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Viewing cable 09BAKU132, HOW IRAN BUILDS INFLUENCE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAKU132 2009-02-18 11:10 2011-06-26 00:00 SECRET Embassy Baku
Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/17/112290/state-department-cables-reveal.html
VZCZCXRO5334
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKB #0132/01 0491110
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181110Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0781
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019 
TAGS: PREL KISL ECON EAID AJ LE IZ IR
SUBJECT: HOW IRAN BUILDS INFLUENCE 
 
REF: A) 2008 BAKU 1018 B) 2008 BAKU 1069 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: POLECON COUNSELOR ROB GARVERICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
Summary 
--------- 
 
1.  (S) Iranian outreach activities in Azerbaijan rest on a 
tripod of "social engagement" organizations, including an 
"Iran Assistance Society"; the Baku-based Iranian Culture 
House and its affiliates; and the Iranian Red Crescent 
society, based in "Iranian Clinics" in Baku and elsewhere. 
Important satellite institutions, such as charitable 
foundations administered by Iranians with Revolutionary Guard 
ties and Iranian-funded mosques (one led by a son-in-law of 
Ayatollah Meshkini), exist as de facto sub-sets under these 
three categories. 
 
2.  (S) While geographic proximity and overlapping culture, 
language, and religion make Azerbaijan a particularly 
accessible target fo Iranian penetration and influence 
building, thestructure outlined above suggests a model for 
mehodologies of Iranian penetration in other Islamic 
countries.  Although the long-range implications and even 
goals of this Iranian effort are unclear the immediate goal 
appears to be the weaning awy of the Azerbaijani population 
from a "Western" to a more explicitly Islamic and pro-Iranian 
political and cultural orientation.  While GOAJ policy change 
may be an ultimate desired result, regime change does not 
appear to be the short-term objective of these activities. 
End Summary. 
 
Iran's "Outreach" Goals 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (S) Note:  This cable is the first in a series of reports 
delving into Iranian influence-building activities in 
Azerbaijan; positioning and activities in Azerbaijan and the 
region of Revolutionary Guard or other regime-connected 
companies and individuals; related illicit trading 
activities; and similar issues.  End Note. 
 
4.  (S) The following information is based on discussions 
with Iranian business figures, students, and academics based 
in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis from several levels of 
society.  All sources claimed direct knowledge of at least 
some aspects of these  Iranian activities.  In terms of broad 
outreach, the main thrust of Iranian influence-building here 
appears to be directed primarily towards influence and 
network-building within the general population in an effort 
to bring Azerbaijan's society and people into a non-Western, 
"Islamic" cultural and political orbit sympathetic to Iran. 
This, rather than fomenting short-term regime change, may be 
Iran's immediate priority.  While Azerbaijan is perhaps 
unique among regional countries in sharing with Iran a large 
degree of cultural, historic, religious, and linguistic 
similarities, with minor revisions the practices discussed 
below may serve as a model for Iranian influence-building 
practices in the larger Middle East, and indeed the entire 
Islamic world. 
 
Iran's "Three-Pronged" Methodology 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (S) Iran's influence-building and network-building 
efforts in Azerbaijan are low-profile, but substantial. 
Exempting the various diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic 
activities of Iran's large Embassy (regarded by several 
Azerbaijani interlocutors as increasingly ineffective 
compared to earlier years), Iran's influence-building effort 
inside Azerbaijan is largely three-pronged: 
 
--  distribution of financial assistance and micro-loans to 
Azerbaijanis via an "Iran Assistance Society," with offices 
in provincial towns; other Iranian foundations also disburse 
stipends or grants. 
 
--  extra-cultural proselytizing, scholarship-granting, 
pilgrimage-funding, and general networking activity centered 
on the Iranian "House of Culture" in Baku, and loosely 
related mosques and clerics; and 
 
--  medical assistance and intelligence personnel positioning 
by the Iranian Red Crescent and an associated "Iran Clinic" in Baku. 
 
The information provided below focuses on Iran's micro-loans 
and other financial assistance activities ("prong #1"). 
Information on the other two "prongs" will be provided in 
Part II of this cable (septel). 
 
Iranian Micro-Loans and Financial Grants 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (S) In the last several months many elite Azerbaijani's 
have expressed concern to Iran watcher and other Baku EmbOffs 
about allegedly spreading pro-Iranian Islamicization in Baku 
and the provinces, partially fostered by Iranian financial 
grants and other "outreach" activities (see reftels).  While 
emphasizing this issue rhetorically, these sources typically 
have provided little beyond assertions to back up these 
concerns.  In the last few weeks Iran watcher has finally 
received information from a number of "grass roots" sources 
that provide some concrete information on what is occurring 
in practice in Baku and at least some provincial centers 
(though comprehensive information on Azerbaijan as a whole 
remains to be assembled). 
 
