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Viewing cable 09BOGOTA526, SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 4-5 VISIT TO COLOMBIA OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BOGOTA526 2009-02-19 18:34 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0526/01 0501834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191834Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7149
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8655
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1677
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 7010
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 9709
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 3031
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7718
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJC/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS BOGOTA 000526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM MOPS MCAP ECON CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 4-5 VISIT TO COLOMBIA OF 
CJCS ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) We welcome the visit of Admiral Mullen to Colombia, 
which comes at a key time in the U.S.-Colombia bilateral 
relationship.  As you know from previous visits, in ten 
years, Colombia has progressed from a near failed state and 
terrorist haven to an economic, political, and social leader 
in Latin America.  Colombia has made major progress in its 
fight against illegal armed groups and set records in the 
eradication and interdiction of drugs.  Murder and kidnapping 
rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of law has 
strengthened through major judicial reforms.  Improved 
security and economic reform has grown the economy, reduced 
poverty, and attracted record levels of investment.  The GOC 
has looked to leverage these successes beyond its borders by 
offering troops to NATO in Afghanistan and providing 
counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to Mexican, 
Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the region. 
 
2. (SBU) Significant challenges remains--especially related 
to human rights abuses within the military.  Drug trafficking 
organizations and illegal armed groups continue to operate in 
large parts of the country, including border areas.  Colombia 
has over three million internally displaced persons, and deep 
social divides still prevent millions of citizens, especially 
in rural areas, from benefiting fully from security and 
economic gains.  Despite progress on human rights, some 
elements of the security forces continue to violate human 
rights, and the military has been accused of numerous 
extrajudicial killings of innocents.  We hope you will be 
able to reiterate to the military leadership the need for 
continued--and significant--progress on these cases and the 
importance of human rights.  Violence against trade unionists 
continues even as the GOC has stepped up prosecutions and 
boosted its protection programs for unionists, human rights 
activists, and other vulnerable individuals.  USG support is 
critical to help the GOC confront these persistent 
challenges, even as we continue our dialogue on how best to 
transfer key security tasks from the USG to the GOC.  End 
Summary. 
 
Democratic Security Advances 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Colombia has achieved successes in its fight against 
the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging 
criminal groups.  The rescue of 15 high-profile FARC hostages 
in July 2008, including three Americans, and the deaths of 
key FARC leaders highlight Colombia's progress in security. 
Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of 
mid-level FARC leaders, and reduced the space in which 
terrorists can operate freely.  A record number of FARC 
members deserted in 2008--including mid and high-level 
commanders.  Total demobilizations of illegal armed groups 
reached 3461 in 2008--primarily from the FARC--making it the 
highest level of demobilizations in Colombia's history. 
 
4. (SBU) With USG help, in 2008, Colombia again set records 
in eradication and interdiction of drugs, while further 
reducing murder and kidnapping rates.  Colombia extradited a 
record 208 criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the 
United States in 2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary 
leaders; Colombia has already extradited more than 20 
criminals in 2009.  The number of homicides fell for the 
sixth consecutive year, dropping to 16,140 (or 33 for every 
100,000 habitants), 45 percent lower than 2002 levels. 
 
Economic Limitations 
-------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Reacting to a projected economic slowdown in 2009, 
the Government of Colombia (GOC) plans to cut the national 
budget by $1.4 billion, including a proposed $190 million 
reduction to the defense budget.  The proposal would likely 
reduce future expenditures on ammunition, rifles, 
communications equipment, infrastructure projects, fuel, 
 
food, and uniforms.  The proposed cuts would not directly 
affect defense expenditures funded by the wealth tax, which 
is expected to raise approximately $3.7 billion between 
2007-2011.  Still, the GOC's ability to sustain current 
levels of defense spending after 2011, when the wealth tax 
expires, is in doubt.  Funding for social programs, critical 
to addressing many of the catalysts for the conflict, will 
also likely suffer due to slower Colombian growth as a result 
of the global downturn.  The economic downturn could generate 
more social unrest, strikes and protests in Colombia in 2009. 
 
 
Regional Context 
---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Colombia sees itself as a key U.S. ally in an Andean 
region increasingly hostile to U.S. values and goals. 
Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Colombia after a 
military strike in March 2008 against FARC Commander Raul 
Reyes's camp just across the border in Ecuador.  The GOC 
maintains a moderate tone with Ecuadorian President Correa, 
despite his often angry rhetoric.  Ecuador recently imposed 
strict requirements on Colombians wishing to travel to their 
southern neighbor. 
 
