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Viewing cable 08STPETERSBURG194, CODEL DELAHUNT VISIT TO ST. PETERSBURG

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STPETERSBURG194 2008-12-16 10:44 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Consulate St Petersburg
R 161044Z DEC 08
FM AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2647
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
UNCLAS ST PETERSBURG 000194 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON RS
SUBJECT: CODEL DELAHUNT VISIT TO ST. PETERSBURG 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On December 9-10, Representatives William 
Delahunt and Dana Rohrabacher met with several diverse groups of 
Russian interlocutors in St. Petersburg.  Our interlocutors were 
pleased to be able to meet with such high-level representatives 
of the U.S. government. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
NGO's:  Tough Sledding, But Optimistic 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) A distinguished leader of a major St. Petersburg NGO 
met with Representatives Delahunt and Rohrabacher.  The NGO 
leader said that despite his many mistakes, former Russian 
President Yeltsin brought about sufficient change in Russia to 
render a return a return to Soviet era repression impossible. He 
welcomed the coming of age of the first generation of Russians 
who have never lived under a repressive regime, and asserted 
that these young people would not likely acquiesce to 
limitations on their personal freedoms, such as being told what 
to read, what to watch, and what to do - all hallmarks of 
previous generations.  Despite what our interlocutor 
characterized as "difficulties" he and others in the NGO 
community presently face, he was optimistic about the future. 
 
3. (SBU) Turning to the issue of the independence of the court 
system, our NGO interlocutor stated that the courts were 
reluctant to completely surrender the independence they had eked 
out in the early nineties.  There remains, he stated, an 
"obvious" amount of pressure from the authorities on the courts 
to rule in a given way, but there is still a modicum of true 
independence that will be very difficult to extinguish.  Our 
interlocutor said that, while St. Petersburg Governor Matviyenko 
and President Medvedev were strong supporters of Prime Minister 
Putin, they also are politicians and could be expected to look 
out for their own best interests.  If those interests differ 
from Putin's, he continued, then so be it.  Congressmen Delahunt 
and Rohrabacher asked what the U.S. could do to encourage 
political pluralism in Russia.  Our NGO contact suggested that 
President-elect Obama show support for President Medvedev's 
independence by coming to Russia and meeting solely with 
Medvedev and, pointedly, not with Prime Minister Putin. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Russian Mentality - Deeply Ingrained in the National Psyche 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Representative Delahunt subsequently met on December 9 
with a Professor of Social Studies at St. Petersburg State 
University.  Delahunt asked the professor about Russian 
attitudes toward the conflict between Georgia and Russia over 
South Ossetia.  In response to the question, the professor 
provided a lengthy description of his theory of the Russian 
mentality, which focuses on the conflict between the individual 
and the collective, and between Russian Orthodoxy as a cultural 
phenomena and the criminal-clan mentality. 
 
5. (SBU) The professor added that anti-American feelings had 
increased as a result of the U.S. response to the conflict 
between Georgia and Russia.  U.S. policies in Iraq and Kosovo 
have also fueled this view among the Russian public.  The 
professor stated that 25% of Russians now view the U.S. as a 
hostile country, and only 10% see the U.S. as a friendly 
country. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
Amcham:  Russian Economy Will Get Worse Before It Gets Better 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Representatives Delahunt and Rohrabacher met with the 
Executive Director and three board members of the St. Petersburg 
American Chamber of Commerce (Amcham).  The Amcham 
representatives commented on the impact of the global economic 
problems on St. Petersburg and described the business climate in 
general.  They noted that St. Petersburg and Northwest Russia 
were beginning to feel the impact of the global economic crisis. 
 Russian business has begun laying off workers and some American 
firms are downsizing.  Credit is harder to receive than 
previously.  Though the country has over 1000 banks in total, 
the fifty largest are responsible for over 80% of all banking 
business.  The Amcham representatives expect numerous smaller 
banks to go under and/or be absorbed by the larger ones, though 
that consolidation process would not greatly affect the economy. 
 
7. (SBU) Devaluation of the ruble, which the Amcham 
representatives said was inevitable, is expected to have a much 
greater impact on Russia.  With the Russian government currently 
spending its hard currency reserves at the rate of US$40 billion 
a month, the members believe the ruble will be devalued to 
around 40 per dollar, with the majority of the devaluation 
expected to occur after mid-January, 2009.  They questioned 
whether the Russian Government would devalue the ruble 
gradually, as arguably it has done in small increments over the 
past few weeks, or at one fell swoop.  The members nonetheless 
remain optimistic with the resiliency of the Russian economy and 
expect the economy to fully recover from the current downturn by 
the end of 2009 or early 2010. 
 
8. (SBU) Regarding corruption, the Amcham representatives 
emphasized that corrupt Russian officials do not attempt to 
extort money from American businesses because they know that the 
American businesses will not pay bribes.  The picture for 
Russian businesses is very different.  The excessive regulatory 
burdens faced by Russian businesses leaves them vulnerable to 
extortion and demands for bribes.  Many Russian businesses, 
faced by arbitrary bureaucratic obstacles, reach the conclusion 
that it is easier and more cost-effective to pay bribes than to 
try to resolve the myriad obstacles mid- and low-level 
bureaucrats can place in their way. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Importance of U.S.- Russian Exchange Programs 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) At dinner December 10, Representatives Delahunt and 
Rohrabacher met with a range of Russian guests, who included the 
Editor-in-Chief of a local, 900,000 circulation weekly 
newspaper, the Director of a leading art institute, and the Dean 
of a prestigious university's School of Foreign Languages. 
 
10. (SBU) The Russian guests lauded U.S. exchange programs and 
their impact on improving U.S.-Russian understanding and their 
role in the professional development of the Russian 
participants.  They said that enlargement of the various 
exchange programs, both Russians going to the United States and 
Americans coming to Russia, was very much in the interest of 
both countries as a means of preventing future 
misunderstandings.  Any such programs, though, would need 
substantial preparatory work to be fully successfully, including 
ensuring adequate preparation for the exchange participants on 
managing their expectations prior to travel and advising them on 
the best ways to utilize their experiences upon their return to 
their home country. 
 
 
GWALTNEY