Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS94, CODEL SMITH: ASAD POSITIVE ON NEW BILATERAL
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09DAMASCUS94.
VZCZCXRO0240
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHDM #0094/01 0321443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011443Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5903
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0024
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0528
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 DAMASCUS 000094
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA, NEA/I, NEA/IR
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO S/E MITCHELL
NSC FOR SHAPIRO
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2029
TAGS: PREL IAEA KPAL PGOV PTER IR IS IZ SY
SUBJECT: CODEL SMITH: ASAD POSITIVE ON NEW BILATERAL
RELATIONS, DEFENDS SYRIA'S REGIONAL EQUITIES
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.
¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 31 meeting with CODEL Smith,
President Bashar al-Asad expressed hope for better relations
with the new U.S. administration, called for immediate and
sustained U.S. engagement in the region, and defended Syria's
relations with Iran, Hizballah and Hamas. On Iran, Asad
disputed assertions that Iran's nuclear program was military
in nature. Successfully dealing with Iran would require the
West to drop its demand that Iran freeze its enrichment
activities as a condition for further discussions. Western
countries could succeed only by recognizing Iran's NPT right
to pursue a civilian nuclear program and moving the
politicized issue out of the UN Security Council. On
U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations, Asad maintained the Syrian
people were reacting positively to the new administration; a
frank bilateral dialogue based on U.S. and Syrian interests
could help to construct a mechanism for promoting
cooperation. Asad argued the region needed U.S. involvement
to reverse the damaging legacy of the previous
administration. Peace with Israel was the only way for Syria
to achieve prosperity for its people, but Gaza had inflamed
the region and would pose difficult obstacles to re-starting
peace discussions. Syria and Israel, he revealed, had been "a
few words away" from moving to direct peace negotiations
before Israeli military operations in Gaza had disrupted the
talks. FM Muallim responded to CODEL calls for re-opening
the American School in Damascus and helping the Embassy build
a new embassy compound by arguing the U.S. first needed to
ease economic sanctions. The positive atmospherics of this
meeting and the subsequent positive local press play suggest
guarded Syrian optimism. The lack of any concrete Syrian
commitments to improve bilateral ties indicates the Syrians
are still taking measure of Washington's intentions. End
Summary
¶2. (SBU) Meeting Participants:
CODEL Members:
The Honorable Adam Smith, D-WA, House Armed Services Committee
The Honorable Susan Davis, D-CA, House Armed Services
Committee
The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, D-MD, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence
The Honorable Ted Poe, R-TX, House Foreign Affairs Committee
The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords, D-AZ, House Armed Services
Committee
The Honorable Glenn Nye, D-VA, House Armed Services Committee
The Honorable Frank Kratovil, D-MD, House Armed Services
Committee
Professional Staff Members:
Mr. John Bohanon
Mr. Alex Kugajevsky
Mr. Bill Natter
Mr. Robert Minehart
U.S. Embassy Damascus:
Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly
Pol/Econ Chief (Notetaker)
Syria:
President Bashar al-Asad
Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid Muallim
Presidential Media Advisor Buthayna Shabaan
-----------------------------------
What Does Syria Want from the U.S.?
-----------------------------------
¶3. (C) A confident Bashar al-Asad greeted the largest U.S.
CODEL since Speaker Pelosi's April 2007 trip to Damascus with
DAMASCUS 00000094 002 OF 006
expressions of hope for better bilateral relations and a call
for reinvigorated U.S. engagement in the region. After
exchanging greetings with President Asad and introducing
CODEL members, Congressman Smith said the election of
President Obama had resulted in a new openness to dialogue
and created an opportunity to explore new approaches to
foreign policy. The CODEL's primary interests and concerns
were Iran's nuclear program and the war on terrorism. Which
issues were most important to Syria? he asked.
¶4. (C) Asad responded it was first necessary to begin with
an assessment of national interests. The U.S. defined
priorities in terms of its role as a global power, whereas
Syria defined its interests as a regional player. Syria's
relations with the previous administration had not been good,
even though both countries shared common interests.
Washington tended to focus on the "20 percent that divided
us," rather than the 80 percent of issues upon which there
were overlapping equities. While it was normal for there to
be differences between countries, Syria hoped the new
administration would recognize and emphasize the
commonalties. Syria remained a developing country, and the
SARG was committed to improving education, standards of
living, and achieving greater prosperity. The key to
achieving these goals was peace with Israel, which continued
to occupy Syrian land.
