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Viewing cable 09DHAKA44, BANGLADESH: WHAT WE NEED TO DO IN THE NEXT 180 DAYS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DHAKA44 2009-01-12 10:40 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXRO4544
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKA #0044/01 0121040
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 121040Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8111
INFO RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000044 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, F, P, AND S/CRS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID BG
 
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH: WHAT WE NEED TO DO IN THE NEXT 180 DAYS 
 
REF: Dhaka 1224, Dhaka 1361 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Bangladesh's return to democracy following the successful 
December 29 Parliamentary elections presents significant 
opportunities for advancing U.S. Government (USG) interests in the 
country and the region.  Embassy Dhaka has identified five major 
mission objectives for the USG to focus on over the next 180 days: 
1) consolidating the democratic transition, 2) promoting stability 
and security, 3) making development assistance effective, 4) 
promoting strategic partnership, and 5) increasing U.S. Mission 
effectiveness.  To achieve these objectives, the Embassy requests 
$10 million in additional Democracy and Governance funds.  Embassy 
Dhaka considers coordinated implementation of this strategy over the 
coming months by all USG agencies critical to its success. 
 
----------------------------------- 
180 DAY TRANSITION PLANNING PROCESS 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) With assistance from the Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Embassy Dhaka recently 
began a comprehensive strategic planning effort outlining USG goals 
and priorities during the first six months, or 180 days, after the 
election of the new Government of Bangladesh (GOB).  The strategic 
planning process, begun in early December 2008 and facilitated by 
S/CRS in both Washington and Dhaka, identified five strategic 
objectives as USG priorities for the first six months of a new 
government.  The interagency transition planning team identified the 
necessary tasks to achieve each objective, developed metrics and 
indicators of success, and completed a risk assessment with 
mitigation strategies for each of four worst-case scenarios, which 
include: a return to corrupt political practices, significant 
post-election violence, the danger of ungoverned spaces, and the 
possibility of economic collapse.  In addition to identifying key 
near-term priorities, the 180-Day Transition Plan has clarified key 
areas for further funding over the longer term.  This exercise will 
be synchronized with the FY 2010 Mission Strategic Plan. 
 
---------------------- 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
---------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Bangladesh's December 2008 Parliamentary elections present 
a key opportunity to strengthen Bangladesh's incipient democracy. 
The first major objective of the 180-Day Transition Plan is to 
ensure the "Smooth transition to a fully functional democratic 
government committed to reforms and accepted by the opposition." 
This will be achieved by encouraging formation of a new GOB quickly 
while minimizing political retribution, encouraging the continuation 
of the Caretaker Government's reform agenda, and ensuring political 
stability during the transition.  Given funding constraints, Embassy 
Dhaka has embarked upon this objective with almost no funding for 
democracy and governance (D/G) activities.  Additional resources are 
urgently needed to initiate a more robust DG program to include 
legislative strengthening activities for the newly elected 
parliament designed to help the opposition play a constructive role. 
 Ideally, we will also strengthen political parties and encourage 
them to embark upon an irreversible path towards internal reform. 
At the same time, Bangladesh requires better governance at the 
municipal and regional levels to strengthen democracy reform in 
country.  We estimate a modest program to achieve these goals would 
require restoring the previously cut $10 million annual D/G funding 
for each of the new Bangladeshi administration's five years in 
office. 
---------------------- 
STABILITY AND SECURITY 
---------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) By supporting implementation of the Caretaker Government's 
roadmap, Bangladesh's military demonstrated its commitment to return 
to its traditional role and provide the newly-elected GOB the space 
it requires to exercise civil authority.  Given the country's 
historical context the military remains wary of a complete 
disengagement from politics.  The second objective of the 180-Day 
Transition Plan focuses on enhancing civilian control of the 
military, continuous professionalization of the security forces, and 
combating terrorism.  Maintaining strong levels of funding for 
International Military Education and Training (IMET), Counter 
Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), and other programs facilitating professional 
military education is crucial.  At the same time, expansion of the 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), International Criminal 
Investigative Assistance and Training Program (ICITAP), and other 
security-related programs is needed to facilitate true police 
 
DHAKA 00000044  002 OF 002 
 
 
reform, make meaningful improvements to the system of border 
management, and provide further training to the Rapid Action 
Battalion (RAB). 
 
---------------------- 
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
---------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) An elected government provides an opening to deepen 
engagement on a host of development related policy issues.  There is 
also an opportunity to promote the reemergence of an independent 
media and strengthen civil society.  The third objective of the 
180-Day Transition Plan encourages the GOB to use an open 
consultative process to establish development priorities, recognize 
development linkages to energy, economic, and trade policy, and to 
create the space for free and independent media.  Even more than 
with other objectives, achievement of this goal will require close 
coordination with other bilateral and multilateral development 
partners. 
 
------------------------------- 
PROMOTING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The transition to a new government is an opportunity to 
remind Bangladesh of its importance as a key democratic partner of 
the U.S.  The fourth objective of the 180-Day Transition Plan seeks 
to highlight the importance of our bilateral relationship, and 
encourage the GOB to play a constructive role in international 
bodies and adopt a new approach to regional cooperation.  Despite 
its good intentions and strong track record, the Caretaker 
Government was never fully able to remove the stigma of its creation 
as a result of a military intervention.  A freely elected government 
will be able to act bilaterally, regionally, and globally without 
this stigma. 
 
------------------------------------- 
INCREASING U.S. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 
------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) During its two years in power, the Caretaker Government was 
unable to focus on resolving numerous Embassy management and 
consular concerns.  With a new GOB, there may be opportunities for 
quick resolution of long-standing issues that could greatly enhance 
the Mission's effectiveness in promoting a stable democracy in 
Bangladesh.  The fifth objective of the 180-Day Transition Plan 
urges the GOB to adopt policies that facilitate legitimate travel 
and seeks GOB agreement on policies that will enhance the Mission 
support platform.  We estimate that addressing Consular concerns 
with the GOB will require no additional expenditure of USG funds. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
COMMENT: MAXIMIZING USG GOALS DURING THE TRANSITION 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (SBU) A more stable, effective Bangladesh will allow the USG to 
effectively promote democracy, development, and the denial of space 
to terrorists.  The USG is well positioned to play a leadership role 
in each of these areas to encourage and assist the new GOB to make 
good on its promises to fight graft, enhance prosperity, and promote 
a new political atmosphere of cooperation.  During the 180 day 
planning process, we were able to identify short-term opportunities 
the Mission could pursue with limited additional resources.  In the 
FY 2010 MSP, we will highlight longer term ways in which Embassy 
Dhaka can advance these important goals as well as the additional 
resources that will be necessary to achieve our objectives. 
 
9. (SBU)  Embassy Dhaka greatly appreciates the outstanding support 
provided by TDY Planner Michael Michener and looks forward to 
continuing collaboration with S/CRS and other Washington-based 
elements of the Country Team. 
MORIARTY