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Viewing cable 08TOKYO3402, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/15/08-2

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO3402 2008-12-15 08:16 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6054
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3402/01 3500816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150816Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9447
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3787
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 1430
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 5221
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 9409
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1996
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6827
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2830
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2928
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 003402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/15/08-2 
 
INDEX: 
 
(9) Enactment of refueling bill; Next contribution in Afghanistan 
not in sight (Mainichi) 
 
(10) Failure of Bush's North Korea policy: No concession cards 
(Yomiuri) 
 
(11) Interview with former prime ministerial advisor Yukio Okamoto; 
Refueling mission helps curbs terrorism and piracy; Japan should 
consider joining PRT in Afghanistan (Asahi) 
 
(12) University of Shizuoka Prof. Hajime Izumi: Significance of 
Japan-U.S. cooperation will increase (Yomiuri) 
 
(13) Stray bullet possibly fired by U.S. military hit auto in 
parking spot of private home 500 meters from base in Okinawa 
(Mainichi) 
 
(14) Aso announces emergency economic package, with revenue sources 
left vague (Mainichi) 
 
(15) Gist of Japan-China-ROK summit (Yomiuri) 
 
(16) Former ASDF Chief of Staff Toshio Tamogami speaks his mind; 
U.S. forces must withdraw from Japan, Japan must discuss nuclear 
option (Part 2) (Shukan Gendai) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(9) Enactment of refueling bill; Next contribution in Afghanistan 
not in sight 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
December 13, 2008 
 
A bill amending the New Antiterrorism Special Measures Law to extend 
the Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian 
Ocean cleared the Diet yesterday by an override vote in the House of 
Representatives. The Aso administration managed to avoid a 
suspension of the refueling mission, as the previous administration 
did last year. Given that the security situation in Afghanistan 
remains serious, however, the international community is calling on 
Japan to come up with another contribution. But there are few 
options for assistance that Japanese troops can make in Afghanistan 
because operations there are fraught with danger. Prime Minister 
Taro Aso, who is losing political ground, has no power to decide to 
dispatch troops to mainland Afghanistan, either. Japan's diplomacy 
has reached an impasse. 
 
The said law contains the same measures as those in the New 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law enacted this January. Since the 
Democratic Party of Japan accepted the government's plan to enact 
the law in exchange for an early dissolution of the Lower House, its 
draft amendment cleared the Lower House in late October. But Aso 
would not pledge to dissolve the Diet, and because it was possible 
to use "the 60-day rule" allowing the government to use an override 
vote in the Lower House, momentum for using the new legislation as a 
bargaining chip over Diet dissolution waned in the ruling and 
opposition camps. 
 
During that period, Barack Obama, who has pledged to withdraw U.S. 
 
TOKYO 00003402  002 OF 010 
 
 
troops from Iraq and shift priority from Iraq to Afghanistan, was 
elected in the U.S. presidential election. But Defense Minister 
Yasukazu Hamada only said yesterday: "Japan has not considered other 
activities (than the refueling operation). The plan to dispatch 
troops to mainland Afghanistan also has been returned to a clean 
slate." 
 
Security situation lying as problem 
 
Nearly 1,000 troops from various countries have been killed in 
Afghanistan. The security situation there remains the biggest 
obstacle to Japan's dispatch plan. If SDF troops are dispatched to 
that country, it is highly likely that fighting will cost some 
lives. Tokyo is also concerned that dispatched troops might have to 
take action that violates Article 9 of the Constitution that bans 
them from using weapons overseas. According to a senior government 
official, the fact-finding team that was dispatched in June by the 
previous Fukuda administration had been aware of the conclusion that 
any other operations than the refueling service would be difficult. 
 
Under the politically divided Diet situation, it would not be easy 
to push through the controversial plan of dispatching Japanese 
troops to mainland Afghanistan. The Aso administration, busy with 
preparing emergency economic measures, had no other choice but to 
devote itself just to having the one bill pass the Diet. 
 
(10) Failure of Bush's North Korea policy: No concession cards 
 
YOMIURI (Page 6) (Full) 
December 13, 2008 
 
Takeo Miyazaki, Beijing 
 
The six-party head-of-delegation meeting on North Korea's nuclear 
program, held for the first time in five years, ended on Dec. 11 
without reaching an agreement. This means that dialogue with North 
Korea, which had been led by U.S. chief negotiator Christopher Hill, 
was unable to produce the result that had been expected. The Bush 
administration's diplomatic efforts in the end have failed to 
prevent North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons. 
 