¶5. (C) The subject of peace required discussion of WMD,
Asad continued. The Syrian government agreed that preventing
the spread of WMD and curbing terrorism were important
objectives. Syria had launched a proposal for a WMD-free
Middle East as a UN Security Council member; the proposal was
now in the UNSC's inactive "blue file." Regarding terrorism,
Asad commented, the U.S. has been fighting it since September
11, 2001, whereas Syria had been fighting terrorism since the
1950s. The point, said Asad, was that discussing objectives
was not enough. Both sides needed to expand the dialogue to
include views on approaching these objectives and identifying
common ground for cooperation. Syria's wish-list from the
U.S. included three items, Asad explained. These were: (1)
No additional U.S. wars in the region; (2) finding a solution
for Iraq; and (3) active U.S. involvement in promoting
comprehensive peace.
--------------------------------------------- --------------
Asad on Gaza, Hamas, Hizballah, and Peace Talks with Israel
--------------------------------------------- --------------
¶6. (C) Congressman Smith agreed with Asad that Syrian
society was largely secular. Yet, while Syria rejected and
actively fought al-Qaeda, Syria maintained close relations to
Hamas and Hizballah, both of which emphasized a
religious-based state and the use of violence. "Your
relations with these groups pose a challenge for us," said
Congressman Smith.
¶7. (C) Asad replied that treatment of these political
issues first required discussion of their social dimension.
Hamas and Hizballah were products of their societies, and
their reliance on extremist ideologies were functions of
Israeli occupation, the political reality Israeli policies
had created, and the lack of actions by leaders to oppose
Israel. Asad argued, "We don't have Hizballah or Hamas in
Syria." Syria could not ignore the political necessity of
dealing with these actors because of their influence on the
ground. He conceded that Syria's embrace of secularism ran
contrary to the ideological banners of Hamas and Hizballah,
noting at one point that "Hamas is technically an illegal
organization" in Syria because of its close association to
the Muslim Brotherhood. But, he continued, "not accepting
these groups' ideologies is not the same as not dealing with
them."
¶8. (C) Asad said he understood the U.S. had a different
view of Hamas and Hizballah, but Syria defined its relations
with these groups based on its interests as a regional
player. Hizballah was an influential group integrated deeply
into Lebanese society and politics. Syria had differences
DAMASCUS 00000094 003 OF 006
with Hizballah, but it could not afford to exclude dealing
with it. Likewise, Hamas represented important
constituencies in the Palestinian arena and could not be
excluded because of ideological differences. Asad
distinguished between a regional culture that made it
impossible to exclude groups because of disagreement over
worldviews and the U.S. "politics of labeling" groups. In
fact, these actors were reacting to Israel's continued
illegal occupation of Arab land which made resistance
necessary. Most Arabs viewed them as organs of resistance
rather than terrorism, Asad continued.
¶9. (C) CODEL members argued U.S. concerns about Iran,
Hamas, and Hizballah reflected the harm these and other
actors were doing to regional stability. Hamas, for example,
continued to advocate Israel's destruction and had chosen
violence when other forms of resistance were available
options. It was advocacy and use of violence that undermined
the possibility of regional peace, and this was why the U.S.
executive and legislative branches viewed these groups with
deep suspicion and scrutiny.
¶10. (C) From Syria's perspective, Asad replied, the goal
was a region free of militants. Getting rid of Hamas and
Hizballah would not achieve this goal, however, since there
would be 10 groups willing to take their place. Israeli
policies of occupation and reliance on violence were the root
of the problem and were making the situation worse. Israeli
violence in Gaza had strengthened the Palestinian desire for
armed resistance, despite Israeli objectives to the contrary.
Moreover, Israeli policies were feeding the spread of
extremism through the region.
¶11. (C) Prior to Israel's late December/early January Gaza
incursion, the mood in Syria about peace with Israel had been
positive, reported Asad. With Turkish assistance, Israel and
Syria were "a few words away" from achieving an agreement to
move to direct negotiations. Hamas had at least implicitly
acknowledged Israel's existence through Khaled Mesha'al's in
principle acceptance of a Palestinian state within 1967
borders. But Gaza had changed the situation completely, Asad
observed. Syria hoped to return to peace talks, but doing so
would require time.
¶12. (C) Congressman Smith replied that Mesha'al could help
things by making the point more publicly and consistently.
Other Hamas leaders were still holding onto the goal of
destroying Israel and this was undermining peace in the
region. Of course they were, said Asad, but what else should
be expected when Israel was conducting military operations in
Gaza? CODEL members argued strenuously that Hamas itself
bore at least some responsibility for provoking Israel
through continuing rocket attacks. Asad countered that
Israel's prolonged blockade of Gaza left Palestinians no
choice but to fight, prompting CODEL members to assert the
importance of Special Envoy Mitchell's efforts to revive the
peace process.
