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Viewing cable 08STATE130227, IRAQ ECONOMIC RECOVERY: ROLE OF SCIENCE &

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE130227 2008-12-11 16:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO3976
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHC #0227/01 3461705
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111658Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 3062
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 1714
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 130227 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
FOR ECON:ROY THERRIEN AND CAO:HELEN LAFAVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ECIN EAID SOCI OEXC PGOV PINS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ ECONOMIC RECOVERY: ROLE OF SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY (ROUNDTABLE REPORT) 
 
REF: (A) BAGHDAD 2769 (B) BAGHDAD 3455 
 
1. (U) Summary: To accelerate Iraq's economic recovery, a 
roundtable of U.S. experts, convened by the Department, has 
offered to help Iraq establish and develop its own National 
Science Foundation (NSF).  Science and technology (the 
application of science) has long been a vital engine of 
economic development but has not been leveraged in Iraq's 
economic recovery.  The roundtable of science and technology 
(S&T) experts identified eight ways that an Iraqi version of 
an NSF can contribute to Iraq's economic recovery, as well as 
to the objectives of the Strategic Framework Agreement and 
the International Compact with Iraq (see paragraph 7). 
However, before the S&T roundtable can provide further 
assistance, it requires more information from the Government 
of Iraq (GOI) (see paragraph 9).  End Summary. 
 
The GOI Intends to Leverage S&T in Iraq's Economic Recovery 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
2. (U) On September 1, the Iraqi Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
with the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to 
evaluate and recommend improvements to Iraq's S&T 
capabilities and policies, so they can better support 
economic development (reftel A).  On September 15, the Iraqi 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) 
announced the GOI's intent to establish and fund an 
independent scientific research authority (SRA) to, among 
other things, (a) evaluate and recommend improvements to 
Iraq's S&T capabilities, policies, and practices; (b) promote 
and fund S&T research; and (c) oversee university S&T 
centers.  These announcements are complementary and - along 
with other recent GOI actions such as the proposed law to 
increase compensation and incentives for top scientists - 
demonstrate the GOI's intent to leverage S&T in Iraq's 
economic recovery. 
 
The Department Is Preparing to Assist the GOI: STIP Review 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The UNCTAD MOU commissions a Science, Technology, 
and Innovation Policy (STIP) Review for Iraq.  The 
Department, through the Office of the Science and Technology 
Adviser to the Secretary, intends to place at least one 
representative on the STIP Review team. 
 
The Department Is Preparing to Assist the GOI: Roundtable 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Since the GOI's concept of an SRA appears similar in 
structure and function to the U.S. National Science 
Foundation, which has long been an important contributor to 
U.S. economic growth,  the Department convened a roundtable 
of S&T experts on November 20 to develop a recommendation for 
how the U.S. government (USG) and the U.S. S&T community 
might assist the GOI in establishing an SRA, modeled on the 
U.S. National Science Foundation but unique to Iraq's 
culture, governmental structure, and current economic 
developmental needs.  The roundtable was composed of one or 
more representatives from the following organizations, with 
all the representatives having experience in S&T in Iraq: 
 
-- Department of State: Office of the Science and Technology 
Adviser to the Secretary of State, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs's Office 
of Science and Technology Cooperation, Bureau of 
International Security and Nonproliferation's Science Center 
Programs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs's Office of Iraq 
Affairs 
 
-- Department of Defense: International Technology Programs 
Office, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
 
-- Non-USG: National Science Foundation, National Academy of 
Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, American Association of Engineering Societies, U.S. 
Civilian Research and Development Foundation, Texas Tech 
University 
 
. . . S&T Is Vital to, but Underutilized in, Iraq's Recovery 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
STATE 00130227  002 OF 003 
 
