was 
having a hard time getting started.  The population was more 
numerous across the whole archipelago, so it would embarrass CCM if 
it couldn't even muster the same numbers it fudged five years 
earlier. 
 
5. (SBU) Commenting on reconciliation between CCM and CUF, Jusa 
admitted there were hardliners within CUF who wanted to take a 
radical approach in dealing with CCM.  Jusa said the "only real 
moderates" left in CUF were himself and SYG Seif Hamad.  With a 
series of lost elections behind them-and failure of the Muafaka 
(reconciliation) talks, twice - he said the two of them were on the 
last shreds of credibility.  "There are different people in CUF who 
have different views on the directions that CUF should take," he 
said.  Jusa mentioned Juma Duni, the CUF Deputy Secretary General, 
as non-compromising and one who would have CUF take a more radical 
approach.  He said one ascendant view within CUF was to opt out of 
the political system altogether since it was "illegitimate." 
Another, majority view, was that CCM was irredeemable.  Therefore, 
CUF's interlocutor should not be the government but the 
international community instead.  There needed to be an 
international commission of some sort that would guarantee a CUF 
victory after a free and fair election.  After attaining power, CUF 
would "clean house." 
 
6. (SBU) Jusa said he supported the views of Ambassador Green in his 
valedictory speech of early January (ref B). Jusa said he was 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000129  002 OF 002 
 
 
sympathetic to the idea of solving the ongoing CUF and CCM stalemate 
in the near term through some kind of power sharing deal.  The trick 
to make that happen was to create some kind of mechanism to make 
government forces assume a neutral role.  Without that as a starting 
point, CCM couldn't be trusted to uphold its end of the bargain. 
 
7. (SBU) On the Union, Jusa said a "three-government-system would be 
the best way to govern Tanzania" (i.e. a Government of Tanganyika, 
of Zanzibar, and a Union Government of Tanzania to deal with shared 
interests).  He said the status quo was that "Tanganyika" also 
claimed to be Tanzania.   He pointed fingers at mainlanders whom he 
said "were working towards dividing Zanzibar to be able to get away 
with everything they want." 
 
8. (SBU) For now, CUF focus will be on the upcoming by-election in 
Magogoni, expected in May.  Jusa doubted it would be free and fair. 
He said "there were rumors about planting illegal voters to be 
brought from mainland Tanzania and the nearby areas."  To build up 
the confidence of the electorate, he wanted the U.S. government to 
play a leading role in managing the Magogoni bi-election and beyond. 
He rejected the idea that the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was 
impartial. 
 
COMMENT: 
 
9. (SBU) Jusa, like most Zanzibari political observers, takes U.S. 
participation in an international election observer mission as a 
given.  We have served that role - and more-in 2000 and 2005.  We 
continue to have expectations that we will have a sufficient budget 
for a 2010 observation effort.  In the meantime, we will continue to 
encourage CUF to work within the system and to keep trying to engage 
with CCM. 
 
Andre