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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA634, GETTING THE MOST OUT OF PARIS PACT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA634 2008-12-02 15:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0634/01 3371543
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021543Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8759
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1411
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0242
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0583
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0211
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0262
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0069
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000634 
 
SECSTATE PASS TO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL AF IR CA PK UN
 
SUBJECT:  GETTING THE MOST OUT OF PARIS PACT 
 
REF:  A. STATE 118430,  B. TSAI-CLINE EMAIL 10/31/08 
  C. STATE 102413 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) The upcoming December 15-16 annual meeting of the Paris 
Pact Consultative Group is a venue for USDEL to advance USG 
counternarcotics objectives in Afghanistan by expressing support the 
UNODC's "Rainbow Strategy." Specifically, the U.S. can use this 
forum to encourage donor contribution to the thus far solely 
U.S.-funded Good Performers' Initiative, as a way to increase the 
number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan.  Secondly, we can 
encourage the expansion of the border control programs in the 
Rainbow Strategy, to countries which span the trafficking route from 
Afghanistan to Europe.  The USG should also consider increasing its 
financial contributions to reward the UNODC's successful Operation 
TARCET to interdict precursor chemicals and to permit TARCET's 
continuation beyond its one-year timeframe.  Lastly, the U.S. should 
consider using the forum to start engaging Iran, which is both a 
transshipment and consumption country of Afghan opium.  While the 56 
Paris Pact members are united in their commitment to fight the 
Afghan narcotics problem, they look to the U.S. for leadership and 
we should use this venue to promote our plans for getting to that 
overarching objective.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (U) Launched in May 2003, the Paris Pact, comprising 56 
"government partners" and several international organizations, is 
intended to tackle the drug problem in Afghanistan through regional 
cooperation.  On the operational level, this has translated into 
cooperation in border control measures, in interdiction of precursor 
chemicals, and in the push to make Afghan provinces opium-free. 
Three annual expert-level roundtables produce recommendations which, 
when implemented, advance these broad goals.  In its early days, the 
Paris Pact defined its priorities as improving regional cooperation 
in West and Central Asia, strengthening border control in the same 
region and establishing legal and institutional frameworks in key 
countries.  Over the years, UNODC, working with the Pact members, 
has refined these priorities and articulated them in greater detail 
in what came to be known in 2007 as the "Rainbow Strategy," 
consisting of seven action "outlines" described in seven papers of 
rainbow colors. 
 
3. (U) Among other objectives, the Rainbow Strategy aims to improve 
management of Afghanistan's border with its immediate neighbors 
Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, strengthen border control in 
transit countries in Central Asia and around the Caspian Sea, and in 
East Africa (the Green, Yellow and Violet papers).  In addition, the 
Strategy defines measures to stem the flow of precursor chemicals 
for the manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan (the Red Paper), to 
disrupt the laundering of drug money (the Orange Paper), and to 
prevent/reduce drug addiction and the spread of HIV/AIDS in 
Afghanistan and the region (the Indigo Paper).  Arguably, the road 
map to make Afghanistan opium poppy-free (the Blue Paper) provides 
the chapeau for a chain of actions that, if completely successful, 
could render the other six unnecessary. 
 
--------------------------- 
PROMOTING OPIUM POPPY-FREE 
ROADMAP THROUGH THE GOOD 
PERFORMERS' INITIATIVE 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Financial incentives have been a key factor in increasing 
the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan.  Of Afghanistan's 
34 provinces, two were poppy free in 2004, six in 2005 and 2006, 13 
in 2007, and 18 in 2008.  The Afghan government has dispensed funds 
from its Good Performers' Initiative (GPI) to reward provinces for 
reducing or stopping poppy cultivation, such as in the case of 
Nangahar, which became poppy-free in 2008.  Currently the United 
States is the only donor to this Initiative, contributing $28 
million in 2008. Canada, a Paris Pact partner, and the largest donor 
to UNODC's Afghanistan activities, may be persuaded to contribute to 
the GPI. 
 
5. (SBU) Canada gave Cdn$27 million to UNODC for its Afghanistan 
programs over the two years 2007-2009.  The Canadian government has 
approved another Cdn$25 million for the same purpose for the two 
years starting April 1, 2009.  Canada's particular interest in 
Afghanistan is border security.  For 2009-2011, it will add Kandahar 
as a focus.  On the margins of the December 15-16 Paris Pact 
meeting, USDEL should meet with the Canadian delegation to explore 
the possibility of Canadian contribution to the GPI.   On December 
16, Canada will co-chair agenda item IV "The Paris Pact Initiative: 
Implementation of Paris Pact Recommendations for Afghanistan and 
Neighboring Countries."  UNODC's Rainbow Strategy will be discussed 
under this item, and the "Opium Poppy-free Roadmap" is one of the 
sub-topics.  USDEL interventions under this topic could usefully 
include a call for contributions to the GPI. 
 
-------------------------- 
EXPANDING BORDER CONTROL: 
GO WEST, AND SOUTHWEST 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Afghan heroin and morphine for western Europe go through 
Central Asia, Turkey and the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and more 
circuitously through East Africa via the Levant/Arabian peninsula. 
According to UNODC's 2008 World Drug Report, Near and Middle 
East/South-West Asia together accounted for 60% of the seizures of 
heroin and morphine in the world in 2006, and southeast and east 
Europe another 14%.  These seizures indicate the magnitude of the 
heroin trafficking through these regions.  The scant amount (0.1%) 
seized in East Africa in 2006 is less a measure of the problem than 
a reflection of the inadequate capacity of the East African 
countries to fight drug trafficking. 
 