7. (SBU) Relations with Venezuela are now stable, and have 
improved since Venezuela recalled its ambassador following 
the Reyes attack.  Presidents Uribe and Chavez met in late 
January 2009 in Cartagena, announcing several vague economic 
cooperation agreements.  However, Colombia remains wary of 
Venezuelan ties to the FARC, as evidenced in the computers 
found in the Raul Reyes camp.  Beyond the Andes, Colombia is 
helping Mexico to combat terrorism, narcotrafficking and 
other criminal activity.  Colombia is also working with 
Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brazil to promote economic 
integration and strengthen democratic institutions in Latin 
America.  Colombia has also offered to send engineering and 
special forces to Afghanistan under NATO auspices, and 
contributes troops to the Multi-National Observer Forces in 
the Sinai. 
 
Economic Growth and Free Trade 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (U) After several years of strong economic growth, 
Colombia has begun to feel the pinch of the global economic 
crisis.  Growth slowed to 3.5 percent in 2008 after record 
growth of 7.5 percent in 2007.  Colombia remains highly 
dependent on commodity exports (petroleum, coal, flowers, 
coffee), making it vulnerable to price drops.  Colombia cut 
unemployment and poverty during the past six years, but those 
gains have stalled.  The financial sector remains solid -- 
cushioned to date against the global credit crunch by 
conservative lending practices.  The slowing economy has led 
to growing popular concern over pocketbook issues, and a 
pyramid scandal in 2008 cost Colombians an estimated $1 
billion in savings.  The GOC inked trade deals with Canada, 
Chile, Central America and smaller European countries in the 
last year.  The GOC is now negotiating an agreement with the 
EU.  The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CPTA) 
remains a bilateral priority for the Colombian government and 
private sector, and the GOC may consult with you as to how it 
can work together with the Congress to promote its passage. 
 
Serious Challenges Ahead 
------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development, 
challenges related to violence, narcotrafficking, 
displacement, human rights, labor rights, and minority groups 
remain.  We estimate the FARC has some 9000 fighters in the 
field, and organized narcotrafficking groups continue to 
cause violence.  Internal displacement due to the armed 
conflict remains serious, with three million displaced by 
violence since 1995.  Deep historical social divides make it 
difficult for millions from the Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
populations to benefit fully from security and economic 
 
gains.  These minority groups suffer from limited education, 
health care, and employment opportunities, and 
disproportionate forced displacement in the mostly isolated 
rural areas where they reside. 
 
10. (U) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its 
human rights performance, and we hope you will be able to 
reinforce the human rights message with the GOC leadership. 
Fifty Colombian military officers were recently dismissed due 
to alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings, but such 
abuses remain a serious problem.  We are working with the 
Ministry of Defense to improve rules of engagement, and make 
sure that soldiers accused of human rights abuses are 
investigated by civilian prosecutors.  Labor unionists and 
homicides declined 76 percent between 2001-2008, yet in 2008 
the number of labor homicides (for all causes) increased from 
39 to 46--largely due to a spike in the first 
quarter--although still well below the national homicide 
rate. 
 
11. (U) Through the Center for Coordinated and Integrated 
Action (CCAI), the GOC is recovering territory previously 
held by illegal armed groups and establishing government, 
state services and securing vulnerable communities.  In 2008, 
the GOC reestablished a government presence in all 1098 
municipalities and all the country's mayors once again 
resided within their municipalities.  A coordination plan for 
Macarena--the historic heartland of the FARC--aims to 
establish a permanent military, police and civilian presence 
in post-conflict areas--some of which have never seen a 
viable GOC presence.  Challenges remain, as resource, 
security and staffing shortfalls continue to limit the 
initiative.  The United States, through USAID, MILGRP and 
NAS, provides assistance to CCAI. 
 
USAID: Aiding Communities At Risk 
--------------------------------- 
 
12. (U) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than 
$950 million in economic and social assistance via USAID. 
USAID's initiatives have delivered legal jobs, social 
services, and development in narcotrafficking and conflict 
zones.  We are reintegrating thousands of Colombians who have 
demobilized, abating child recruitment into armed groups, and 
increasing social services for victims of conflict.  We are 
restoring citizen confidence in governance, improving the 
criminal justice system and institutions, increasing the 
poor's access to justice, and promoting human rights through 
investigation and prosecution of human rights and 
labor-related cases.  These programs focus on communities at 
high-risk of violence, provide legal and psycho-social 
assistance, and strengthen key Government oversight and 
judicial institutions. 
 
