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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA190, UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 3:

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA190 2009-02-13 16:38 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1920
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0190/01 0441638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131638Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3559
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7394
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4865
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6088
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4345
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1673
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6826
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4116
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0454
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7681
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 1762
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2699
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0860
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9093
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7279
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3545
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON BR
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S FOREIGN MINISTRY, PART 3: 
INTER-AGENCY COMPETITION 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 0180 
     B. BRASILIA 0177 
     C. 2008 STATE 115233 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) As Brazil takes an increasingly prominent place on the 
international stage, its Foreign Ministry, known widely as 
Itamaraty after its headquarters building, finds itself 
facing unaccustomed inter-agency competition.   Still 
Brazil's most prestigious ministry and the unquestioned lead 
on foreign affairs matters, Itamaraty is nonetheless 
experiencing some erosion of its control over foreign policy 
decisions.  This is likely to continue as Brazil's 
involvement with more countries across a broader range of 
issues continues to expand.  For now, though, Itamaraty 
continues to exercise considerable control over almost all 
elements of the U.S.-Brazil relationship, aided by legal 
authority, a poorly developed inter-agency process, and 
insufficient preparation in many other ministries.  As noted 
ref A, advancing U.S. interests in Brazil will require 
broadening our relationship with Brazilian government 
institutions and non-governmental players.  As we do so, 
successful strategies will also take into account Itamaraty's 
influence, interests, and likely reactions, and will map out 
when and in what way to engage this still-dominant foreign 
policy player. 
 
2. (C) This is the third and final cable in a series on 
Itamaraty.  Along with the inter-agency dynamics described 
here, the foreign policy ideology put in place by Lula and 
his three principal foreign policy advisors (ref A), 
Itamaraty's institutional difficulties as it seeks to meet 
Brazil's global aspirations (reftel B), and a large new 
cohort of more pragmatic and globally oriented diplomats will 
make it challenging to work with Itamaraty in the short term, 
but also offer new opportunities to influence this key 
foreign policy player.  End summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Control Issues 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) Itamaraty has long been the pre-eminent GOB agency on 
almost all international relations matters (with the 
exception of some international financial issues), guarding 
its prerogatives through both policy and bureaucratic 
instruments.  Itamaraty provides international affairs 
advisors to most of the principal GOB executive branch 
agencies including the presidency, to congress, to the 
Supreme Court and other elements of the judiciary, to former 
presidents, and to larger state and municipal governments. 
These senior advisors generally have direct access to the 
minister or other senior leadership, and it is rare for 
foreign diplomats to attend a high-level meeting without 
having an Itamaraty representative present.  Many ministries, 
particularly those with less experience working international 
issues, practice self-censorship, often refusing to engage 
their counterparts in other governments without a green light 
from Itamaraty.  The Labor Ministry, for example, which does 
not have an Itamaraty advisor, almost always insists on 
having Itamaraty involved in anything more than an 
informational meeting with foreign government 
representatives.  Officials at the Racial Integration 
Secretariat (SEPPIR), whose minister signed and has the lead 
on our bilateral action plan on racial discrimination, almost 
always ask Itamaraty to join our meetings, and often defer in 
our discussions to more junior MRE colleagues. 
 
4. (C) Itamaraty intends and uses these advisors to monitor 
and control other agency contacts with foreign governments, 
 
BRASILIA 00000190  002 OF 003 
 
 
but their presence is not necessarily detrimental to U.S. 
interests.  While most are zealous to ensure Itamaraty 
control and a few are actually obstructionist, others have 
been helpful in moving a bureaucracy not used to working 
international issues or in achieving Foreign Ministry 
cooperation or approval for our initiatives.  This has been 
the case, for example, with regard to Brazilian participation 
in the OECD.  Although Secretary General (Deputy FM) Samuel 
Pinheiro Guimaraes, Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia, and others who see Brazil as champion of the 
South against the North are preventing serious consideration 
of Brazilian membership, the Finance Ministry (Fazenda) has 
been successfully pushing the envelope by pressing for a red 
light/green light exercise to expand Brazil's participation 
in OECD committees.  This is due in no small part to the 
engagement of diplomats seconded from the Foreign Ministry to 
Fazenda. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
A Losing Battle, But Far from Lost 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (C) Such inter-agency cooperation is not the norm, 
however, and Itamaraty officials generally resent the 
challenge to their prerogatives.  A full-page series of 
articles in Brazil's premier daily on January 19, 2009 
proclaimed the Foreign Ministry's "irritation" with "informal 
chancellors"  (Estado de Sao Paulo, p. A4, "Chanceleres 
Informais de Lula Irritam o Itamaraty").  Among the offenders 
cited were presidential foreign policy advisor Marco Aurelio 
Garcia, Strategic Planning Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 
Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, and Environment Minister 
Carlos Minc.  The stories, which appear to have been 
generated by complaints from within Itamaraty, are almost 
entirely critical of these non-MRE foreign policy players and 
take a familiar tack:  "At Itamaraty, not even the recent 
arrivals from the Rio Branco Institute (Brazil's FSI) doubt 
that the more channels of communication that Brazil has with 
foreign countries, the greater the risk of confusion in the 
implementation of foreign policy."  The line recalls one U/S 
for Political Affairs Everton Vargas has used with several 
USG officials: "It is best to work all issues directly with 
Itamaraty, rather than through others.  Things will always 
work better if you come to Itamaraty first." 
 