Returning to Washington before watching the end of the meeting, U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Hill severely criticized Pyongyang, 
which remained firmly (opposed to the codification of a verification 
protocol), saying: "North Korea is a country that finds it difficult 
to cooperate with other countries." 
 
The six-party head-of-delegation meeting was aimed to enter the 
final stage of the North's commitment to abandoning its nuclear 
programs, once the verification protocol issue was resolved. The 
meeting reflected President Bush's strong intention to produce 
diplomatic results while he was still in office. The President held 
summit meetings that discussed the issue with the leaders of Japan, 
China and South Korea on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum in November in Lima. However, Hill was 
unable to find common ground in a meeting with his North Korean 
counterpart held in Singapore prior to the meeting of the chief 
negotiators of the six-party talks. Hill announced that Washington 
would not hold any bilateral meeting with Pyongyang on the 
verification issue, admitting that the negotiating style that until 
now had moved the six-party talks forward was no longer effective. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003402  003 OF 010 
 
 
The Bush administration had earlier shifted to a policy of placing 
emphasis on dialogue with the North, having learned a bitter lesson 
in its first term. In his State of Union Address Bush in 2002, Bush 
described North Korea as part of an "axis of evil." He refused to 
hold direct talks with the North and took a strategy of containing 
that country, after Pyongyang had admitted to its nuclear weapons 
program using highly enriched uranium. 
 
The Bush administration, however, changed its position to attaching 
priority to dialogue when North Korea conducted nuclear testing in 
October 2006. Hill held direct talks with the North Koreans in 
January 2007 in Berlin. The six-party talks led by the United States 
and North Korea became established. Since Hill made many 
concessions, including one accepting a toothless nuclear 
declaration, a strict verification protocol was required. Therefore, 
the six-party talks were certain to face difficulties. 
 
The reason for the failure of the latest round of the six-party 
talks is that the United States had used up its major concession 
cards toward North Korea. When Pyongyang backpedaled on its 
commitment to disable its nuclear facilities because the talks had 
reached a dead end, Washington decided to delist the North as a 
state-sponsoring state, the final trump card. North Korea, having 
obtained a reward, has not made any concession since. It now aims to 
secure more rewards from the Obama administration. 
 
A high official of the Bush administration played up its achievement 
in the six-party talks, noting: "We let the North blast the cooling 
tower of its main nuclear power plant. Plutonium (material for 
nuclear bombs) will not increase." However, North Korea calls itself 
a nuclear power and can restore within about one year the nuclear 
facility that has been undergoing the disabling process. 
 
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan indicated that 
Pyongyang has ditched the Bush administration, saying after the last 
U.S.-DPRK meeting: "The United States now feels that there is not 
enough time." 
 
(11) Interview with former prime ministerial advisor Yukio Okamoto; 
Refueling mission helps curbs terrorism and piracy; Japan should 
consider joining PRT in Afghanistan 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
December 13, 2008 
 
By Keiichi Kaneko 
 
A bill extending Japan's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean has 
cleared the Diet. I interviewed Yukio Okamoto, a former prime 
ministerial advisor and foreign affairs commentator, to hear his 
views on the legislation's possible impact on support for 
Afghanistan and relations between Japan and the United States. 
 
The refueling mission in the Indian Ocean carries substantial 
significance. The number of suspicious vessels has decreased 
markedly owing to maritime patrols by multinational naval vessels 
that have been refueled by Japan. Terrorists' navigation has been 
blocked and piracy at sea has been curbed considerably. 
 
Islamic fundamentalist forces are on the sharp rise in Africa, 
including Somalia. Without losing power, the forces of the 
international terrorist group Al Qaeda have linked up extensively. 
 
TOKYO 00003402  004 OF 010 
 
 
If worst comes to worst, part of Africa could become a breeding 
ground for terrorists. That makes the maritime patrols in waters off 
Somalia even more vital. 
 
Japan refers itself as a peace fostering nation, but there is 
frustration in the international community, wondering, "What is it 
going to do specifically?" The economic cooperation budget has 
shrunk noticeably. If Japan remains inactive regarding international 
contribution, the country is certain to meet with criticism and 
insult harsher than those during the Gulf War of 1991. 
 
With the inauguration of Barack Obama of the Democratic Party as the 
President, the United States is expected to apply greater pressure 
on Japan. To build new Japan-U.S. relations, the Obama 
administration might honestly lend an ear to Japan's explanation for 
about six months. Japan's international cooperation capability will 
be tested. Without it, Japan might be pressed for financial 
contribution. The size of it might be greater than the 13 billion 
dollars Japan contributed (during the Gulf War). 
 
