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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA156, COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: MAKING THE 3 PLUS 1
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09BRASILIA156 | 2009-02-06 15:30 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | SECRET | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO5096
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0156/01 0371530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 061530Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3492
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7359
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6064
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7661
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0838
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9046
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7232
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3494
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 BRASILIA 000156
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, S/CT, INL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034
TAGS: PTER EFIN PREL PGOV SNAR KTFN PA AR BR
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM IN BRAZIL: MAKING THE 3 PLUS 1
WORK
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 000504
¶B. 08 STATE 671
¶C. 08 BRASILIA 001264
¶D. 08 BRASILIA 001664
¶E. 05 ASUNCION 001363
¶F. 04 BRASILIA 01291
¶G. 08 BRASILIA 43
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).
¶1. (C) Summary: The 3 Plus 1 Mechanism on Security in the
Triborder Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay
remains, six years after its initial plenary session, the
only instrument available to discuss counterterrorism (CT)
with regional partners at the policy level. Given the
likelihood that the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) will reject
new policy-level proposals for regional security cooperation
as the GOB focuses on building up a regional security
architecture in South America that does not include the
United States (i.e., Mercosul working groups on security,
UNASUL, South American Defense Council), re-invigorating the
3 Plus 1 becomes all the more necessary, both as a means of
achieving meaningful policy-level commitments from Brazil on
this important issue and as a way of maintaining a foothold
in regional security discussions. The United States' turn to
host the upcoming 3 Plus 1 offers the best opportunity since
the initial plenary to shift the dynamics of the mechanism in
a way that ensures its effectiveness and our broader security
interests in the region. Taking advantage of greater GOB
openness to the new U.S. Administration, a concerted USG
strategy to implement this new approach that includes careful
inter-agency preparation and high-level participation could
lay the groundwork for the GOB to accept expanding the scope
of the 3 Plus 1 -- substantively, geographically, or both --
to make it a more effective regional security dialogue. End
Summary.
-------------------------------------
3 Plus 1 and the Brazilian Catch-22
-------------------------------------
¶2. (S) The history of the 3 Plus 1 suggests that it will
require careful planning and execution to make it a truly
effective forum for cooperation. The Brazilians have been
consistent in limiting discussions of topics that are not
within the established and narrow confines of the 3 Plus 1
(only counter-terrorism, only TBA), and have made it nearly
impossible for the USG to propose projects for the four 3
Plus 1 partners to undertake jointly. The Brazilian catch-22
works this way: The GOB refuses to discuss anything but TBA
terrorism in the 3 Plus 1. Although the GOB knows that the 3
Plus 1 is not a forum for sharing intelligence and, as a
result, that there is a limit to how much the USG can provide
regarding terrorism-related activities in the region, it uses
our reticence to share information in this forum to assert
that there is no evidence of terrorist activity in the TBA
and that, if such evidence does exist, the United States is
refusing to show it. (Note: It is not clear the extent to
which MRE authorities, who lead Brazil's 3 Plus 1 delegation,
are aware of the intelligence sharing between other GOB and
USG agencies, or of the intelligence regarding TBA activities
that is in the possession of their own agencies. End note.)
It therefore dismisses the existence of terrorist activity in
the TBA and shuts down most discussions that are explicitly
focused on addressing terrorism-related activities.
¶3. (C) Brazil also parries our efforts by complaining about
the supposed sullying of the TBA's reputation, which they say
undermines their efforts to promote it as a tourist
destination. At the same time, when the United States
proposes to discuss security issues that are broader than the
TBA, Brazil refuses to discuss them precisely because the
issues do not fit the mission of the 3 Plus 1, which is to
discuss issues pertaining to the TBA. For example, at the
January 2008 plenary in Asuncion, Brazil shut down U.S.
efforts to discuss protection of food supplies because the
issue of food security is not a "TBA problem", but "a
universal problem that all countries face." More appropriate
BRASILIA 00000156 002 OF 007
forums exist to discuss that topic, according to Itamaraty.
-----------------------
The Value of 3 Plus 1
-----------------------
¶4. (C) Despite these difficulties, from Mission Brazil's
perspective, even under present circumstances, the 3 Plus 1
mechanism serves several important purposes.
