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Viewing cable 09AITTAIPEI144, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09AITTAIPEI144 2009-02-11 06:35 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0144/01 0420635
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110635Z FEB 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0871
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8914
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0366
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS, CROSS-STRAIT 
RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies February 11 
gave extensive coverage to former First Lady Wu Shu-chen, who 
appeared in court and pleaded guilty to forgery but denied the 
corruption charges against her Tuesday.  News coverage also centered 
on the island's sagging economy, and on Taiwan's inclusion in the 
United Kingdom's six-month visa waiver program starting in March. 
In terms of editorials and commentaries, a column in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times" discussed U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton's upcoming visit to Asia and suggested Taiwan take 
full advantage to win some favorable bargaining chips for itself. 
An editorial in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei 
Times" said "[B]y sending the Secretary of State so soon to China, 
the Obama administration is emphasizing that ties with Beijing will 
continue to be among the US's most strategic - and carefully 
navigated - relationships."  The article concluded by saying that it 
hopes "Taiwan does not become a mere bargaining chip."  A "Taipei 
Times" op-ed piece, written by a senior fellow at the Atlantic 
Council of the United States, on the other hand, discussed the 
defense white paper China released in late January.  The article 
said "the defense paper seems to be ... attempting to push out US 
influence to domesticate the Taiwan issue."  End summary. 
 
2. U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations 
 
A) "New Opportunities in Taiwan-U.S. Relations" 
 
Paul Lin, a political commentator based in Taiwan, wrote in his 
column in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 
700,000] (2/11): 
 
"For her first overseas trip since taking office, U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton will visit four East Asian countries including 
Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China.  The preliminary plan was 
to visit Japan alone first, and the three other countries were added 
[to her itinerary] afterwards.  It is thus obvious that in the U.S. 
global strategy, Japan remains a primary focus among the Asian 
nations.  Taiwan should be pleased [about such a situation] since 
Washington and Tokyo still maintain their security alliance, which 
is also related to Taiwan. ... 
 
"But Secretary Clinton, who is in charge of foreign affairs 
(including Sino-U.S. relations), is [former President Bill] 
Clinton's wife, and most of the U.S. officials now dealing with 
Chinese affairs were key members of President Clinton's 
administration.  As a result, it appears on the surface that 
Washington's [position] will more or less remain unchanged in terms 
of cross-Strait issues.  But given that Hillary Clinton is a 
political figure who sticks to her own personal opinion, it is hard 
to tell whether there will be any change [in Washington's 
cross-Strait policy]. ...  But the situation will be favorable for 
Taiwan if issues such as freedom, human rights and [regional] 
security can attract Washington's attention, because the 
unification/independence argument in Taiwan is fundamentally a 
matter of completely different value systems between Taiwan and 
China. ...  It goes without saying that the United States' 
cross-Strait policy will not be swayed by one's emotions.  But 
Taiwan should take full advantage of its edges to strive to win some 
favorable bargaining chips for itself. " 
 
B) "Keep the 'Separatist' Issue Separate" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] editorialized (2/11): 
 
"On Thursday, the administration of US President Barack Obama set 
the tone for its foreign policy when it confirmed that US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton's first trip abroad would be to East Asia. 
... Over the last year, economic concerns have pushed their way to 
the fore of an American psyche that had focused on security concerns 
since the Sept. 11 attacks. There can be no doubt that Clinton's 
meetings in China, the US' single largest creditor, will be the 
highlight of the tour. They will certainly be the most watched and 
will be pivotal to US interests at home and in the region.  By 
sending the secretary of state so soon to China, the Obama 
administration is emphasizing that ties with Beijing will continue 
to be among the US' most strategic - and carefully navigated - 
relationships. 
 
"Speculation already abounds about what will be said in Beijing. A 
recent Washington Post report was cause for concern among friends of 
Taiwan waiting to see what stance Obama will take on cross-strait 
matters. The paper said that some experts foresaw a risk that China 
'may demand a freer hand on Taiwan and Tibet in exchange for working 
with the United States on reducing emissions.' 
Sources at the State Department were quick to rebuff those concerns 
when contacted by the Taipei Times, insisting the US would not 'sell 
Taiwan down the river.' But compromise is the stuff of diplomacy: 
That China would seek to further its interests in Taiwan in this 
RELATIONS 
 
manner is a scary but hardly unlikely scenario. ... 
 
"Despite the daunting scale of environmental problems in China, 
Beijing might find it a more appealing bargaining chip with the US 
than promising political and social freedoms. And while the Chinese 
Communist Party does not see respecting human rights as key to 
staying in power, it seems aware that environmental issues will have 
to be faced at some point.  Let's just hope Taiwan does not become a 
mere bargaining chip." 
 
3. Cross-Strait Relations 
 
"The Shift in China's Taiwan Policy" 
 
Yu Tsung-chi, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the Untied 
States, opined in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei 
Times" [circulation: 30,000] (2/11): 
 
"... If one reads between the lines, last month's 105-page [Chinese 
defense] white paper shed some light on subtle changes in the 
security function of interaction among the US, China and Taiwan, 
which deserves consideration by those who are concerned about 
Taiwan.  Beijing used to urge Washington to pressure Taipei and 
treat it as a troublemaker, but the defense paper shows that China 
seems to be shifting in a new direction, attempting to push out US 
influence to domesticate the Taiwan issue.  Beijing seems determined 
to win a tug-of-war between Sino-US and Taiwan-US relations. 
Although it may never openly admit it, one of Beijing's ulterior 
motives is to gradually weaken US influence on the Taiwan issue 
through China's rising economic, diplomatic and military clout. ... 
 
"The paper not only played down China's military buildup opposite 
Taiwan, but also declared 'China will never engage in military 
expansion now or in the future, no matter how developed it becomes,' 
although it still treated Taiwanese independence as a potential 
threat.  These messages aim to create the impression that China's 
rise is peaceful, that the two sides of the Strait have resolved 
their sovereignty dispute and that US arms sales to Taiwan not only 
violate international law but also constitute interference in 
China's domestic affairs and an attempt at sabotaging cross-strait 
peace. ... 
 
"Good reasons exist for analyzing China's new strategy. Direct 
military coercion has been replaced by an indirect three-in-one 
approach that draws on psychology, the media and law. ...In other 
words, China's three-pronged strategy aims to weaken morale and 
obfuscate the designation of the 'enemy' by influencing public 
opinion and seeking support from domestic and international 
audiences for its military actions. ...  Taiwan as a democracy is 
poorly organized and unready for China's three-pronged strategy, 
because no international organization or court of justice, nor the 
US, can protect Taiwan from a psychological campaign that is protean 
and cannot be legally adjudicated. ...  Faced with China's 
overwhelming military, economic and ideological threats, Taiwan can 
only survive if its democratic values are secure, its citizens loyal 
and its soft power effective enough to achieve objectives beyond its 
hard power. ..." 
 
YOUNG