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Viewing cable 09BUJUMBURA79, ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BUJUMBURA79 2009-02-17 13:25 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bujumbura
P 171325Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1378
INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 000079 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF/RSA CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, INL/AAE AARON ALTON, 
AND DS/T/ATA TONY GONZALEZ; LONDON, PARIS, PLEASE PASS TO 
AF WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KCRM ASEC FR BE NL BY
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF BURUNDIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
JUDICIAL TRAINING NEEDS 
 
REF: STATE 5448 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Government of Burundi (GOB) faces 
significant challenges in reforming its security sector, 
including a lack for training for mid-level officers within 
the Burundian National Police (PNB) and a pervasive culture 
of impunity.  The GOB is willing to partner with 
international actors in reform efforts, but lacks an 
organizational culture that allows training focused on 
high-level authorities to permeate throughout the PNB. 
Therefore, training for mid-level police in every aspect of 
police procedure is Post's highest priority.  International 
partners, including the Dutch, UN, French and Belgians, are 
leading comprehensive security and justice reform efforts 
that allow for complementary training programs.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Challenges to Burundi's Non-Military Security Apparatus 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Burundi,s civilian security sector confronts many 
challenges, many of which come from within the ranks of the 
police themselves.  When the civil war ended in 2005 many of 
the demobilized rebel fighters were integrated into the 
civilian police.  As a result the majority of the police 
force not only have no formal police training or education 
but, as former rebels, had become accustomed to making their 
living through extortion and robbery.  Post receives regular 
reports of police involvement in crimes throughout Burundi. 
 
3.  (SBU) Further, violent crime is pervasive and Burundi's 
security environment is permissive for many other forms of 
criminal activity.  Of particular concern is the large number 
of small arms and light weapons, particularly AK-47s and hand 
grenades, circulating within the population.  There are few 
formal controls on weapons issued to government security 
forces and officials cannot even estimate the vast number of 
weapons in the hands of private citizens.  As a result, 
certain provinces experience daily acts of highway robbery, 
home invasions, auto theft and retaliatory attacks on 
individuals for reasons ranging from land disputes to 
political rivalry.  Although Burundi is not yet a haven for 
drug traffickers and/or money launderers, the lack of 
enforcement of laws and prosecution for crimes, as well as 
pervasive corruption at all levels, make Burundi a potential 
future home for such activities. 
 
4.  (SBU) Further, the courts face a significant backlog of 
cases and lack adequate infrastructure and resources to 
address the problem.  Years of civil war and minimal judicial 
capacity mean that the some civil cases date back several 
decades.  The judiciary's inability to deal with the backlog 
of criminal cases has led to extended pretrial detention 
times and overcrowded prisons.  Further, widespread impunity 
for individuals with means remains a problem and weakens the 
population's faith in an equitable justice system. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Can Burundi Respond to these Challenges? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) The GOB and the upper echelons of the civilian 
security sector understand the problems they face and are the 
only members of the sector currently with the capability and 
training to address Burundi's challenges.  Most of the upper 
management of the police have attended advanced courses and 
conferences concerning all aspects of enacting laws and law 
enforcement but they appear unwilling or unable to transfer 
that knowledge to their subordinates.  Consequently, officers 
in middle management do not understand simple concepts such 
as evidence collection or interviewing witnesses.  Therefore, 
the majority of crimes, with the exception of high-profile 
cases, go uninvestigated and trials are rare. Command and 
control of the street police is even more limited and street 
cops themselves are not empowered nor trained sufficiently to 
handle anything but the most obvious crimes. 
 
