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Viewing cable 09ATHENS226, TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09ATHENS226 2009-02-20 12:52 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0226/01 0511252
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201252Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3252
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0134
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0683
RUEHBULAMEMBASSY KABUL 0459
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER TU GR
SUBJECT: TURKISH EMBASSY'S VIEWS ON MIGRANT READMISSIONS 
FROM GREECE 
 
REF: 08 ATHENS 1668 
 
Classified By: DCM Deborah McCarthy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (C) According to an official at the Turkish Embassy in 
Athens, there are two reasons why Turkey is unwilling to 
permit Greece to return third-country illegal migrants to 
Turkey at the port of Izmir, as called for in a 2001 
bilateral protocol and which the Greeks believe would greatly 
reduce the huge inflow of illegal migrants who use this 
route.  The first reason is concern that Turkey cannot handle 
large numbers of additional illegals in a "tourist area." 
Second is concern that if Greece returns the migrants to 
Turkey too quickly and without adequate legal processing in 
Greece, it could "violate the migrants' rights."  The 
official said the problem is likely to get worse, that Turkey 
did not want the burden, and that Turkey might have to pull 
out of the 2001 protocol if a better solution is not found. 
End Summary. 
 
Yes If by Land, No If by Sea 
---------------------------- 
2. (C) We met February 9 with Turkish Embassy Second 
Secretary Tolga Ucak, to follow up on readouts we had 
received from Greek officials about ongoing talks with Turkey 
to improve implementation of the 2001 protocol (reftel).  The 
Greeks had expressed frustration that, despite the protocol, 
Turkey had never accepted return of more than a small number 
of migrants.  The Greeks' preferred solution would be to open 
up Izmir -- one of three points in Turkey specified in the 
protocol -- for returns by sea, which would permit thQGreek 
Coast Guard to handle the returns directly without having to 
go through a long and almost always unsuccessful bureaucratic 
procedure via Athens to return the migrants at the land 
border.  According to the Greeks, their Turkish interlocutors 
responded that using Izmir was impossible for unspecified 
"security reasons."  While this impasse has continued, the 
number of migrants using the Turkey-Greece route has 
skyrocketed over the past two years, with Greek authorities 
detaining 146,337 illegals in 2008, most of whom had 
transited Turkey.  Leading countries of origin include Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Pakistan. 
 
3. (C) Ucak acknowledged that the protocol did identify Izmir 
port as a point for readmitting migrants, but he said that 
practical and human rights considerations made that 
impossible.  On the practical side, he argued that Izmir was 
a "tourist area" that "could not support" a large additional 
number of detained migrants.  He said Turkey was in the 
process of building new detention centers, but it did not 
have as many resources as Greece for this purpose.  These 
concerns applied not only to Izmir but to any port on the 
Anatolian coast that might be considered for readmissions. 
 
4. (C) Ucak also expressed concern that if Greece returned 
the migrants to Turkey too hastily, it might violate legal 
and human rights standards.  There had to be some process to 
establish that the migrants had in fact entered Greece from 
Turkey, although he admitted that the protocol said 
circumstantial evidence could be sufficient.  He also said 
there had to be a procedure in Greece to consider asylum 
claims by the migrants, or at least to give them a genuine 
opportunity to claim asylum.  Greece had come under criticism 
from the EU and NGOs for its low rate of asylum request 
approvals.  It would simply not be acceptable, Ucak said, for 
Greece to return the migrants to Turkey with little or no 
consideration of the individual cases. 
 
5. (C) Ucak said Turkey genuinely wanted greater cooperation 
and burden sharing with Greece on migration issues, and he 
pointed to a bilateral Coast Guard visit exchange program as 
one example of progress.  He acknowledged that the problem of 
migrants transiting Turkey and Greece was getting worse, and 
he expressed concern that there may be another large increase 
in summer 2009.  When pressed, he admitted that Turkey -- 
like other countries on the migration route -- did not want 
the burden of being responsible for migrants who could 
neither go back to their home countries nor onward to the 
next destination.  He added that Turkey would oppose the EU 
getting involved in border enforcement in the region, 
especially in the Aegean, which has long been a source of 
contention between Turkey and Greece.  Given the 
unworkability of readmissions by sea, Ucak said, it would 
probably be necessary to re-negotiate the 2001 protocol.  If 
this was impossible, he added, Turkey might at some point 
withdraw from the protocol unilaterally. 
 
Comment 
------- 
6. (C)  In our view Turkey and Greece need to engage in more 
vigorous discussions on the 2001 potocol to address the 
massive flow of immigrants coming through Turkey to Greece. 
The Turkish Embassy's comments about the effects on tourism 
in Izmir and the need for Greece to take action on asylum 
cases for people who first transit through Turkey appear to 
us to be efforts to toss this hot potato.  Last but not least 
the comment on Turkish reaction to EU assistance to the 
problem is troubling as Greece is reaching out to the EU for 
assistance in handling the large flow of immigrants.  We 
recognize that Greece has not acted as strongly as it could 
to prevent aliens from moving on to the next destination 
(usually Italy) or moved as quickly as it could to enter the 
aliens' fingerprints in the EU's EURODAC electronic database 
to identify them as having entered Europe in Greece.  We will 
work with EU colleagues here to encourage the Greeks to do 
so.  We will also encourage them to continue efforts with the 
GOT to make the 2001 protocol more workable, and would 
welcome Embassy Ankara's thoughts on how to do so. 
SPECKHARD