-----
Iran
-----
¶13. (C) CODEL members argued Syria could play an important,
positive role in helping to convince Iran to change its
nuclear policies. Asad resisted this notion, saying Western
countries had erred by referring a highly politicized issue
to the UN Security Council. Iran had agreed in 2003-2004 to
allow IAEA monitoring. But a confrontational U.S. approach
relying on unsubstantiated reports of "illegal" activities
led Iran to suspend its cooperation. Under current
circumstances, Iran would not cave to international pressure
to suspend its enrichment activities as a condition to
further discussions, since this was a right afforded to it as
an NPT signatory. The West needed to understand that Iran
was pursuing interests as a regional actor. Those interests
included securing and defining its borders with Iraq and
Afghanistan and improving ties in the Arab world, Asad
offered.
DAMASCUS 00000094 004 OF 006
¶14. (C) At different times throughout the meeting, CODEL
members stressed the prevailing international view that Iran
was pursuing nuclear weapons. There was growing concern that
Iran would probably cross the threshold within the next 12
months. That left the international community a short window
of opportunity to reverse the situation. Syria, CODEL
members stressed, could play a positive role in influencing
Iranian thinking and averting the need for deploying military
options to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions.
¶15. (C) Asad rejected the assumption that Iran's nuclear
program was military in nature. IAEA Director General
Mohammed al-Baradei had publicly stated the IAEA lacked
sufficient evidence to make this determination. Moreover,
continued Asad, Iran would do what it assessed to be in its
interests; the use of military power against it would
succeed only in strengthening Iran's resolve against Western
demands. Syria would have little influence on Iranian
thinking in this regard. The best advice from Syria to the
West was to remove the Iranian nuclear file from the UN
Security Council and treat it as a technical monitoring issue
in the IAEA. Iran might then respond positively to such a
gesture, contended Asad.
¶16. (C) CODEL members stressed the urgency of the Iranian
nuclear issue, noting their strong support for President
Obama's policy, according to which Iran could not be allowed
to become a nuclear weapons state. Israeli officials had
stated repeatedly they would act to prevent Iran from
crossing this threshold. Syria could and should use its good
relations with Iran to prevent such a scenario, CODEL members
reiterated. Asad again rejected the assumption that Iran's
nuclear ambitions were military in nature. "We are against a
military program," he said, arguing Syria shared a common
objective. Syria preferred a different, non-politicized
approach, however. "You must accept Iran's right to develop
a civilian nuclear program," the Syrian President stipulated.
Iran would not listen to the West or even to Syria unless
this condition were met. Moreover, the West needed to
recognize that Iran had legitimate security interests in the
region, Asad repeated.
----
Iraq
----
¶17. (C) In response to CODEL inquires about Syria's
relationship with Iraq, Asad reaffirmed Syria's interest in
better relations with its eastern neighbor. Asad referred to
his 2007 meeting with Iraqi President Talabani in Damascus
and said little had improved concretely, despite continuing
Syrian efforts to engage Baghdad. The Syrian regime had
criticized Iraq's Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) because
the Iraqi government was clearly acting at the behest of the
United States. U.S. influence had directed Baghdad away from
better relations with Syria and had blocked the
implementation of economic cooperation MOUs despite their
mutual benefit to both countries. At present, Syria held a
negative view of the Iraqi political process because it had
excluded important voices. Syria believed U.S. domination
had prevented a serious reconciliation effort and that Iraq's
confessionally-based political system was likely to collapse
due to unmitigated factional rivalries.
¶18. (C) On the subject of Iraqi refugees, Asad contrasted
the 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in Syria with the 500,000
Palestinians, noting Iraqis had a state to which they could
return. He commented the large influx of Iraqis in a short
two-year period had led to a significant increase in Syria's
population and was a drain on Syria's economy. Asad
complained that Iraq had enjoyed budget surpluses of $40
billion during each of the previous two years, but Baghdad
had not contributed any money to educating Iraqi children in
Syria. As a political/social issue, however, the Iraqi
refugees posed several challenges that Syria could not afford
to ignore. Iraqi refugees were moving toward narcotics
trafficking, prostitution, and terrorism. The SARG had
focused on opening Syrian schools to Iraqi students in order
to prevent the loss of an Iraqi generation, he said. Syrian
DAMASCUS 00000094 005 OF 006
officials feared that the next generation of Iraqi youth
would return to their country unprepared for the challenges
awaiting them. They would be "a bomb that would explode
Iraq" and provide a fertile ground for extremism. This was
a problem neither the U.S., nor Syria, nor Iraq could avoid,
Asad argued.