-- Policy-level dialogue: Although law enforcement
cooperation with Brazil has always been excellent and fluid
at the operational level, 3 Plus 1 is the only sub-regional
discussion on these issues in which we participate at a
policy level. As in other areas, Itamaraty continues to
resist engaging with the United States in regional
discussions at the policy level on security issues, even as
regional cooperation with Brazil at the operational level is
growing. As Brazil becomes more confident in its regional
leadership, Itamaraty is becoming more comfortable telling
the United States that our presence is not needed. As a
result, we believe it likely that Itamaraty will reject USG
proposals to establish new regional fora to address security
issues and, if sufficiently concerned about U.S. initiatives,
might make an effort to quash our excellent operational
cooperation. This attitude and concern give added value to
working from within the 3 Plus 1, where we already have
Brazil buy-in for the United States to participate.
-- Networking: Members of the Mission's Law Enforcement
Working Group (LEWG, which includes DEA, DHS (ICE, CBP, and
USSS), DOJ (FBI, RLA), DOD (DAO, MLO), and State) who have
attended the 3 Plus 1 sessions see value in the networking
possibilities created through mechanism. For them, it is an
unparalleled networking opportunity for the four countries,
each of which usually brings a cohort of officials from their
intelligence, law enforcement, and financial agencies, and
LEWG members report that useful discussions occur on the
margins of the plenary.
-- Accountability: The 3 Plus 1 ensures that some
accountability exists among the partners, and this could be
exploited further. For example, a perennial topic of
discussion is the establishment and staffing of the Joint
Intelligence Center in Foz de Iguacu, an initiative that, we
understand, was first proposed during a 3 Plus 1 plenary.
Having announced it at the 3 Plus 1, the Brazilians now have
set up a benchmark for themselves that they feel obligated to
report and deliver on. Although there remain problems with
staffing of the center, it is unlikely that absent the
pressure point that annual 3 Plus 1 meetings represent, that
Brazil or the other partners would have found the wherewithal
to hammer out the legal and diplomatic agreements to create
it. Another element of accountability that we have not fully
exploited relates to compliance with UN resolutions mandating
member states to update their anti-terrorism and terrorism
finance legislation (which neither Brazil nor Paraguay have
done). During the January 2008 plenary in Asuncion, Brazil
made vague statements about several bills dealing with CT
that were various at stages of the legislative process, but
we know that at the time they made those statements the GOB
had already decided to shelve an anti-terrorism bill it had
spent several years drafting (ref a). The 3 Plus 1 allows us
the opportunity to question Brazil and the other partners as
to what progress they have made to comply with basic
international norms, and to remind them of their
international obligations.
-- Information sharing: Even though we rarely come to
agreement on new joint initiatives, the Brazilian delegations
do brief on what are, essentially, law enforcement measures
undertaken by them, such as new surveillance technologies
that have been installed, new police and customs facilities
that are being built, measures to patrol the riverine
frontiers and the Itaipu lake, and the number of interdiction
operations performed by the Brazilian Federal Police.
Mission believes much of this information is valuable for
understanding what the GOB is doing independently and jointly
BRASILIA 00000156 003 OF 007
with its neighbors, not all of which is information we
receive through other contacts or in the vetted and open way
in which it is reported at the 3 Plus 1.
-- Moral suasion: Brazilian government officials repeatedly
cite their participation in the 3 Plus 1 as a measure of
their commitment to combat terrorist activity in the region.
During a November 2008 conference on CT jointly held in
Brasilia and hosted by the UNODC and the Brazilian
government, the head of Brazil's financial intelligence unit
(COAF) and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency's chief of CT
analysis both called the 3 Plus 1 an effective mechanism. To
the extent that the GOB puts value on the 3 Plus 1, it
provides some leverage to encourage Brazil to be a positive
partner.
¶5. (C) As a result of these benefits, Mission Brazil believes
the 3 Plus 1 mechanism should be maintained. But we also
need to look for ways to make it more effective. We see two
main options for improving the mechanism: a somewhat simpler
but less satisfactory evolution to a broader TBA agenda, or a
more difficult and ambitious effort at restructuring the 3
Plus 1 into a country-wide counter-crime forum. Both of
these would be consistent with the ideas presented at the
most recent Regional Security Initiative conference (ref b).