7. (U) The Paris Pact has broadened its early focus on controlling 
the border between Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors (Iran, 
Pakistan, and the Central Asian states) to include countries west of 
Central Asia.  Working within the Paris Pact framework, UNODC first 
established operational measures, such as mobile interdiction teams, 
border liaison offices, and the Central Asian Regional Information 
and Coordination Center, or CARICC.  In 2007 it added a border 
initiative for Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea region.  In 2008 it 
held an expert round table for the Black Sea region on both 
counternarcotics enforcement and drug demand reduction.  Also in 
2008, with the advocacy and support of the United States, Paris Pact 
held its first round table outside Eurasia, in Nairobi, Kenya.  That 
roundtable sought to analyze, among other issues, the trafficking of 
Afghan opiates to and through East Africa, and to identify priority 
actions to address this problem. 
 
8. (SBU) The United States should encourage this push for border 
management and other counternarcotics actions moving westwards and 
southwards.  Fighting Afghan heroin trafficking therefore should 
involve many countries that lie between Afghanistan and the western 
Europe on the trafficking route.  Given the excellent law 
enforcement and counternarcotics infrastructure and abundant 
resources in Europe (e.g., EC, EUROPOL), we think U.S. resources may 
be better utilized on such efforts in East Africa, where the 
Europeans have displayed less enthusiasm.  USDEL may wish to 
intervene accordingly under Agenda item I.a. (presentation on the 
Black Sea roundtable) and I.b. (presentation on the East Africa 
roundtable) on December 15. 
 
---------------------- 
REWARD SUCCESS IN 
INTERDICTING PRECURSOR 
CHEMICALS 
----------------------- 
 
9. (U) UNODC, with the cooperation of a number of Paris Pact 
partners (United States, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Russia, and the U.K.) helped Afghanistan and the surrounding 
countries to launch Operation TARCET in late 2007-early 2008. 
TARCET aims to disrupt the flow of precursor chemicals (acetic 
anhydride and others) into Afghanistan, which is needed to convert 
opium into heroin.  TARCET (the Red Paper of the Rainbow Strategy) 
trains law enforcement officers in detection techniques and 
methodology and promotes information/intelligence sharing among the 
countries.  The results have been impressive -- with seizures in 
2008 of 19 tonnes of acetic anhydride, and over 20 tonnes of other 
chemicals in Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
10. (SBU) Signaling the importance of fighting the flow of precursor 
chemicals into Afghanistan, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1817 in June 2008, a resolution also adopted by the 
Ministerial meeting on Afghanistan convened in Paris in June.  The 
UNSC resolution, "welcomes" the TARCET initiative, and "invites" the 
international community to provide financial and technical 
assistance and support to the relevant countries and to UNODC to 
help them fight the traffic in precursor chemicals.  Recently the 
USG contributed more than $370,000 to UNODC for such purpose (Ref 
C).  Further financial support will enable Operation TARCET to 
continue beyond its one-year time-frame. 
 
------------- 
ENGAGING IRAN 
------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Within the Paris Pact framework, UNODC launched in Vienna 
in June 2007 the Triangular/Trilateral Initiative to enhance border 
cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. In a second 
meeting in Tehran in May 2008, the parties agreed to follow-on steps 
including border liaison offices, cross-border telecommunication 
links, information and intelligence sharing, and a common policy 
towards sea and land trade.  Combating counternarcotics remains a 
priority for the Iranian regime because of its domestic drug abuse 
problem and the violence in southeast Iran related to the drug 
trade.  Our UNODC and diplomatic colleagues argue that Iran has made 
laudatory efforts to combat the problem through comprehensive drug 
treatment and border-control programs.  The U.K. already works 
closely with Iran on counternarcotics cooperation and Iran has 
requested repeatedly additional aid from the U.K. and others, 
including in nuclear-related discussions with the EU-3. 
 
12. (SBU) Earlier, UNODC floated the idea of holding one of the 
three 2009 roundtables in Iran, provided Iran would agree to invite 
all Paris Pact members (Refs A and B).  Recently UNODC's Paris Pact 
Coordinator told Counselor that it had approached the Iranian 
Mission in Vienna, which  refused to provide such a guarantee. 
(NOTE:  Ref A also instructed Mission not to support such a 
roundtable in Tehran. END NOTE.) If USG policy towards Iran should 
change to permit contact with Iran, USDEL could find many 
opportunities around the expert-level roundtables -- to be held 
elsewhere -- to open an informal dialogue with Iran on technical 
counternarcotics issues.  UNODC maintains a small field office in 
Tehran, and claims to be the only UN entity in Iran still 
constructively engaged with the government. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
13. (SBU) The Paris Pact is a large and diverse group of countries 
united in their commitment to fight the Afghan drug problem. While 
the overarching goal is the same for all, the tactics for getting 
vary among member states.  The USG should use the December Paris 
Pact meeting to promote our plans of getting to that goal (e.g., the 
GPI), to advance our particular interests (e.g., East Africa) and to 
engage a long-standing nemesis, if our policy should change to 
permit such contact.  End Comment. 
 
SCHULTE