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Viewing cable 09ATHENS252, CODEL DURBIN FOCUSES ON CYPRUS IN MEETING WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ATHENS252 2009-02-26 12:24 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Athens
VZCZCXRO3213
PP RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHTH #0252/01 0571224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261224Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3285
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5442
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 1209
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000252 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP CVIS PHUM NATO UNFCYP GR TU MK CY
SUBJECT: CODEL DURBIN FOCUSES ON CYPRUS IN MEETING WITH 
GREEK PM KARAMANLIS 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  In their February 18 meeting with PM 
Karmamanlis, Senator Durbin and Illinois state treasurer 
Giannoulias focused primarily on how to achieve progress on 
Cyprus this year.  PM Karamanlis noted improvement in 
Greek-Turkish relations in many areas, but not on "heavy 
political issues" like Cyprus.  Senator Durbin and PM 
Karamanlis agreed that this was a year of opportunity on 
Cyprus, with leaders of both communities committed to finding 
a solution.  Karamanlis questioned whether some EU countries 
might "hide behind Cyprus" in opposing further enlargement if 
the issue remained unresolved.  Asked about his domestic 
priorities, Karamanlis focused on response to the global 
economic crisis.  He asked the delegation to support 
extension of the Visa Waiver Program to Greece, and detailed 
efforts to resolve the name issue with Skopje, given Greece's 
support for NATO enlargement. Senator Durbin noted that, 
should Chicago win its bid to host the 2016 Olympics, it 
would turn to Greece for advice from its successful 
experience in 2004.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS . . . 
 
2.  (SBU)  PM Karamanlis welcomed the CODEL as the "first 
delegation to Greece during the Obama administration." 
Senator Durbin stressed that the U.S. relationship with 
Greece was strong -- and would become even stronger as we 
worked together on issues of concern (including a Cyprus 
solution).  PM Karamanlis noted that Greece's relationship 
with Turkey was complex, but Cyprus overshadowed it all. 
Karamanlis had been trying to find a breakthrough in 
relations with Turkey, establishing good relations with PM 
Erdogan (including through a visit to Ankara, the first for a 
Greek PM in fifty years).  However, while he and Erdogan had 
made progress in some areas (gas pipeline, business 
investment, banking), the "heavy political issues" remained. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Karamanlis believed that the Turkish military, 
which saw itself as the guarantor of a secular state, also 
thwarted Turkey's democratic development and ability to 
maneuver in foreign affairs.  Cyprus was an example:  while 
he and PM Erdogan had discussed how to help the two 
communities, Karamanlis belived that the "deep state" was 
reluctant to change the status quo.  He questioned whether 
Turkey's civilian government had the ability to form its own 
agenda and policy. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Senator Durbin asked Karamanlis whether Turkey 
still wanted to enter the EU.  Karamanlis replied that 
"nominally, they do" -- but if Turkey fully applied EU 
standards, the military would lose much of its weight and 
economic influence.  So he questioned the Turkish military's 
commitment to EU entry.  Karamanlis speculated whether 
Erdogan had struck a secret compromise with the military to 
allow AKP to govern. 
 
. . . AND THEIR IMPACT ON A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT 
 
5.  (SBU)  Senator Durbin noted the importance of EU 
accession for a Cyprus solution.  This was a year of 
opportunity:  the leaders of both communities wanted to find 
a solution, and the EU's consideration of Turkish accession 
at the end of the year would be simplified if Cyprus was 
resolved.  In addition, Turkish-Cypriot leader Talat would 
face elections in 2010.  PM Karamanlis expressed the strong 
belief that, if the Cypriots were left alone, they would find 
a solution.  Both communities knew that a unified island 
would benefit everyone, and that the division was artificial 
-- though it would be tricky to find the checks and balances 
needed to construct a federal state.  The biggest question 
was whether Turkish-Cypriot leader Talat would be "left 
alone" or whether his room to maneuver would be limited by 
Ankara.  Senator Durbin noted that Talat had told the 
delegation Turkey had the power to stop the negotiations -- 
but had let them continue, with no restrictions. 
 
6.  (SBU)  Karamanlis emphasized that his administration 
supports Turkey's EU accession.  But some other EU countries, 
faced with economic crisis and believing the EU was 
"overextended," were more skeptical.  They may "hide behind 
Cyprus" when the EU faces key decisions.  Senator Durbin 
asked Karamanlis what the U.S. could do to help, though a 
solution was an issue for the people of Cyprus, not external 
forces.  Karamanlis suggested that the U.S. send the "right 
message" to Turkey, but "not necessarily formally."  Public 
statements sometimes left political leaders with less room 
for maneuver.  But it was important that Turkey be reminded 
frequently that a Cyprus solution was in their own interest. 
 
GREEK DOMESTIC PRIORITIES:  FINANCIAL CRISIS, VWP, FYROM 
 
ATHENS 00000252  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  Illinois State Treasurer Giannoulias asked 
Karamanlis about his domestic priorities, and how the U.S. 
could help.  Karamanlis expressed concern over the impact of 
the global financial crisis, particularly given Greece's 
"traditionally high" level of public debt.  It was essential 
to convince people that the government was on top of the 
issue and would find a way out.  Fortunately, Greece's growth 
rate over the past five years had been good.  But no country 
could go it alone; global cooperation was key. 
 
8.  (SBU)  Karamanlis pressed for extension of the Visa 
Waiver Program to Greece.  Ambassador Speckhard noted that 
while two of the three agreements needed to move forward were 
nearly complete, we were still awaiting a reponse from Greece 
on data sharing (the PCSC).  Karamanlis also explained Greek 
concerns regarding its dealings with Skopje over the name 
issue (including reference to Skopje's recent decision to 
name a portion of "Corridor X" the "Alexander the Great 
Highway").  Karamanlis stressed that it was essential to find 
a compromise on a composite name, so that the issue would not 
be an obstacle in the future.  Senator Durbin agreed, 
expressing his support for a resolution.  Finally, Senator 
Durbin pointed out that Chicago was among the candidates to 
host the 2016 Olympics; Mayor Daley had already visited 
Athens to learn from their experience.  Should Chicago be 
chosen, Senator Durbin noted that we would look to Athens for 
additional advice. 
 
9.  (U)  CODEL Durbin cleared this cable. 
 
 
SPECKHARD