In either case, we would need to think through our approach
to Brazil carefully, make use of the advantages we will have
this year as host, and play on what we expect will be a
desire on the part of the GOB to show goodwill toward the new
U.S. administration in order to have a good chance at
officially re-focusing the mechanism into a broader
geographic and substantive instrument.
---------------------
Option 1: Evolution
---------------------
¶6. (C) The first possible direction is to begin a push to
substantively expand the focus of the 3 Plus 1, to make it,
in essence, the most effective Triboder Area-focused
mechanism it can possibly be. This would entail pushing the
3 Plus 1 fully into the transnational crime milieu. Mission
believes there is sufficient precedent for encouraging an
evolution toward broader transnational crime matters.
¶7. (C) The 3 Plus 1 is an outgrowth of the Tripartite Command
of the TBA, an Argentine, Brazilian and Paraguayan effort to
counter the use of the TBA by organized crime and terrorist
groups that was established in 1996. After the September 11
attacks, the TBA countries invited the United States to
participate in a sister mechanism to the Tripartite Command,
the 3 Plus 1. Although the Tripartite Command was focused
broadly on transnational crime and terrorism, the 3 Plus 1,
at U.S. insistence focused exclusively on terrorism and
terrorist financing, overshadowing and diminishing the TBA
countries' focus on other areas of criminality. In fact, a
1998 agreement between the Tripartite Command called for the
TBA countries to intensify the fight against terrorism,
smuggling (of contraband, arms, people), money laundering,
and drug trafficking.
¶8. (C) Furthermore, a review of the history of the 3 Plus 1
reveals a number of instances were the Brazilians have pushed
to include items related to illicit criminal activity in
various 3 Plus 1 meetings. Some of these items include:
organized criminal activity, cross-border movement of cash,
controlling the borders, drug and arms trafficking,
counterfeit goods, and improved cross-border customs. For
example, during the 2004 plenary the three partners
emphasized the need to continue using the 3 Plus 1 platform
to reinforce the fight against organized, transnational
crime. Heading the Brazilian delegation, then head of the
Ministry of External Relations' (Itamaraty) Office of
Transnational Crime (COCIT), Marcus Pinta Gama emphasized the
need for greater cooperation among the partners in joint
monitoring of air cargo, improved coordination in controlling
cross-border movement of cash, and improved joint customs and
immigration operations. The story was repeated during a
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non-plenary meeting of the 3 Plus 1 countries which took
place in Asuncion in October 2005 to discuss transborder
movement of bulk cash and the illicit use of charities and
again in the late-2005 plenary, when Brazil proposed agenda
items that included drugs and arms trafficking, money
laundering, and border controls. The US delegation,
supported by the Argentine and Paraguayan delegations,
actually pared down this agenda to focus it more heavily on
explicit terrorism-related items.
----------------------------------------
Option 2: A more ambitious expansion
----------------------------------------
¶9. (C) A second possible direction for the 3 Plus 1 would be
to make an effort to expand beyond its narrow focus on the
Triborder area and on CT to cover the entire territory of the
partners over a broader range of issues. An even more
ambitious step would be to invite surrounding nations to
participate, initially as "observers."
¶10. (C) An effort to set a broader agenda could begin by
getting the 3 Plus 1 partners to re-commit to combating all
of the crimes listed in the 1998 agreement (making explicit
reference to the agreement in the process), while offering
increased USG technical and perhaps logistical support to
improve and better coordinate their efforts in those areas.
It is critical, if the path of an expanded agenda that
includes transnational criminal activity in the entire
territory of the partners is followed, that we can justify to
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, that there is a concrete U.S.
interest in these issues. In the Brazilian view, if there is
smuggling activity between Paraguay and Brazil that is a
bilateral problem for the two countries to solve. Being able
to justify our interest in discussing the broader set of
transnational crime issues will require sharing information
that reveals how international criminal activity taking place
in the region is affecting U.S. interests. This could be
dealt with by tasking an intelligence community assessment
that is releasable to the partners prior to the 3 Plus 1,
even if such an assessment were not itself part of the
discussion during the plenary for security reasons.