In support for Afghanistan, there are a variety of means to send 
personnel without enacting new legislation. Japan should consider 
joining the military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). 
Steps against piracy in waters off Somalia should also be considered 
as part of antiterrorism measures. In such a case, how to defend 
non-Japanese commercial ships is quite difficult. I believe if an 
escort ship steps in between pirates and a commercial vessel, the 
pirates will flee. If attacked, the right to collective self-defense 
should be exercised. 
 
It is regrettable that security is regarded only as a bargaining 
tool to use in the Diet. Japan's security policy has matured with 
the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and the mission in Iraq, 
following the PKO Cooperation Law, the Guidelines (for Japan-U.S. 
Defense Cooperation), and the amended SDF Law. We must not allow it 
to collapse like a house of cards. 
 
Japan riled the United States during the Gulf War. The operation of 
Japan's unique Export Trade Control Ordinance and the three 
principles banning weapons exports has been out of tune with the 
commonsense of the international community. There have been a couple 
of episodes in which U.S. uniformed officers were outraged to an 
extent that they might send troops to Japan by halting the operation 
to topple Saddam Hussein. They are partly responsible for chilly 
Japan-U.S. relations of the 1990s. 
 
Seeing Japan's passive attitude toward international cooperation, 
the United States might think, "We are fed up with Japan," like 
during the Gulf War. I am concerned about future Japan-U.S. 
relations. 
 
(12) University of Shizuoka Prof. Hajime Izumi: Significance of 
Japan-U.S. cooperation will increase 
 
YOMIURI (Page 6) (Full) 
December 13, 2008 
 
It is not surprising that the six-party talks wrapped up without 
reaching an agreement. This is because there is a gap between the 
U.S. Bush Administration, which wants to produce results before its 
term ends on Jan. 20, and the five other member countries. 
 
 
TOKYO 00003402  005 OF 010 
 
 
It is impossible to reach an agreement on the codification of a 
verification protocol on North Korea's declaration of its nuclear 
programs, unless the North agrees to accept a compromise to 
stipulate in a separate informal document sampling of nuclear 
materials from nuclear facilities. It is only natural for Pyongyang 
to choose the incoming Obama administration as a negotiating partner 
rather than the outgoing Bush administration. Although there is a 
possibility that the United States will sound out other six-party 
talks member countries on the holding of a next round, it will 
probably be difficult to draw out a compromise from North Korea. 
 
In negotiating with North Korea, the incoming Obama administration 
should press for a comprehensive resolution on such issues as 
nuclear, missiles, and human rights, while taking over the dialogue 
policy that the outgoing Bush administration has carried out for the 
last two years. Since the Obama administration's policy is 
coincident with Japan's position, Japan-U.S. cooperation in the 
six-party talks may become more important than at present. 
 
(13) Stray bullet possibly fired by U.S. military hit auto in 
parking spot of private home 500 meters from base in Okinawa 
 
MAINICHI (Page 10) (Abridged) 
Eve., December 15, 2008 
 
Around 7:30 pm on Dec. 13, the male owner (25) of a car parked 
outside his home in Igei district of Kin Town in Okinawa Prefecture 
dialed 110 to report that his lighted number plate on the front of 
his car had been smashed by a bullet that penetrated the vehicle. An 
investigation by the Ishikawa police discovered a bullet that was 
approximately 4.5 centimeter long and approximately 1 centimeter in 
diameter. Igei district is adjacent to Camp Hansen, where 
approximately 500 meters to the northeast of the incident is a 
live-fire range. The police see a high probability that the bullet 
strayed from the U.S. military, and are investigating the charge of 
damaging property.  The Okinawa Defense Bureau and Kin Town 
authorities confirmed the damage on the 14th. The possibility is 
high that a stray bullet passed over a local highway adjacent to 
Camp Hansen. 
 
(14) Aso announces emergency economic package, with revenue sources 
left vague 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
December 13, 2008 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso announced an emergency package to protect 
people's livelihoods yesterday. This move is aimed at reinstating 
his policy stance of giving priority to economic growth, which has 
been overshadowed by his decision to put off submitting a fiscal 
2008 second supplementary budget bill to the next ordinary Diet 
session. Regarding the fiscal resources to finance the package, 
however, he just said: "The government will show the entire picture 
by the end of the year." Some observers, focusing on a conflict 
having arisen in the government and the ruling camp over revenue 
sources in compiling a fiscal 2009 budget, have expressed concern 
about the feasibility of the proposed emergency measures. 
 
