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Viewing cable 09BAKU139, HOW IRAN BUILDS INFLUENCE: CULTURE HOUSE AND RED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAKU139 2009-02-20 10:44 2011-06-26 00:00 SECRET Embassy Baku
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/17/112290/state-department-cables-reveal.html
VZCZCXRO7846
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #0139/01 0511044
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201044Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0807
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL KISL EAID LE IZ AJ IR
SUBJECT: HOW IRAN BUILDS INFLUENCE: CULTURE HOUSE AND RED 
CRESCENT 
 
REF: A. A) BAKU 132 
     B. B) 2008 BAKU 1069 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: POLECON CHIEF ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 SUMMARY 
--------- 
 
1.  (S) In addition to operating generous micro-loan and 
financial grant programs (Ref A), Iran builds its influence 
in Azerbaijan through overlapping ideological proselytizing, 
recruiting, network-building. and humanitarian assistance 
programs operating out of the Iranian Cultural House, 
Iranian-subsidized mosques and clerics, and Iranian Red 
Crescent-subsidized clinics and doctors.  Religious 
indoctrination, recruitment, and subsidies to followers and 
sympathetic clerics is reportedly overseen by a son-in-law of 
the late Ayatollah Meshkini, who doubles as the Imam of the 
major Iranian mosque. All these activities and institutions 
complement and strengthen each other in creating good will 
and reducing political and cultural orientation towards the 
West.  They are also creating and bolstering networks of 
provincial Hajjis and other notables who gain economic 
benefits and personal prestige by virtue of their cooperation 
with Iranians and their access to Iranian funds.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (S) This the second in a two-part series on Iranian 
outreach methodologies used in Azerbaijan (and potentially 
elsewhere) to gather intelligence and build influence among 
the general population.  Part One discussed broad-based 
micro-loans and financial grants; this cable focuses on 
proselytizing and networking activities of the Baku-based 
"Iranian Culture House," the so-called "Iranian Mosque," and 
other loosely related entities.  This cable also describes 
the "third prong" of Iranian influence-building, centered on 
Iranian Red Crescent-subsidized doctors and clinics. 
 
Iranian Culture House: Hard-Line Nerve Center 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The Iranian Culture House in Baku is a 
GOI-sponsored organization for promoting Iranian language and 
culture.  It is officially independent of the Iranian Embassy 
here, but works closely with it.  It hosts cultural events, 
maintains a library, and offers free Persian language 
instruction.  In these capacities, it is roughly equivalent 
to the British Council. 
 
4.  (S) According to Iranian and Azerbaijani sources, the 
Culture House also doubles as a nerve center for promoting 
"hard-line" Iranian Shi'ism: selecting candidates for 
religious scholarships in Qom and for other scholarships in 
Iran,  and networking with and disbursing subsidies to 
conservative Azerbaijani "alumni" from Qom.  An important 
Iran Culture House activity is providing financial or 
material "gifts" and/or job placement for members of 
provincial families and clerics recommended by established 
"Iranophiles" (i.e., individuals who for reasons of personal 
conviction, self-interest, or convenience have formed close 
relationships with Iranian entities).  Iranophiles also 
cooperate with the Culture House in such activities as 
placement of Iranophile clerics in provincial mosques; 
organizing of all-expenses paid trips to Iran for selected 
Azerbaijanis, and ideological workshops and regional Koranic 
study sessions for Islamic youth. 
 
Ideological/Religious Proselytization 
------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (S) The leadership of the Iranian-funded Husseiniya 
mosque in Baku (aka the "Iranian mosque") works closely with 
the Iranian Culture House and provides a venue for 
"hard-line" ideological training and preaching.  The Imam  of 
the Husseiniya mosque, Mullah Ojaghnejad, is the son-in-law 
of the late Ayatollah Ali Meshkini (former Chairman of the 
Assembly of Experts).  Ojaghnejad formerly worked for 
Ayatollah Khameini in Teheran, and serves as Khameini's 
personal religious representative in Azerbaijan.  He 
reportedly coordinates with the Iranian Culture house in 
directing financial stipends/"gifts" to Azerbaijani clerics 
who studied in Iran and needy families of Azerbaijani 
students currently studying there. 
 
6.  (S) An Iranian and an Azerbaijani student separately 
described the Husseiniya mosque as a venue for Iranophiles 
networking with young Azerbaijani's attracted by its 
reputation for facilitating contacts with "higher-status" 
Azerbaijanis and offering opportunities for "all expenses 
paid" pilgrimages to Mashad.  (Note: recent information 
obtained by Iran watcher suggests that the Iranian financial 
loans and grants discussed in ref A and above are being 
disbursed to recipients without the use of banks (septel). 
End Note).  A young Azerbaijani contact who recently visited 
the mosque with a regular attendee saw an acquaintance there 
who told him about occasional "interesting" evening study 
sessions, with the implication that he should attend. 
 
Iranian Red Crescent: Medical Outreach 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (S) The Iranian Red Crescent directly or indirectly 
supports several medical clinics in Azerbaijan, including an 
official "Red Crescent Hospital" located near the Iranian 
Culture house.  The medical clinics provided low cost medical 
care and medications to Iranian residents in Baku and free 
medical care to needy Azerbaijanis. 
 
Empowering Iranophiles 
---------------------- 
 
8.  (S) An Iranian medical school student in Baku told Iran 
watcher that she frequently visits the clinic as it provides 
free laboratory and instrument access for registered local 
Iranian medical students.  Apart from some needy walk-ins, 
she said that the Red Crescent clinic takes many cases 
referred to it by Iranophile figures in Baku and the 
provinces.  She said that the clinic arranges low or no cost 
medical treatment and surgery in Iran for serious cases, 
including housing in Iran if needed for accompanying family 
members.  She added that the Red Crescent Clinic in Baku 
maintains a list of "approved" doctors elsewhere in 
Azerbaijan to whom patients may be referred, with costs 
partially or fully covered by the Red Crescent. 
 
Intelligence Positioning and Network-Building 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (S) Reiterating claims we have heard from other sources, 
the student said that the Red Crescent includes a number of 
Iranian intelligence officers (including some she believes 
are monitoring Iranian students).  She asserted that Red 
Crescent staff actively identify and cultivate ties with 
potentially Iranophile or "pious" Azerbaijanis, some of whom 
are approached about study opportunities and/or pilgrimage 
assistance. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (S) The above institutions and the Ref A financial 
programs fill vacuums in Azerbaijani society and contribute 
in a variety of ways to enhancing Iran's image among rural 
and poorer urban populations in Azerbaijan.  They also 
promote soft intelligence gathering, promote creation of 
"Iranophiles," and buttress religious conservatism in ways 
that seek to move Azerbaijan away from the West.  These 
efforts further complement and bolster each other by 
facilitating the creation of networks of Hajjis and other 
notables in the provinces who receive economic benefits and 
local prestige via their associations with Iranians and their 
ability to obtain Iranian benefits (medical care, 
scholarships, loans, etc.) for others.  End Comment. 
 
DERSE