Iranian Loans in Practice: Generous Terms... 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (S) An Azerbaijani XXXXXXXXXXXX from a leading 
family in the (majority-Sh'ia) village of Lahej in North 
Central Azerbaijan, and his father, both of whom have been 
known well by Iran watcher for more than seven years.  These 
sources provided Iran watcher with details about several 
hundred thousand dollars in micro-loans and grants given 
recently by Iranians to Lahej residents.  They described 
these as loans and charitable grants given by a regional body 
known as the 'Iran Assistance Society (Iran Yardim Jamiati)," 
operating out of an office in the provincial capital of 
Ismaili (where the source's family also maintains a house). 
They claimed that over the last few months this organization 
has caused a stir in Lahej and the greater region by 
providing small shopkeepers, craftsmen, and other residents 
(including several of their relatives) with "business 
development" loans of up to 4,000 Manats (about $4300). 
8.  (S) They described these as no-interest loans, with 
phased repayment delayed until two years after the date of 
the loan.  Noting that neither the GOAJ nor any other 
organization offers such assistance loans to broad numbers of 
local people, they asserted (somewhat cynically) that as a 
result of its generous micro-credits and charitable grants 
"Iran is becoming very popular in Lahej now." The sources 
said that loan applicants are not asked explicitly about 
their politics or religious activities, but claimed that 
prominent local religious conservatives and Hajjis (including 
the father's half-uncle) are frequently consulted about 
applicants from their area before loan decisions are made. 
They also opined that some of these conservatives have access 
to larger funds from the Iranians, citing improved houses, 
new cars, and other "circumstantial evidence."  Comment: We 
have heard widespread assertions that conservative Islamic 
networking "pays" in the provinces, with Sh'ia close to Iran 
gaining income as a result, while conservative Sunnis  obtain 
benefits from Turkish or Saudi sources.  As articulated, the 
attitude echoes the Soviet-era belief that becoming a 
"professional communist" could be a lucrative career path. 
End Comment. 
 
9.  (S) The father added that the loan officers commonly ask 
applicants informally about conditions in their area, who the 
leading/most respected people are, whether they have made any 
pilgrimages, and similar questions, but did not give specific 
examples.  The student reported that he had been advised by 
his great-uncle to approach the Iranians for funding for a 
notional pilgrimage to a famous Iranian religious shrine in 
Mashad.  Comment: Much of this information coincides with 
claims provided separately to Iran watcher by Iranian 
students and other residents in Baku unknown to this source 
(see paras #11 - #13 below).  End Comment. 
 
...But No "Easy Touch" 
--------------------- 
 
10.  (S) Implying that grants are not given to all 
conservative comers, the XXXXXXXXXXXX related that a religiously 
conservative relative recently put a hejab (head covering) on 
his elderly sister, and submitted a request from her for a 
charitable grant.  The student said that grant was denied 
because the woman has four adult sons.  He added that many 
women who apply for assistance put on hejabs specifically for 
the purpose of their application (Note: hejabs are not 
traditionally worn in Lahej, though social practices are 
conservative in other respects.  End Note). 
 
Other Sources on Iranian Social Loans 
------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (S) An Iranian student activist, a well-connected 
Iranian business figure, a former Azerbaijani Ambassador to 
Iran (Nasib Nassibili), and a former Iranian political 
journalist, separately commented on alleged Iranian regime 
affiliated activity in Azerbaijan.  According to these 
sources, the "Komiteh Imam Khomeini" (specified by the 
student) and other major Iranian foundations help poor 
families in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and 
elsewhere, with the help of on-budget government grants as 
well as profits from commercial and real estate assets.  All 
asserted that (apart from being notionally subject to audits) 
these organizations have little constraint on their 
activities, and frequently works closely with the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian security services. 
 
12.  (S) All sources claimed that these organizations 
typically give no-interest credit to low-income Azerbaijanis, 
including Azerbaijani refugees resulting from the 
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict with Armenia, and other types of 
financial or in-kind assistance.  Two sources cited in 
passing the large Iranian Foundation of the Oppressed 
("Baniyadeh Mustazafan") that owns a soap detergent factory 
in Baku (and many enterprises in Iran), and provides stipends 
to eligible Iranian residents in Azerbaijan and other 
disbursements.  The sources claimed that the head of this 
Foundation in Azerbaijan is a retired senior officer in the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard (septel). 
 
13.  (S) Gathering information on local issues, elites and 
religious figures was mentioned by virtually all sources as 
an important activity of these organizations.  Sources 
claimed that the organizations also seek to develop 
relationships with religiously conservative figures by 
offering them assistance and/or influence in granting 
assistance to others; scholarships for their children in Iran 
(or in Baku at the large Iranian-funded private school); 
funds for pilgrimages; employment or business opportunities 
with Iranians or Azerbaijani Iranophiles; etc. 
 
14.  (S) Several sources explicitly depicted the 
organizations as clearing houses for identifying individuals 
amenable to training in Iran, who might become a future 
"vanguard" Iran-sympathetic/anti-Western political or 
religious cadres.  Valeh Aleskarov, Deputy Speaker of the 
Azerbaijan Majlis, and a figure well known to the USG, 
observed to Iran watcher that "it doesn't take many committed 
people to become an effective vanguard," and asserted that if 
even ten percent of those assisted by Iran became politicized 
Iranophiles "this wil be dangerous for us" as a politically 
secular country. 
 
DERSE