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Viewing cable 08STATE135270, PORT SECURITY DEMARCHE - YEMEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE135270 2008-12-30 21:38 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0033
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5270 3652152
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 302138Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0000
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 0000
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RULSJGA/COMDT COCARD WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC 0000
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC 0000
UNCLAS STATE 135270 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EWWT KHLS PREL PTER YM
SUBJECT: PORT SECURITY DEMARCHE - YEMEN 
 
1. This is an action request.  See paragraph 5. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2. (SBU) The United States Government (USG) is concerned that 
the 
current level of port security in Yemen does not adequately 
reflect the current threat situation given recent terrorist 
events in country. The USG seeks to engage the Government 
of Yemen (ROYG) to address U.S. concerns regarding a 
possible increased risk of terrorist exploitation of 
international maritime commerce to launch attacks, 
including on the United States. Accordingly, the USG urges 
the ROYG to enhance port security measures at its port 
facilities and for vessels upon arrival to Yemen as 
applicable under the International 
Maritime Organization,s (IMO) International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code provisions of the 
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
1974.  Embassy Sanaa should also seek ROYG agreement to 
receive additional U.S. Coast Guard visits to offer 
recommendations for additional measures as appropriate.  If 
these actions are not implemented, the USG may impose 
conditions of entry on vessels arriving to the United 
States whenever one of their last five ports of call was in 
Yemen. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
3. (SBU) The Maritime Transportation Security Act Of 2002 (46 
U.S.C. 70108-70110) requires the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism 
measures maintained in foreign ports and to take action if 
effective anti-terrorism measures are not in place.  As 
part of this assessment process, a U.S. Coast Guard 
International Port Security (IPS) Program Team visited 
Yemen in April/May 2007 to discuss implementation of the 
ISPS Code in Yemen,s ports.  A follow-up visit occurred in 
November of this year.  Based on a thorough assessment of 
available intelligence, observations in the port of Aden, 
and a decrease in the overall security environment due to 
recent terrorist events in country targeting U.S., Yemeni, 
and other international interests, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security in coordination with the Maritime 
Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC) has 
determined that the anti-terrorism measures in place in 
Yemen do not reflect the current threat situation. 
 
4. (SBU) Accordingly, the ROYG, under its responsibilities as 
the 
contracting government to the SOLAS regulations, including 
the ISPS Code, is requested to immediately review the port 
security posture in its ports.  A thorough and detailed 
Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) should be 
undertaken and a revised and detailed Port Facility 
Security Plan should be prepared which takes into account 
the threats and risks identified in the PFSA. In the 
interim, the ROYG should take additional security measures 
in its ports and should also require vessels that call at 
its ports to take additional security measures consistent 
with security level 2.  The ROYG is also requested to host 
a team of U.S. Coast Guard experts to assess the additional 
security measures implemented by the ROYG.  If these 
actions are not implemented, the USG may impose conditions 
of entry on vessels arriving to the United States whenever 
one of their last five ports of call was in Yemen. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Post is requested to deliver the talking points in 
paragraph 5 to officials in the appropriate ministries. 
Please advise to whom the points were delivered, the date 
of delivery, and the response. In its response, post is 
also requested to provide its views regarding the likely 
impact of such increased security measures in terms of both 
the additional resource demands on the ROYG and the 
shipping industry, and the potential public impact of such 
measures. The U.S. Coast Guard is prepared to conduct a 
follow up visit Yemen to assist in the implementation of 
ISPS security measures in collaboration with appropriate 
host government officials. Please advise if such a visit 
would be appropriate and welcomed by the ROYG. If so, post, 
s assistance in arranging the visit and providing a post 
point of contact would be appreciated. 
 
-------------- 
Talking Points 
-------------- 
 
6. (U) Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), 
the United States Congress mandated that the United States 
Government (USG) assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism 
measures in foreign ports. 
 
As part of this assessment process, a U.S. Coast Guard 
International Port Security (IPS) Program Team visited 
Yemen in April/May 2007 to discuss implementation of the 
ISPS Code in Yemen,s ports.  An additional visit occurred 
in November of this year. 
 