6. (C) Because the Foreign Ministry is the recognized and 
legally empowered GOB lead on international issues and must 
approve international agreements before they can be sent to 
the Presidency, ignoring Itamaraty is almost never an option, 
and MRE agreement can be crucial to the success of bilateral 
initiatives.  On the up side, Foreign Ministry buy-in can 
move resistant or less qualified bureaucracies; Itamaraty has 
actively worked to achieve progress on bilateral tax talks, 
for example, and has carefully sought to shepherd a less 
organized SEPPIR to move forward on the Joint Action Plan 
Against Racial Discrimination. On the other hand, even when a 
ministry is willing to work with foreign counterparts, it is 
not uncommon for initiatives to be blocked by opposition from 
Itamaraty.  As a result, even those ministries that more 
habitually work international issues, including the Industry 
and Commerce Ministry (MDIC), the Planning Ministry, Defense, 
and Fazenda, are careful to ensure Itamaraty's concurrence 
when working bilateral or regional issues.  Other ministries 
regularly emphasize to us the importance of working Itamaraty 
to achieve success and are frequently partners in advising 
how best to engage Itamaraty on a particular issue. 
 
7. (C) For example, even under the leadership of its first 
activist minister in the Defense Ministry's nine-year 
history, MOD has made clear that it must pick its battles. 
Consequently, it has been reluctant to pursue a number of 
 
BRASILIA 00000190  003 OF 003 
 
 
possible avenues of cooperation because they would require 
sign-off by Itamaraty.  In a bureaucratic tug of war soon 
after Defense Minister Nelson Jobim took up his post, 
Itamaraty succeeded in getting Lula to delay Jobim's first 
trip to Washington and then sought--unsuccessfully--to limit 
his schedule.  The MOD has been unwilling to press for 
completion of a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement 
(although agreements with Russia, Israel, and Venezuela have 
moved forward) or the renewal of the Military Liaison 
Office's terms of reference.  Both sit in the office of the 
anti-American MRE Secretary General (deputy FM) Samuel 
Pinheiro Guimaraes, without any sign of movement.  Likewise, 
U.S. law enforcement agencies often find Itamaraty 
questioning their cooperation with Brazilian counterparts--in 
January, Itamaraty almost succeeded in preventing the move of 
DEA personnel from Bolivia to Brazil even though the Federal 
Police, the Justice Ministry, and even the Bolivian 
government strongly supported the move (see septel). 
 
8. (C) Nonetheless, under Lula, foreign policy decisionmaking 
has unquestionably become more dispersed at the senior 
levels, drawing in more ministries than ever before, which 
are in turn establishing even broader relationships with 
their counterparts abroad.  In addition, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that globalization and Brazil's expanding 
interests are quickly outstripping Itamaraty's ability to 
manage, provide oversight, and maintain bureaucratic control 
over GOB contacts with foreign counterparts.  Despite his 
battles, Defense Minister Jobim continues to confound 
Itamaraty by winning bureaucratic battles to pursue his own 
international agenda with Lula's blessing.  Justice Minister 
Tarso Genro has likewise been able to overcome Itamaraty 
opposition to work productively with the USG.  As we have 
engaged Brazil in such areas as science and technology, 
education, homeland security, and environment, we have also 
seen evidence that Itamaraty struggles to keep up with 
activist ministers. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comment: A Force to Be Reckoned With 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (C) As noted Ref A, forward movement on many initiatives 
the USG seeks to pursue with Brazil will only be possible by 
working early on with Brazilian players in addition to 
Itamaraty, including the private sector and other 
non-governmental actors, or by engaging via counterpart 
agencies.  It is not in our interest for Itamaraty to be the 
sole filter for working with the GOB.  We have repeatedly 
seen the power of multi-player cooperation, and believe that 
it is fundamental to building a broad-based, long-term 
partnership with Brazil.  At the same time, Itamaraty's 
effort to maintain dominance over bilateral relations is one 
more element, along with ideological forces and institutional 
challenges, that will make the GOB a frustrating partner to 
engage on many initiatives.  As a general rule Itamaraty is 
less enthusiastic than action ministries about partnerships 
with the United States--particularly within South America, 
and more so on non-economic matters--and it maintains a 
significant ability to put a stop to foreign policy 
initiatives that it does not wish to see proceed.  Whether we 
determine that it's best to ask the Foreign Ministry's 
forgiveness or permission, successful strategies will take 
into account Itamaraty's interests and likely reactions, and 
will map out when and in what way to engage this dominant 
foreign policy player. 
SOBEL