Aso emphasized in a press conference yesterday: "I am determined to 
make every possible effort in order for Japan to emerge from the 
recession as more quickly than any other industrialized countries. 
In implementing emergency economic measures, though, there is the 
 
TOKYO 00003402  006 OF 010 
 
 
question of where the fiscal resources would come from. Aso 
categorically said that the government would not float 
deficit-covering bonds to finance the additional economic package 
announced on Oct. 30, but he made no reference to revenue sources 
for other areas. The prime minister aimed to increase the tobacco 
tax in the fiscal 2009 budget, but the proposal has been derailed 
due to opposition from some ruling party members. Given this, Aso 
appears to have judged it unwise to refer to any specific fiscal 
resource. 
 
The government and the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic 
Party and the New Komeito have also been at loggerheads over a 
mid-term program regarding social security and tax and fiscal 
policy. The ruling coalition has decided not to give any specific 
timeframe for hiking the consumption tax, while the government has 
aimed at specifying the timing. Only one week is left until the 
Finance Minister presents its draft budgetary bill for fiscal 2009 
on Dec. 20. If the Diet falls into deeper disarray over revenue 
resources to finance the emergency economic package, the Aso 
administration's political footing might weaken even more. 
 
(15) Gist of Japan-China-ROK summit 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
December 14, 2008 
 
(Trilateral relations) 
 
Prime Minister Taro Aso: It is necessary for the three countries to 
jointly tackle such issues as the global financial crisis and the 
North Korean issue. 
 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao: Three countries should cooperate in such 
areas as distribution, industry, and financing. 
 
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak: We would like to cooperate in 
promoting exchanges among young people and the like. 
 
(Economic and monetary situations) 
 
Three leaders: Now that the financial crisis is growing serious, 
cooperation among the three countries is essential and necessary. We 
welcome an agreement reached to expand currency swaps. It is 
important to strengthen the roles of the Chiang Mai Initiative and 
Asia Development Bank. 
 
(North Korean issue) 
 
Each leader: It is regrettable that no agreement was reached on a 
nuclear verification protocol in the latest six-party talks. We will 
continue to join hands in the six-party talks. 
 
Aso: I would like to ask for your understanding and support of our 
effort to improve relations with North Korea, including a settlement 
of the abduction issue. 
 
Wen and Lee: We will understand and support Japan's effort. 
 
 (UN reform) 
 
Aso: Reforming the UN Security Council is necessary. I hope Japan 
will hold a constructive dialogue with China and South Korea. 
 
TOKYO 00003402  007 OF 010 
 
 
 
Wen: I will attend negotiations on UN reform in a responsible 
manner. 
 
Lee: I agree on a reform plan that will serve to benefit Asian and 
all other countries. 
 
(Climate change) 
 
Aso: In a session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in late 2009, it is necessary 
to form a mechanism that involves all major greenhouse gas emitters. 
 
 
Lee: Japan, China, and South Korea in cooperation should submit the 
same opinion. 
 
(Disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation) 
 
Aso: I would like to seek your cooperation in spreading the nuclear 
non-proliferation effort and the treaty banning cluster bombs. 
 
Wen: I have given heed to Japan's position. 
 
Lee: I agree to and support Japan's position. 
 
 ASTERISK Japan-China summit 
 
(Japan-China relations) 
 
Aso: I am determined to pour my energy into promoting exchanges 
between young peoples and in the security area. 
 
Wen: I highly evaluate the leaders' frequent visits to each other's 
countries. I appreciate Japan's assistance on the occasion of the 
Great Sichuan Earthquake and the Beijing Olympics. 
 
 (Senkaku Islands) 
 
Aso: Operations by Chinese oceanographic research vessels are 
regrettable. They will not have a favorable impact on Japan-China 
relations. 
 
Wen: This district is China's inherent territory from ancient times. 
This position is consistently clear and firm. We would like to 
properly resolve the issue through talks. I hope the issue will not 
negatively affect our favorable bilateral relationship. 
 
Aso: The Senkaku Islands are Japan's inherent territory, and there 
is no doubt about it historically and in view of international law. 
I ask you to take proper preventive measures. 
 
(Development of the East China Sea) 
 
Aso: I hope the two countries will hold talks at an early date to 
translate our political agreement into action. 
 
Wen: I expect working-level talks to be continued. 
 
(Food safety) 
 
Aso: I would like your country to pin down the causes of a series of 
 
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incidents, including Chinese-made frozen dumplings found 
contaminated with pesticides. 
 
Wen: I want to continue to communicate and cooperate with Japan. 
 
(North Korean issue) 
 
Aso: I expect the role to be played by China. 
 
