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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA188, BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION, THE BALKANS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA188 2009-02-13 15:50 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1831
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0188/01 0441550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131550Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3555
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0004
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0389
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0005
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0010
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0020
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0021
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9089
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7275
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3541
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0021
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000188 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL AORC NATO RS AL BK KV MK BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION, THE BALKANS 
AND CAUCASUS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 11928 
 
Classified By: political Counselor Stephen Liston.  Reason 1.5 (d) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Brazil's position on Kosovo recognition 
has not changed: the GOB would prefer a clear UN consensus in 
favor of Kosovo independence.  Serbia is lobbying Brazil and 
other key UN members to file briefs at the ICJ in its favor. 
The Foreign Ministers of Macedonia and Bosnia have 
recently visited Brazil to seek investment in their countries 
and improved bilateral contacts.  Brazil will enhance its own 
presence in the Balkans with the opening later this year of 
an embassy in Tirana.  Brazil remains curious about the 
situation in the southern Caucasus, prospects for renewed 
violence and Russia's relations with its neighbors and NATO. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  In an extensive discussion with Ministry for 
External Relations (MRE) Director for Eastern Europe 
Elizabeth Mazzella, Embassy Brasilia found that there is no 
change in Brazil's position on recognition of Kosovo.  Brazil 
prefers consensus on UN issues and would like to believe that 
there can be some arrangement possible whereby Serbia can 
accept Kosovo independence, possibly as a condition for EU 
membership or in exchange for territory north of the Ibar. 
Even though the MRE understands that according to the Serbian 
government these scenarios are highly unlikely, Brazil will 
continue to prefer not to take a potentially controversial 
position.  Mazzella mentioned that Brazil has been lobbied 
"skillfully" by Serbian MFA Undersecretary Zoran Vujic to 
file a brief with the ICJ on Serbia's contention that 
Kosovo's declaration of independence is illegal.  Given 
longstanding Brazilian concerns about the importance of what 
it considers international law in defense of national 
sovereignty, the 
MRE is considering Serbia's request.  Comment: That Serbia's 
request would receive consideration has little to do with the 
situation in the Balkans and much to do with long-standing 
Brazilian paranoia that outside forces could potentially act 
to take away Brazil's Amazon region.  While such concerns are 
not based in any real threat, they have a high enough profile 
in Brazilian political discourse that they must be given 
consideration.  End comment. 
 
3.  (C)  Mazzella also reported Serbian fear-mongering about 
the U.S. and Czech governments "arming" Albanian "criminals" 
in the guise of the newly-created Kosovo Security Force 
(KSF).  Embassy polmiloff pointed out that the KSF would be 
smaller and less well armed than the Rio Police Department, 
would be under NATO supervision and would be heavily 
outgunned by Serb forces on Kosovo's borders.  Mazzella asked 
if the EU would be playing a larger role in Kosovo rule of 
law and expressed concern that EULEX was insufficient, citing 
Serbian claims that independent Kosovo would become a haven 
for crime. 
Polmiloff noted that without an improved economy, crime would 
be difficult to control and the greatest barrier to economic 
improvement was the lack of standing with the UN and IFIs 
that discouraged foreign assistance and investment. 
 
4.  (C)  The first part of 2009 has seen an expansion of 
Brazilian attention to the Southeast Europe region with the 
January visits by the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia and 
Macedonia to Brasilia.  Apart from the understandable 
objective of escaping a winter in the Balkans for Brazil's 
more congenial climate, both Ministers had similar goals: to 
improve bilateral ties and to seek investments in their 
countries by portraying them as potential "hubs" for 
commercial activity in the region.  When asked what sorts of 
investments might be possible in Macedonia, Mazzella, replied 
that Brazil has nothing specific in mind but was looking for 
one or two "symbolic" opportunities to demonstrate Brazil's 
global reach by establishing a presence in the Balkans.  Both 
Macedonia and Bosnia signed agreements on visa free travel 
with Brazil and stated intentions to open regional embassies 
in Brasilia to cover all or most of South America.  The 
Brazilian government continues to expand its own diplomatic 
presence abroad and will later this year open its first 
embassy in Tirana. 
 
BRASILIA 00000188  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
5.  (C)  Moving to the east, the Mazzella expressed concern 
about the situation in Georgia.  The MRE had expected that 
President Sakashvili would be forced from office for 
"causing" last year's conflict with Russia.  (NOTE: Without 
diplomatic presence in Georgia, Brazil's information on the 
South Caucasus comes only from Moscow.)  Brazil is encouraged 
by what is seen as more moderate rhetoric from Moscow 
regarding the U.S. and NATO, noting that with the fall in 
world oil process, Moscow now seems less 
confrontational.  Mazzella asked if the new U.S. 
Administration might signal a change in U.S. missile 
defense plans.  While understanding that the U.S. has sought 
dialogue with Russia to provide assurance that anti-missile 
defenses will have no effect on Russian deterrence, Brazil 
believes that missile defense will remain an irritant to the 
NATO-Russia relationship. 
SOBEL