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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA196, BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA196 2009-02-13 19:33 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO2496
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0196/01 0441933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131933Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3566
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0292
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1564
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0135
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0023
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9099
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7285
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3551
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6094
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0864
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000196 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/MNSA 
GENEVA FOR CD 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
USNATO FOR POL 
UESEU FOR POL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP PARM UNGA IAEA NPT BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES ABOUT VIEWS ON NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
REF:  STATE 6970 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY.  Brazilian Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) 
Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, 
Minister Santiago Mourao, to stressed that Brazil would like to see a 
consensus document come out of the 2010 Review Conference concerning 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  To avoid the failure of 
the 2005 RevCon, this time there must be a balanced approach, not 
just focused on nonproliferation, but also on the other two NPT 
pillars:  disarmament and peaceful uses.  While concerned about 
issues of noncompliance, universality of NPT membership, and 
discouraging withdrawals, Mourao had to balance the sovereignty 
concerns.  He envisioned that Brazil will be expanding its enrichment 
and reprocessing capabilities as it became a major producer and 
supplier of nuclear fuel.  Brazil is not looking to agree to an IAEA 
Additional Protocol and will oppose efforts to make it a universal 
requirement (absent carving out an exception for them).  Detailed 
answers to the NPT questions raised in REFTEL are provided below. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) On February 12, 2009, Environment, Science and Technology, 
and Health (ESTH) Counselor and Political Officer met with Brazilian 
Ministry of Exterior Relations (MRE) Director of the Division for 
Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, to 
discuss issues concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and the third Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in May of this 
year leading to the Review Conference (RevCon) in April-May 2010. 
Per REFTEL, EmbOffs raised the questions about the NPT per REFTEL. 
Mourao was expansive, and described at length his views about nuclear 
nonproliferation, nuclear energy, and disarmament.  The answers to 
the NPT questions in REFTEL are provided below, keyed to the 
questions.  SEPTEL will report on the other aspects of Mourao's 
remarks. 
 
3.  (C) Answers keyed to REFTEL's NPT questions: 
 
QUESTION A.    What are Brazil's objectives for the NPT in general, 
and for the current review process in particular? 
 
ANSWER A.    Given the failure of the 2005 RevCon to agree on a Final 
Document, Mourao believed that the most important objective for this 
NPT review cycle would be to reach consensus on such a document this 
time around.  While acknowledging that many problems remain from the 
previous cycle, Mourao saw reason for optimism because of what he 
termed "new approaches" to key NPT issues by key states, including 
the nuclear weapons states (NWS).  In addition, Mourao believed that 
all three NPT pillars - disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful 
uses - should be addressed strengthened to "preserve the balance" of 
the Treaty.  He said that in 2005 there was a lack of balance, with 
the majority of the attention on nonproliferation, while leaving 
disarmament and peaceful uses to the side.  This imbalance, he 
opined, contributed to the failure to reach consensus. 
 
QUESTION B.    What policies or actions regarding the NPT does Brazil 
hope to see from the United States? 
 
ANSWER B.    Mourao believed that the most important step the United 
States could take at this point would be to join with the other NWS 
to reiterate their disarmament commitment contained in the Treaty. 
The NWS had done this in the past and he saw this as a prerequisite 
for any effort to reach a consensus.  He also pointed to what he 
considered helpful USG signals on the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty(CTBT) and potential agreement on a cutoff of production of 
fissile material as positive indicators for the PrepCon.  While 
 
BRASILIA 00000196  002 OF 003 
 
 
Mourao noted the substantial progress made by the USG on dismantling 
weapons stockpiles, he stated that disarmament was more than reducing 
stockpiles.  Revising defense policies to reduce the role of nuclear 
weapons is also a part of disarmament.  He called attention to U.S. 
military doctrines that still allow for the use of nuclear weapons as 
undermining overall disarmament goals. 
 
QUESTION C.    What does Brazil believe would represent a successful 
outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the 2010 Review 
Conference?  How important is it for Parties to reach consensus on 
substantive matters? 
 
ANSWER C.    For Brazil, a consensus agreement that reaffirms the 
three pillars of the NPT is their desired outcome for this NPT cycle. 
 He recognized the myriad of complex, sensitive issues involved and 
so was favoring something along the lines of a recommitment to 
principles together with an overarching framework that would provide 
a process for continuing the discussions.  Brazil is prepared to work 
with the United States and other NPT members, particularly the "New 
Agenda" coalition - composed of Brazil, Sweden, Ireland, Mexico, 
South Africa and Egypt - to reach consensus on substantive issues at 
the RevCon.  Mourao expressed his view that to gain consensus, the 
Final Document would have to be "balanced" and not just "Iran 
bashing."  He also suggested that the NPT process could result in 
better management of what he termed "a proliferation of 
nonproliferation initiatives."  Mourao made clear that reaching a 
consensus at the RevCon is critical for Brazil, far more important 
than concluding any particular substantive item. 
 