¶11. (C) Under either option, some possible additional topics
could include, but not be limited to:
-- Critical Infrastructure Protection: This is a perennial
topic of discussion. It would serve the purpose of
continuing to follow up on the Secretary Chertoff visit (ref
c). Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) head General Felix
may be in Washington at the same time as the 3 Plus 1 is
taking place, and, if he could be persuaded to attend parts
of the 3 Plus 1, this and other topics he discussed with DHS
Secretary Chertoff could represent fruitful topics for
discussion.
-- Treasury,s proposal for a Financial Threat Assessment: A
worthwhile proposal that has not been followed up on since it
was brought up at the last 3 Plus 1 in Asuncion.
-- Crossborder kidnapping: An area of particular concern to
Asuncion.
-- Internationalization of gang activity: The growing, and
increasingly transnational, threat of Brazilian prison gangs.
This will be a tricky proposition, but a seed could be
planted for future discussion. In this vein, it would be
useful to know whether there is an Intelligence Community
assessment, or one could be written, examining the
international links of the Brazilian prison gangs (Primeiro
Commando da Capital (PCC) and Commando Vermelho (CV) and its
international links. If a U.S. connection is found, this
could become a legitimate topic of discussion under the 3
Plus 1 rubric.
-- Maritime smuggling and trafficking activity: See post's
annual terrorism report submission (ref d).
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--------------------------------------------
Strategy for Moving Forward is Necessary
--------------------------------------------
¶12. (C) Success at expanding the 3 Plus 1 will require a
careful diplomatic strategy. Brazil is in a comfortable
position now -- it gets the benefits of 3 plus 1 without
having to make commitments -- so it will be reluctant to
accept broad changes to the mechanism. In order to overcome
this expected resistance, we must be tactically savvy and
employ a wider range of tools that we are not now using.
-- High-level U.S. participation: This is a must. Brazil
should see that the 3 Plus 1 is a high priority for the
United States in the context of the region and that we are
committed to making it work. In addition, high-level
participation will likely raise the level of Brazilian
participation, with the salutary effect of ensuring that one
of our most difficult interlocutors in the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry, current COCIT chief Virginia Toniatti, is not head
of the Brazilian delegation. Not only has she proven
resistant to cooperation with the United States on any number
of issues of mutual concern outside of the 3 Plus 1, but her
rank of minister, allows her to refuse to agree to proposals
at the 3 Plus 1 meetings by claiming, plausibly, that she has
no authorization to agree to them. An ambassadorial or
higher head of the U.S. delegation might cause Brazil to send
an equivalent official who does not carry the same negative
baggage.
-- Homework: The US Del needs to be prepared to call Brazil
on its generalities and contradictions in its statements and
positions. Brazil has yet to pass either anti-terrorism or
terrorism finance legislation, and a prepared USDel can
attempt to get more specific answers on record than vague
generalities about "bills that are in various stages of the
legislative process." Adequate preparation can prevent
Brazil from playing the spoiler, as they did during the 2008
plenary, refusing to discuss Trade Transparency Units (TTU),
despite the fact that TTU's had been discussed at previous 3
Plus 1 meetings, during which all the partners had shown keen
interest in the U.S. program (ref e).
-- Inter-agency Planning: A robust inter-agency preparatory
process that includes posts will help ensure that both
specific proposals and the way in which they are to be
presented have been fully discussed and agreed upon, and that
we avoid surprises that make cooperation more difficult. The
2006 Treasury designations just prior to the 3 Plus 1 plenary
that year spoiled our CT dialogue with Brazil at the policy
level for at least a year, during which time Brazilian
officials missed no opportunity to chide the United States
for our "unilateralist" approach to the designations. If the
United States is proposing a topic for discussion that is not
traditionally thought of as falling under the CT rubric, we
will need to make the case early with the Brazilians and--as
previously noted-- be able to justify why such a topic is a
matter of U.S. concern or how it fits into the 3 Plus 1.
Mission recommends an annual post-3 Plus 1 internal USG
meeting (with the 3 posts included) not more than three
months after the plenary to determine how to do follow-up and
to plan the year-ahead agenda leading up to the next 3 Plus 1
-- Patience: We should not expect to be able to accomplish
the goal of broadening the 3 Plus 1 at the next 3 plus 1. We
should expect to plant some seeds prior to this plenary
through Ambassador-level meetings; advance some at the
plenary itself; and continue with the push at subsequent
follow-up meetings.