13.(U) USAID's alternative development program is a key 
component of our counter-narcotics efforts.  It promotes 
sustainable economic opportunities in regions vulnerable to 
drug production and conflict.  These programs create jobs and 
economic opportunities in areas recently retaken from illegal 
armed groups and build the social infrastructure to mitigate 
future conflict.  USAID is expanding social and economic 
opportunities and improving livelihoods for Afro-Colombians 
and indigenous communities disproportionately affected by 
conflict.  These programs provide jobs, education, health 
care housing, and social services for these vulnerable 
populations. 
 
DOJ: Providing Justice Reform 
----------------------------- 
 
14. (U) The Department of Justice (DOJ) coordinates a 
multifaceted program focused on strengthening the Colombian 
criminal justice system, its institutions, processes and 
personnel.  This program involves six major areas: 
implementation of an accusatory system; human rights 
investigations and prosecutions; Justice and Peace 
investigations and prosecutions; complex areas of criminal 
 
law; improved forensics capability; and witness protection. 
The bulk of the assistance is provided through training and 
technical assistance to the Prosecutor General's Office. 
 
NAS: Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing 
----------------------------------------- 
 
15. (U) We made real strides in battling narcoterrorism in 
Colombia in 2008.  The most recent U.S. figures for cocaine 
production in Colombia show a 24 percent reduction in 
production since the peak year 2001.  In 2008, Colombian 
security forces seized 245 metric tons of cocaine and coca 
paste, eradicated 230,000 hectares of coca and destroyed 3667 
drug labs.  We kept hundreds of metric tons out of the United 
States.  We have reduced the funds available to the FARC and 
other criminal groups for the purchase of weapons and 
explosives, corruption of public officials, and coercion of 
local populations. 
 
16. (U) We have made progress in eradication.  Increased 
coordination between manual and aerial eradication improves 
our ability to deal with replanting.  Much of the success in 
battling narcotrafficking and terrorism is due to air 
mobility capabilities provided by the United States.  Without 
helicopters, the GOC could not project force or provide 
government presence in a country the size of Texas and 
California combined.  Colombia is nationalizing our aviation 
assets, but still needs some U.S. support.  In the last two 
years, more than 50 aircraft have been turned over to the GOC 
to fund, maintain, and control.  Colombia's ability to 
confront narcotics and terrorism depends in large part on its 
air mobility. 
 
MILGRP: Aiming for Irreversibility 
---------------------------------- 
 
17. (U) The Military Group (MILGRP) has focused its support 
to the Colombian military based upon a three-phased approach. 
 The first focused on building Colombian military forces, 
projecting those forces into ungoverned spaces and securing 
those spaces.  It also supported offensive operations against 
illegal armed groups on a scale never seen before.  The 
second phase, currently being executed, focuses on securing, 
consolidating and sustaining those gains, increasing 
offensive operations against illegal armed groups, and 
ensuring the irreversibility of those gains.  The third 
phase, to be initiated in 2011, is to promote a strategic 
partnership to sustain key Colombian military capabilities. 
 
18. (U) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas: 
joint rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations, 
governability, airpower, maritime interdiction, joint 
intelligence and communications, and joint force initiatives. 
 Support to these programs is vital in both the short and 
long-terms.  In the short-term, we will assist Colombia in 
controlling illegal armed groups and bringing peace and rule 
of law to the Colombian population.  In the long-term, we 
will focus on building a strategic partnership with 
Colombian, and develop key Colombian military capabilities 
that can support U.S. national security objectives worldwide. 
 
 
New Initiatives 
--------------- 
 
19. (SBU) We are working with the GOC, other governments, and 
international organizations to develop an initiative to 
consolidate the gains made to date in key conflict areas. 
The initiative builds on current and past USG and GOC 
programs, and involves close coordination of security, 
eradication, alternative development, energy, and 
institutional development programs.  The initiative's primary 
goal is to provide incentives for Colombian citizens to join 
the licit economy in the conflict zones plagued by coca 
cultivation, narcotrafficking and illegal armed groups. 
These targeted regions produce roughly 80 percent of the coca 
in Colombia and serve as major trafficking hubs, with a high 
 
incidence of violence and displacement. 
BROWNFIELD