 ASTERISK Japan-ROK summit 
 
(Japan-ROK relations) 
 
The two leaders: We make efforts to establish a mature partnership. 
 
Lee: We would like to change our bilateral ties from the remote 
relations between close countries to a close relationship between 
close countries. 
 
(Economy) 
 
Aso: It is necessary to quickly resume talks on concluding an 
economic partnership agreement. 
 
Lee: In working-level talks, it will be possible to find ways that 
will benefit both sides. 
 
(North Korean issue) 
 
The two leaders: Strengthening cooperation with the U.S. Obama 
administration is imperative. 
 
(16) Former ASDF Chief of Staff Toshio Tamogami speaks his mind; 
U.S. forces must withdraw from Japan, Japan must discuss nuclear 
option (Part 2) 
 
SHUKAN GENDAI (Excerpts) 
December 20, 2008 
 
Regarding the question of reducing U.S. bases, Japan has not been 
able to say anything to the United States which has vested interests 
in remaining. Japan has been paying the U.S. military the so-called 
sympathy budget worth over 200 billion yen annually. It would be 
nice to earmark that much money for the SDF, but the government 
cannot mention that, either. Once a final decision is made on the 
relocation of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Japan would be 
forced to foot a large portion of the bill for it. The incoming 
Obama administration, scheduled to be inaugurated in January, seems 
enthusiastic about the Afghanistan issue, so there is a possibility 
that Japan will be forced to send SDF troops to Afghanistan, which 
is far more dangerous than Iraq. 
 
There is only one way that can prevent the United States from acting 
arbitrarily in talks with Japan. That is for Japan to actively 
disclose what was discussed with the United States. That would 
prompt the public to raise objections, saying, "That's absurd." 
Public protests would not allow the government to be at America's 
beck and call. 
 
Japan must discuss its nuclear option as early as possible 
 
Going nuclear would be the most effective way for Japan to become an 
 
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independent country. In international politics, non-nuclear weapon 
states have to be subservient to the wishes of nuclear powers in the 
end. Opting to arming itself with nuclear weapons is the fastest way 
for a country to break away from a position of subordination. 
 
Let's say there are two countries at odds with their military 
strength 10 to 1. The country with 10 wins in a conventional war. If 
the country with military strength 1 possesses nuclear weapons, 
there would be no winner. That is because with a threat to use 
nuclear weapons by the country with 1, the country with 10 would not 
be able to launch an attack for fear of a counterattack. In that 
sense, nuclear weapons are arms that would never be used. Nuclear 
weapons are so powerful that (a country) can demonstrate their 
effectiveness by just declaring it will go nuclear. 
 
Fully aware of such a principle of nuclear weapons, the nuclear 
powers have created the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) 
regime so as to prevent further increases in the number of nuclear 
powers. Even so, India and Pakistan have become nuclear powers in 
Asia. 
 
North Korea, too, conducted a nuclear test the year before last. The 
six-party talks to put an end to the North's nuclear development 
have been underway for over five years, but no substantial results 
have been achieved. The North has no intention of abandoning its 
nuclear ambitions, so it is no surprise that the talks have not 
moved forward. 
 
Once the North possesses a nuclear weapon capable of reaching the 
United States, the situation in Northeast Asia would change 
drastically. As I just mentioned earlier, the United States would 
not be able to attack the North and its guarantee to defend Japan 
from the North would disappear. If Japan wants to maintain its 
deterrence, the country must arm itself with nuclear weapons. 
 
But the subject of nuclear arming is taboo in Japan, and people are 
discouraged from even discussing the option. 
 
But being a party to the NPT, it is difficult in reality for Japan 
to go nuclear right away. So the second-best option is to have 
America allow us to use its nuclear weapons in time of a 
contingency. 
 
I'm talking here about an introduction of the nuclear-sharing 
arrangements that exist already among Germany, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey, all members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Routinely conducting training using America's 
nuclear weapons (nuclear-powered submarines, etc.), the five 
countries are allowed to have the wartime use of some of 
American-owned nuclear weapons. Tokyo should ask Washington to let 
Japan have the same arrangement. The system could bring about the 
same effect as possessing nuclear weapons without Japan having to 
build it own nuclear arsenal. 
 
Japan must consider having an independent deterrence capability, 
while considering a variety of means, including such a system. I 
will reiterate that we cannot ensure the security of Japan by 
leaving everything to the United States. 
 
As a first step, it is important to begin discussions without 
taboos. I have been treated as a dangerous individual by some 
lawmakers and the news organizations. I would be satisfied if I can 
 
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create a stir by stimulating extensive national debate on defense. 
 
SCHIEFFER