-----------------------------------------
Improving U.S.-Syrian Bilateral Relations
-----------------------------------------
¶19. (C) CODEL members said Syria, and not just the U.S.,
needed to demonstrate a desire for better relations. They
argued Syria could take positive steps such as re-opening the
American School in Damascus and granting permission for the
U.S. Embassy to build a new compound. Asad responded that he
saw the new U.S. administration as a new opportunity. Syria
was interested in improving the lives of its people and
needed U.S. engagement to achieve peace in the region. The
U.S. was not a great power because of its military, he added,
but rather because of its moral authority, economic might,
and technological sophistication. The U.S. had failed to
dominate the region by force alone and now had to confront
the consequences of previous failed policies. But Syria
wanted the U.S. to lead so long as it did so without relying
exclusively or even principally on military force.
¶20. (C) Dialogue remained essential between the U.S. and
Syria, Asad asserted. He agreed with CODEL arguments that
small steps could improve atmospherics, but asked the group
to understand the depth to which relations had sunk with the
previous administration. Asad explained he had faced a
choice after the October 26 U.S. attack on Abu Kamal that had
killed eight innocent Syrian civilians. "I could have closed
the American school or sent Syrian troops into Iraq to target
American soldiers," he argued. Choosing the former option
had signaled Syria's interest in preserving the possibility
of better relations with the new administration.
¶21. (C) Congressman Smith replied that both sides could
dwell on past grievances, but this would not yield any
positive results. Asad concurred, saying Syria wanted and
was trying to turn a new page. He had agreed in principle to
reopening the American school with former President Jimmy
Carter in December; the new Administration should signal its
respect for Syria. As a practical matter, Asad added, it
would be difficult to open the school at present because
students were now studying elsewhere and it would take time
for the school to make the necessary preparations to resume
operations.
¶22. (C) FM Muallim interjected that Syria's major bilateral
issues were with the U.S. Congress. He complained that U.S.
economic sanctions, particularly the 2003 Syria
Accountability Act (SAA), prevented U.S. companies from
selling medical technology to Syrian hospitals and spare
parts for commercial aircraft. In light of these
restrictions, he asked, "How can you ask us about schools and
Embassy buildings?" Congressman Smith argued the U.S.
Congress had passed the SAA for specific reasons. "These are
past us," replied Muallim, arguing that Syrian troops had
left Lebanon for good. The U.S. was now focusing on Syria's
potential contributions for regional stability, answered
Congressman Smith. The President had hired key officials,
such as APNSA Jones, with regional experience and had
dispatched Senator Mitchell to the region less than a week
into his term. Congress also played a role and would look
into existing legislation concerning Syria, Congressman Smith
added.
¶22. (C) Ending the conversation where it started, Asad and
CODEL Smith discussed Hamas's role in the current regional
crisis. Hamas ideology ran contrary to the pursuit of peace,
argued CODEL members. In addition, added one CODEL
participant, Americans regarded Iranian President Ahmedinejad
as negatively as Syrians and Iranians appeared to regard
former President Bush. Asad responded that Hamas had
expressed a willingness to live within 1967 borders. "Why
DAMASCUS 00000094 006 OF 006
don't you take this positive development and build on it," he
argued. Hamas was incapable of amending its position
quickly, he added. Regarding the American school, Asad
suggested "we can look at the SAA and schools together." For
Iran, Asad summarized, Syria's approach had the most
credibility because it was based on mutual trust. The
importance was to continue the conversation and to reach
agreement on the right mechanism to coordinate U.S. and
Syrian positions, Asad said. Asad stated he was willing to
make positive statements about future U.S.-Syrian relations
and hoped there would be similar remarks coming out of
Washington.
-------
Comment
-------
¶23. (C) Asad was cautiously optimistic about, and seemed
genuinely open to improved bilateral relations. Local
post-CODEL press play was generally upbeat and positive. The
SARG's unwillingness to avoid any concrete commitments at
this stage suggests Asad is still taking measure of the new
U.S. administration, a process that is likely to continue for
some time. Asad's reliance on international relations jargon
in defense of Syria's relationships with Iran, Hamas, and
Hizballah reflected some refinement of his talking points,
but the Syrian President's positions indicated no increased
understanding of USG priorities and decisionmaking. FM
Muallim's efforts to transform Asad's in principle agreement
with President Carter to reopen the American School into an
issue linked to the easing of U.S. economic sanctions
demonstrates Syrian guile at its best and worst. Changing
the terms of the deal is a common feature of doing business
in the souks of Syria. The President's office is no
exception.
¶24. (SBU) CODEL Smith did not have an opportunity to clear
on this cable.
CONNELLY