-- Alternate proposals: We must consider the possibility that
Itamaraty will initially reject expanding the 3 Plus 1. It
will be necessary to float new ideas. Mission has discussed
the following: To challenge Brazil's (largely manufactured)
outrage about the demonization of the region, the United
States could float the idea that "Triborder" be struck from
the 3 Plus 1's official name (or suggest to either Argentina
or Paraguay to do so). Another possible way to challenge
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Brazil's outrage is to propose that Uruguay and Chile be
included in a future 3 Plus 1, initially as observers, in
order to ameliorate the undue focus on the TBA. The idea of
including Chile and Uruguay in the 3 Plus 1 was originally
proposed by the former head of the COCIT, Minister (now
Ambassador) Marcos Pinta Gama (ref f). Although Pinta Gama
proposed it in different setting, it could nevertheless be
noted that Brazil had been open to the idea in the past.
Although the Mission can accept the 3 plus 1 as is, more
careful efforts to re-evaluate our strategy on a regular
basis might yield additional options for advancing our
interests through the 3 Plus 1.
-- Interim Visits: Mission recommends either a non-plenary
gathering as outlined below, or visits to the individual
posts by S/CT representatives as a way to push our goals and
signal a renewed and expanded commitment to the 3 Plus 1.
The United States could propose to hold sub-plenary sessions
at the mid-year point on more narrowly tailored themes.
These took place in the past: in August 2005, a sub-plenary
was held in Asuncion to discuss illicit use of charities and
bulk cash smuggling across borders. Such meetings have tended
to be at the technical level, and as a result carry less
political baggage. But since 2005, no sub-plenary meetings
have been held. Brazil once proposed to hold a sub-plenary
on joint monitoring of air cargo moving through the TBA (an
initiative they later backed off from). The United States
could propose, for example, to host a sub-plenary to discuss
internationalization of gangs in light of our own experience
in dealing with Central American gangs in our country. Such
a sub-plenary could have participation from Portuguese
officials, perhaps as observers, where there are indications
that Brazilian gangs may be gaining a foothold.
-- Follow-up: Regaining momentum will require USG effort on
a year-round basis. There is little to be gained from making
proposals at the 3 Plus 1 that are later dropped or
forgotten. Treasury's excellent proposal to conduct a joint
illicit finance threat assessment was brought up at the 2008
3 Plus 1 in Asuncion. Unfortunately, with no advance notice,
it was initially rejected, and no effort was made to act on
Mission's suggestions that we work it in capitals after the
meeting. Such an assessment could have laid the foundation
for a semi-formal bilateral dialogue in between plenaries and
in future 3 Plus 1 meetings.
--------------------------
If You've Got It, Use It
--------------------------
¶13. (C) The 3 Plus 1 as currently constituted is flawed
structurally because of its specific focus on the Triborder
Area, which narrows potential areas of discussions with the
partners, and its now almost exclusive focus on an issue that
Brazil sees as distinctly secondary, counterterrorism.
Ultimately, in Mission's view, it makes little sense to have
a mechanism to discuss CT or broader transnational crime
issues by focusing on a small bit of territory that, no
matter how problematic, is a small part of a broader security
problem in the region. Mission notes that the CT problem in
Brazil, not to mention the transnational crime problem, is
not confined to the TBA, and that other areas in Brazil, such
as Sao Paulo, are of at least equal concern to the TBA (ref
g). Brazil, however, currently sits in the driver's seat; it
gets to say it participates in the 3 Plus 1 without letting
the mechanism produce much of a positive agenda.
¶14. (C) That said, as Brazilian efforts to build up a
regional security architecture with a Brazilian imprimatur--
such as Mercosul working groups on CT and transnational
crime, UNASUL, and the South American Defense Council --
crowd out U.S. leadership and involvement in regional
security discussions, the 3 Plus 1 provides a useful starting
point and is our only existing foot in the door at the
regional level. By exploiting the natural advantages offered
from hosting the 3 Plus 1 and using the expected goodwill
from the Brazilian government toward the new U.S.
administration, we have the best opportunity to re-invigorate
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this forum and advance our broader security interests in the
region.
SOBEL