QUESTION D.    Does Brazil believe that NPT parties should take 
action to address the NPT issues described below?  If so, what 
actions would it support? 
--  Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and North 
Korea. 
--  The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from the 
Treaty. 
--  The lack of NPT universality. 
--  The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and the 
Additional Protocol. 
--  The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to 
additional countries. 
-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible 
international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
consistent with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. 
--  Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations 
relating to nuclear disarmament. 
--  Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with regard to 
their nuclear weapons forces and policies. 
 
ANSWER D. 
 
Noncompliance - Brazil shares the United States' concerns about the 
issues mentioned under this question but is not ready to endorse 
specific actions in response.  As noted above, Mourao stressed that 
they did not want the RevCon to be an "Iran bashing" affair.  Brazil 
believes that the review process should include discussion of 
noncompliance and these other issues, but longstanding Brazilian 
concerns about the primacy of national sovereignty remain strong. 
Mourao termed the issue of noncompliance "difficult" and supported 
continued coordination on Iran and North Korea to keep them within 
the NPT framework.  He claimed that the U.S. agreement with India 
could weaken efforts to urge noncompliant states to comply, even 
though India is not a NPT member. 
 
Withdraw - Brazil has no answer to the question of what should be 
done in the case a state party withdraws form the Treaty and would 
prefer to work to avoid such a situation.  He said that he supported 
 
BRASILIA 00000196  003 OF 003 
 
 
making it more difficult to leave or more attractive to stay in, 
especially if a country has benefited from cooperation and technology 
under the peaceful uses pillar.  Nonetheless, at the same time, he 
concluded that a country was sovereign and would have the right to 
withdraw. 
 
Universality of NPT Membership- The lack of universality is an issue 
that is not likely to be solved, according to Mourao.  Brazil 
supports outreach to non-NPT states but does not believe universal 
membership is achievable in the short term.  He did not want to amend 
the NPT to allow them in because once the treaty was opened up for 
amendments the balance would be upset and all sorts of changes would 
be called for.  In the long term, he could see that there might be 
something along the lines of an NPT Plus Three (Israel, India and 
Pakistan) structure. 
 
Universality of Safeguards and Additional Protocol - This is a very 
sensitive issue.  Brazil's position is that at a minimum there should 
be no measure that requires explicitly or implicitly Brazil (and 
Argentina, is partner in the Quadpartite Agreement with the IAEA) to 
take on additional safeguard obligations. 
 
Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) Capabilities - With the expected 
massive expansion of nuclear power in South America and the rest of 
the world, Mourao said the current system of nuclear fuel supply and 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities would have to change.  He 
thought the RevCon could frame the issues, but wouldn't resolve them. 
 He identified several options, such as having regional fuel 
suppliers (which would mean Brazil for South American), or an 
international system, or something else.  He stressed that Brazil was 
determined to become self-sufficient in supplying nuclear fuel, which 
would involve significant expansion of its ENR capabilities.  Mourao 
envisioned a Brazil-Argentine joint venture becoming the dominant the 
supplier for at least South America.  Mourao said that Brazil had 
been willing to support an effort at the Nuclear Suppliers Group to 
require recipients of ENR technology to have an Additional Protocol 
in place (so long as Brazil and Argentina were understood to be 
grandfathered in through their inspection system).  However, he was 
seeing internal reluctance to continuing support for that position. 
 
Peaceful Uses - The RevCon needs to look at promoting peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy, not just nonproliferation, according to Mourao. 
 
Disarmament and NWS Transparency - It is important that the RevCon 
address disarmament too, Mourao emphasized.  He saw a need for the 
NWS to once more confirm their commitment to disarmament.  He would 
like to see efforts to not just reduce numbers of weapons, but also 
revising military policies to reduce the role played by nuclear 
weapons.  In support of disarmament and transparency, Brazil plans to 
propose a listing of steps toward disarmament taken by NPT members. 
This would include a range of activities, such as weapons reduction 
by the NWS and non-NWS dismantling of weapons programs or elimination 
of weapons, such as by Libya, South Africa, and Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. 
 
SOBEL