6.  (SBU) The justice system suffers from a lack of adequate 
resources and organizational ineffectiveness that make it 
difficult to overcome the many challenges it faces.  Reform 
of the system will take many years and a committed group of 
partners.  The culture of impunity that exists is a political 
problem that must be addressed at the highest levels of 
government before it is erased at the local level. 
Nevertheless, sustained professional training will help speed 
progress. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Burundi's Training Requirements 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The PBN needs training in all aspects of law 
enforcement at all but the highest levels.  The officers in 
middle management need training in the law, leadership, 
public affairs, human rights, investigations, forensics, 
computers, financial crime, terrorism, traffic law and basic 
policing.  The street police need to be trained in use of 
force, officer safety, weapons maintenance and handling, law, 
traffic management, civil rights and how to deal with the 
public. 
 
8.  (SBU) The United Nations and the Belgian Technical 
Cooperation are leading a comprehensive reform effort of the 
judicial system.  However, further resources to assist the 
judiciary with training in judicial access, justice for 
minors, professionalization of judges, capacity-building for 
local administrations and further assistance to victims of 
domestic violence are needed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Burundi's Willingness to be an Effective Partner 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
9.  (SBU) The GOB is an eager, willing and receptive partner 
in the fight to professionalize its security and justice 
sectors.  Instead of focusing solely on senior security 
officials however, Post feels there is a significant benefit 
to training mid-level officers in basic police concepts. 
 
------------------------------ 
International Partner Efforts 
------------------------------ 
 
10.  (SBU) The most significant partners in security sector 
capacity-building and reform are the United Nations, the 
Belgians, the French and the Dutch.  The United Nations is 
training police instructors, providing uniforms, gear, radios 
and vehicles, as well as assistance in controlling small arms 
and light weapons.  The Belgians have assisted the PNB in 
creating and implementing a training program designed to 
train all street police and officers in the basics of human 
rights and law enforcement.  As of early 2009, 16,000 police 
and 1,000 officers have completed the first week-long module 
addressing code of conduct, human rights, civics and mission 
and organization of the PNB.  Six hundred police and 45 
officers have also received the second week-long module on 
use of force. 
 
11.  (SBU) The French laid the cornerstone February 16 of a 
police academy which will offer a two-year graduate-level 
training course to 60 officers per course. The Dutch are 
tackling command and control by advising the Ministry of 
Internal Security on the creation of a comprehensive 10-year 
strategic plan to overhaul and professionalize the PNB.  To 
assist in the execution of the plan, the Dutch have one 
full-time advisor from the Dutch police force that is 
embedded with the PNB.  Further, the Dutch are financing a 
police officer census and the creation of a computer database 
to manage human resources, and will provide and assist in 
database maintenance.  The Dutch are also working to build 
six regional police training facilities, but land and 
contract disputes have stalled the project.  Most countries 
with representation in Burundi provide some type of training 
support to upper level police officials, but the same 
individuals continue to attend the external training. 
 
12.  (SBU) The United States is promoting police 
professionalism through regional training efforts and 
programs designed to control small arms and light weapons. 
Two officers have been sent to and completed training at the 
FBI,s National Academy in Quantico.  Burundi has just been 
accepted into the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) in Gaborone.  Four officers have already attended DEA 
training at ILEA and as many as 14 are scheduled to attend 
training before the end of the year.  The Department of 
Homeland Security is providing training in border security 
with regional training to be conducted in Nairobi.  The U.S. 
is also planning to support the fight against uncontrolled 
small arms and light weapons through construction of 
police-based armories and by training weapons custodians to 
properly implement existing weapons control policies. 
 
13.  (SBU) The United Nations and the Belgian Technical 
Cooperation are leading a comprehensive reform effort of the 
judicial system that includes four embedded advisors within 
the Ministry of Justice.  Further assistance includes 
infrastructure development, professioanlization training, 
promoting wide judicial access for disadvantaged people, 
providing vehicles and computer equipment, and developing a 
public relations strategy to help reduce violence against 
women and children. 
 
---- 
POC 
---- 
 
14.  (SBU) Further correspondence can be directed to Regional 
Security Officer Chris Bakken at bakkenca@state.gov. 
 
 
Moller