The team noted that security in two ports, Aden and 
Hodeidiah, was provided by the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG). 
The YCG is making progress in ensuring that a secure 
environment exists. However, the USG has several areas of 
concern.  These include: 
 
A lack of coordination between the Designated Authority and 
the YCG. 
 
The need for a thorough Port Facility Security Assessment 
and Port Facility Security Plan that reflect the risks in 
Yemen. 
 
Unclear or non-existent standard operating procedures for 
providing security in the ports. 
 
The apparent lack of a reliable security organization to 
provide security in the port of Mukalla 
 
The lack of oversight by the Designated Authority to ensure 
that provisions of the Port Facility Security Plan are 
being followed. 
 
As a result of the overall assessment, and a decrease in 
the overall security environment exemplified by recent 
terrorist attacks against U.S., Yemeni, and other 
international interests, the USG is concerned that the 
current level of port security in Yemen does not adequately 
reflect the threat situation.  When such a determination is 
made, the USG, under the authority of the Maritime 
Security Act of 2002, may impose conditions of entry on all 
vessels sailing to U.S. ports that have called at a port in 
Yemen within five port calls of a U.S. arrival. However, 
appropriate action by the Government of Yemen could prevent 
the need to take such measures. 
 
Specifically, the Government of Yemen, under its 
responsibilities as a contracting government to the SOLAS 
regulations, including the ISPS Code, is requested to 
immediately undertake a thorough and detailed Port Facility 
Security Assessment (PFSA) for its ports. 
 
Based on the results of the PFSA, the Government of Yemen 
is requested to prepare a thorough and detailed Port 
Facility Security Plan (PFSP) and to fully implement its 
provisions. 
 
The USG understands that an initial PFSA and PFSP were 
prepared some time ago.  However, the USG believes that 
given recent events, there has been a sufficient change in 
the security environment to warrant a new PFSA and PFSP. 
 
While a new PFSP is prepared and implemented, the USG 
believes that Yemen should take immediate steps to 
strengthen port security. The USG recognizes the concerns 
that the Yemeni government has regarding the formal raising 
of the security level in its ports.  Nonetheless, the USG 
recommends that the government of Yemen take measures in 
line with security level 2 at all of its ports on a 
sustained and consistent basis.  Such measures should 
include: 
 
--Requiring positive identification of all personnel 
entering the port facility at all times 
 
--Searching a specified number of persons and vehicles 
entering the port facility on a consistent basis 
 
--Conducting more frequent landside and waterside patrols 
to monitor the security at the port facility and ensuring 
that the results of these patrols are documented and 
recorded 
 
The USG further recommends that the Government of Yemen 
require that vessels arriving at ports in Yemen: 
 
-- take measures equivalent to security level 2 (as defined 
in the ISPS Code); 
 
-- ensure that each access point to the vessel is guarded 
and that the guards have complete visibility of the 
exterior (both landside and waterside) of the vessel while 
the vessel is in port in Yemen. Guards may be provided by 
the vessel's crew; however, additional crewmembers should 
be placed on the vessel if necessary to ensure that limits 
on maximum hours of work are not exceeded, and/or minimum 
hours of rest are met, or guards may be provided by outside 
security forces approved by the vessel's master and company 
security officer; 
 
-- execute a declaration of security while the vessel is in 
port in Yemen; 
 
--log all security actions in the ship's log while the 
vessel is in port in Yemen. 
 
(NB: These are the same security measures the U.S. Coast 
Guard would impose on vessels visiting U.S. ports had these 
vessels docked at high threat ports during any of the last 
five port calls.) 
 
The U.S. continues to consider Yemen an important Counter 
Terrorism partner. The U.S. Coast Guard would welcome an 
opportunity to re-visit Yemen to assist in the preparation 
of the PFSA and PFSP. Such a visit would form the basis for 
determining whether additional measures are needed or if 
any technical assistance could be provided. 
 
 
End talking points. 
RICE