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Viewing cable 09COLOMBO26, GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA BANS LTTE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09COLOMBO26 2009-01-08 12:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXRO2155
PP RUEHBI
DE RUEHLM #0026/01 0081203
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081203Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9133
INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1217
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8218
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6432
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4634
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2498
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4590
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3696
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 8860
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 6244
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0816
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3086
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PTER PREF CE
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA BANS LTTE 
 
REF: COLOMBO 003 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY: On January 7, the Government of Sri Lanka 
banned the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Under 
the ban's regulations, anyone found guilty of promoting, 
encouraging or aiding and abetting the LTTE would be 
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. On January 8, Ambassador 
attended a briefing by the Foreign Minister at which he asked 
the FM what the ban meant for Government Agents (GAs) and the 
civilian population still in the Vanni.  Minister Bogollogama 
responded that new regulations would permit continued GA 
contact with the LTTE for humanitarian reasons, but dodged 
the question of whether the ban would act as a disincentive 
to IDP movements out of Tiger-controlled areas.  Bogollogama 
also restated the GSL's commitment to the 13th amendment on 
regional provincial-level administration but reported that 
President Rajapaksa was still considering when to roll out 
more ambitious devolution proposals.  Bogollagama stated that 
the government did not support a Sinhalese supremacist 
party's proposed anti-conversion bill. The Foreign Minister 
commented that both Norway's facilitation efforts and the 
Co-Chair's role were independent of the now-defunct peace 
process and therefore should continue.  He also stated that 
the Government was prepared to talk to the LTTE if they 
renounce violence and lay down arms.  End summary. 
 
GSL Bans LTTE 
------------- 
 
2. (U) As expected (ref A), the Government of Sri Lanka 
banned the LTTE at a cabinet meeting chaired by President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa on January 7.  The order cited the LTTE for 
using civilians as human shields in embattled areas and 
endangering their lives, despite requests by the government 
to release them. The ban went into effect at midnight. The 
proscription will be enforced under sections of the Public 
Security Ordinance.  The LTTE has been banned twice before by 
the Sri Lankan state in 1978 and 1998.  The ban was lifted in 
2002 following the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the 
government that year. 
 
3. (U) According to Senior Minister Maithripala Sirisena 
(also General Secretary of the President's Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party), the ban would make it an offense to become a member 
or a cadre of the LTTE or any of its affiliated organizations 
or to provide leadership to them. The contribution of 
financial or material aid to the banned organization and the 
supply of goods, and the storage, transportation and 
distribution of them are also prohibited under the new 
regulations.  It outlaws dissemination of propaganda or 
information on behalf of the LTTE or engaging in any other 
transactions with it.  Under the ban's regulations, anyone 
found guilty of promoting, encouraging or aiding and abetting 
the LTTE could be sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. 
 
Foreign Minister Dodges Ambassador's Question 
About Ban's Implications for Vanni's Population 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (U) Ambassador attended a briefing by the Foreign Minister 
for the diplomatic community on January 8.  In the Q and A 
session that followed Ambassador asked several questions. 
First did the ban mean that GSL officials who work in the 
Vanni such as Government Agents, who cannot do their jobs 
without coordinating with the LTTE, will no longer be 
authorized such contact?  Similarly, will the proscription 
apply to the IDPs trapped in the Vanni since many necessarily 
have contact with the LTTE since family members have been 
forcibly conscripted?  If so, won't the ban discourage them 
from moving into GSL-controlled areas?  The Foreign Minister 
responded that the ban will not hinder contacts by Government 
officials involved in coordinating humanitarian relief 
efforts in LTTE-controlled areas.  Regulations that are being 
drafted will ensure that.  He avoided answering the IDP 
question directly, saying the Government will ask Government 
 
COLOMBO 00000026  002 OF 002 
 
 
Agents to reassure the IDPs that they should move south. 
Ambassador urged that a public message be sent to the IDPs 
assuring them they won't be prosecuted if they move into 
GSL-controlled areas and will receive treatment according to 
international standards. 
 
FM: Gov't Will Implement 13 Amendment; 
Opposes Religious Conversion Bill 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) Ambassador then stated that President Rajapaksa has 
always said that the GSL will pursue a political solution 
once hostilities are over, presumably once the GSL has taken 
control of the Vanni.  Yet the JHU and other hard-liners in 
the government are now advocating not only a military 
solution but a broader effort to curb Tamil nationalism, 
abolish the APRC, and advance an extreme religious conversion 
bill.  There are also some who think the ban on the LTTE is 
part of that agenda and will be used to prosecute Tamils who 
may previously have had direct contacts with the LTTE. 
Ambassador said it would be helpful if the Government could 
reaffirm now whether it intends to pursue a political 
solution and what the broad parameters of that would be: 
implementation of the 13th amendment on provincial 
governments?  Provincial council elections in the north along 
the eastern model? Conclusion of the All Party Representative 
Committee (APRC) process on further devolution of power?  The 
Minister responded that in a diverse coalition government, 
there are many voices.  President Rajapaksa has stated he 
will implement the 13th amendment and is looking at ways he 
can do that better.  The Minister said the President also is 
committed to the APRC process but has not decided on the 
timing for rolling that out (implying it might be months or 
longer).  On the Sinhalese supremacist JHU's proposed 
"anti-conversion" law, Bogollogama affirmed the bill is a 
"private" one which the Government opposes, as he said the 
President told the Vatican on his recent trip to Italy. 
 
FM: Continued Role for Norway, Co-Chairs; 
GSL Ready to Talk if LTTE Disarms 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) The Minister also was asked whether there is a 
continued role for the Co-Chairs, Norwegian Facilitator and 
the Government Peace Secretariat, given the ban on the LTTE. 
The Minister responded that he Norwegian facilitation effort 
preceded the pece process, while the Co-Chairs are an 
independet mechanism, so the ban on the LTTE should have no 
bearing on Norway's facilitation or on the Co-Chairs' 
continued efforts.  With respect to the Peace Secretariat, 
the Minister affirmed it will also be needed since the 
Government is prepared to talk to the LTTE if they renounce 
violence and lay down arms. 
 
7. (SBU) COMMENT: Bogollogama gave vague and general answers 
on the most important issues - the way forward after the 
Government gains control over the Vanni, and how the GSL 
would work to encourage IDP movements out of LTTE territory. 
The ban, following the January 2008 abrogation of the CFA by 
the government, marks the final end of the already moribund 
peace process launched by the UNP-led government in 2002. 
Post remains concerned that the GSL lacks a clear strategy to 
deal with the aftermath of the semi-conventional conflict. 
Embassy's perspective on the way forward in this new 
environment and recommendations for U.S. policy will be 
reported septel. 
Blake