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Viewing cable 09CHIANGMAI18, TOUGHER TIMES AHEAD FOR PRO-THAKSIN FORCES IN NORTH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CHIANGMAI18 2009-02-02 08:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO0511
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0018/01 0330833
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 020833Z FEB 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0963
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1041
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000018 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PROP TH
SUBJECT: TOUGHER TIMES AHEAD FOR PRO-THAKSIN FORCES IN NORTH 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 247 (PRESSURE ON THAI GOVERNMENT) 
     B. CHIANG MAI 10 (PRO-THAKSIN VOTE DROPS) 
     C. CHIANG MAI 4 (THAKSIN'S HEARTLAND MAY MOBILIZE) 
     D. CHIANG MAI 3 (REDSHIRTS FLEX) 
     E. 08 CHIANG MAI 178 (PRO AND ANTI-THAKSIN) 
     F. 08 CHIANG MAI 168 (POLITICAL TEMPERATURE) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000018  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Sensitive but unclassified; please handle accordingly. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Summary and Comment 
------------------------------------ 
 
1.  (SBU) Despite reports from multiple sources of a decline in 
their support base, pro-Thaksin "redshirt" groups in northern 
Thailand continue to intimidate officials and supporters of the 
present government, even when they travel to northern Thailand 
on personal business.  In the latest spate of incidents, the 
targets were a Deputy Prime Minister, the Deputy Finance 
Minister, and a Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) leader. 
Separately, we understand that the police are scrutinizing 
redshirt activities here more closely and considering pressing 
charges in some cases, and that the Government may attempt to 
close the main pro-Thaksin community radio station in Chiang Mai. 
 
2.  (SBU) Comment: Legal action against the Rak Chiang Mai 51 
(Love Chiang Mai 51 -- RCM51) group and other redshirt 
protestors appears warranted in some cases due to their use of 
violence.  However, such action would raise concern over 
double-standards given the Thai Government's reluctance so far 
to prosecute PAD leaders and members over their seizure of 
Government House and Bangkok's two airports in 2008.  Failure on 
the part of the government and law enforcement to treat both 
sides equally would only inflame political tensions that are 
already high, and could result in increased sympathy for the 
redshirts if the general public believes they are being unfairly 
targeted.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Redshirts on the Hunt 
-------------------------------- 
Q 
3.  (U) In three recent incidents, redshirt groups have made it 
clear they will continue to intimidate officials and supporters 
of the Royal Thai Government during their travels to northern 
Thailand, even if their trips are not of an official nature.  On 
January 24, members of the pro-Thaksin RCM51 group interrupted a 
gathering of Chiang Mai University alumni at which Deputy Prime 
Minister Suthep Thaugsuban was present.  In order to prevent 
them from entirely spoiling the festivities, Suthep departed the 
venue and returned almost immediately to Bangkok, according to 
journalists covering the story.  Nonetheless, one Chiang Mai 
University faculty member attending the event was hit in the 
face with a hard object her colleagues believe was a shoe by a 
redshirted, masked assailant. 
 
4.  (U) Separately, on January 21, RCM51 members surrounded a 
Chiang Mai temple at which Deputy Finance Minister Pradit 
Pataraprasit was participating in a merit-making ceremony. 
Accounts differ as to the particulars of the incident, with The 
Nation newsQper reporting that police had to rescue the 
Minister, while our contacts told us that police did not have to 
take action because he had departed the scene before the RCM51 
members arrived.  The Nation also reported that the RCM51 
members were armed with bags of a blood-like substance and that 
they held a ceremony outside the temple cursing the Minister, 
but we were unable to verify this information.  (Note:  RCM51 
has previously used pig's blood against government officials, 
per Ref D.) 
 
5.  (U) On January 23, RCM51 sent supporters to a Buddhist 
meditation center where PAD leader Chamlong Srimuang was 
reported to be.  They entered the complex searching for him, 
demolished some of the rickety shacks, and set others ablaze. 
As it turned out, Chamlong did not even travel to Chiang Mai. 
 Journalists covering the story allege that RCM51 knew Chamlong 
would not be present, but wanted an excuse to attack the center, 
which they view as pro-PAD. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------- 
Protection and Support for Redshirts Waning? 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------- 
 
6.  (SBU) RCM51 and other redshirt groups have long benefited 
from police indifference toward their activities (Ref E), but 
that may be about to change.  Not only have rumors begun 
circulating about the search for a replacement for the current 
Region 5 Police Commander, who is a classmate of Thaksin's, but 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000018  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
also Deputy Prime Minister Suthep has made public comments about 
the need for a shake-up in the police force.  A reporter also 
told us he expected an announcement soon about the imminent 
change.  Separately, the Chiang Mai Vice Governor in charge of 
security affairs told us that the police have been instructed to 
wrap up investigation of the cases involving violence by the 
redshirts, paving the way for legal action against them. 
 
7.  (SBU) Incidents under investigation include the murder of 
the father of Chiang Mai's pro-PAD community radio station 
operator last December, and the assault against two 
Constitutional Court officials at Chiang Mai airport last 
November.  The Vice Governor told us he believes that charges in 
these and other pending cases will send a message to RCM51 that 
it is no longer above the law, and may deter it from future 
violent actions.  Furthermore, according to a member of the 
press, RCM51 leaders were summoned to Provincial Police 
headquarters on January 28 and cautioned against future 
transgressions. 
 
8.  (SBU) Separately, a senior police contact told us that 
hard-core members of RCM51 now number 50-60, though the group 
can still mobilize 200-300 supporters via its community radio 
station.  Another contact pointed to signs that the redshirts' 
support base is on the decline:  he claims that their funding 
sources are drying up and they are unable to gain the support of 
MPs in the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai opposition party.  In addition, 
some key voices at Chiang Mai University who were previously 
sympathetic to the redshirts cause or who stayed out of the 
political fray, have begun calling for a stop to the redshirts' 
aggression and for impartial law enforcement. 
 
-------------------------- 
Woe on the Radio? 
-------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) In another development, a Minister in the Prime 
Minister's office recently spoke of the need to close five 
community radio stations in Thailand, including two in Chiang 
Mai and Lamphun provinces, for being used as political tools and 
instigating unrest.  The only station cited by name in the press 
report was the Taxi Lovers Club station in Bangkok, which is 
pro-Thaksin.  Citing credible sources, a reporter with whom we 
spoke said that the pro-Thaksin station in Chiang Mai was 
another station that would be closed.  The Minister in question 
nonetheless reportedly said, "There will not be discrimination 
against rivals." The same reporter told us that some DJs had 
left the pro-Thaksin station in question to establish their own 
stations.  RCM51 leader and oQator of Chiang Mai's main 
pro-Thaksin station confirmed that many of his emplQees had 
left because he was not able to pay them a regular salary since 
his station was commercial free and therefore did not earn 
advertising revenue. 
 
10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
MORROW