 
5. (U) Roundtable participants agreed that S&T research and 
commercialization is a vital engine of economic development 
in countries around the world, but lamented that S&T has not 
been leveraged in Iraq's economic recovery.  They discussed 
the dire condition of Iraqi S&T: (a) scientists and engineers 
have been targeted and killed, (b) many have fled Iraq for 
safer locations, (c) the S&T community that remains in Iraq 
is fragmented, (d) both the Iraqi S&T communities dispersed 
outside Iraq and fragmented inside Iraq are isolated from 
essential communication and collaboration with other Iraqis 
and the international S&T community, (e) many S&T research or 
educational facilities and much S&T infrastructure are 
antiquated or destroyed, and (f) key S&T research or 
educational funding has been eliminated.  Consequently, Iraqi 
S&T may be 20 or more years behind global state of the art 
and Iraqi scientists and engineers, especially those in the 
private sector, have been unable to make sufficient 
contribution to Iraq's economic recovery. 
 
. . . Window of Opportunity to Employ S&T in Iraq's Recovery 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
6. (U) Roundtable participants considered the improving 
situation in Iraq: As security, governance, essential 
services, and economic conditions improve, Iraqi scientists 
and engineers are now needed even more for the next stage of 
Iraq's economic recovery.  And these improving conditions 
have created a window of opportunity: (a) Iraqi scientists 
and engineers are beginning to stay in or return to Iraq and 
reconnect with each other; (b) the GOI can now focus more on 
initiatives not directly related to immediate problems with 
security, governance, and essential services; (c) the GOI is 
more ready and able to fund S&T initiatives; and (d) U.S. S&T 
institutions and companies that can contribute to S&T 
initiatives are more able to work in Iraq. 
 
. . . Through Iraqi Version of a National Science Foundation 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Roundtable participants identified the following 
benefits to Iraq that an SRA could provide and that the U.S. 
S&T community could support with appropriate advice and 
assistance.  These benefits could help achieve objectives in 
both the Strategic Framework Agreement with Iraq (SFA) and 
the International Compact with Iraq (ICI); the benefits are 
linked below to each document.  (Note: None of the eight 
items in the following list are actual terms or conditions in 
the SFA or ICI, and none of these items would be funded by 
the USG.  Each of these items could, however, help achieve 
the general intent of the referenced clause in the SFA or 
ICI.) 
 
-- Iraqi facilitating and funding of S&T research and 
encouraging commercialization of that research - to fuel 
Iraq's education and economic recovery (SFA IV.2, V.10) 
 
-- Providing incentives for scientists and engineers not to 
flee Iraq and for those who have fled to return - to 
contribute to Iraq's education and economic recovery 
(ICI 4.4.1) 
 
-- Engaging Iraq's private-sector S&T expertise, a mostly 
untapped resource, in Iraq's economic recovery (ICI 4.2.1) 
 
-- Alleviating insufficient Iraqi ministerial capacity needed 
to exploit S&T in Iraq's economic recovery and providing a 
forum for improving cooperation between Iraqi ministries, 
between the Iraqi central and provincial governments, and 
between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (SFA V.5) 
 
-- Bridging ethno-sectarian divides that have hampered other 
U.S. initiatives during Iraq's reconstruction, since S&T 
activities are normally apolitical and cross-cultural - 
thereby promoting social stability (ICI 3.1.1) 
 
-- Equipping of university S&T research centers by the GOI; 
funding of advanced research by the GOI; and facilitating 
faculty and student S&T collaboration, partnerships, and 
exchanges between Iraqi universities and between U.S. and 
Iraqi universities - to modernize and rejuvenate Iraqi higher 
education and develop Iraq's human capital (SFA IV.2, IV.3; 
ICI 4.4.1)  (see reftel B for complementary Post initiatives) 
 
-- Engaging the global community, especially Arab countries, 
in Iraq's economic recovery through S&T collaboration and 
direct investment (SFA V.5, V.7; ICI 4.3.4) 
 
 
STATE 00130227  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- Accelerating redirection of Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) experts into activities that contribute to 
Iraq's economic recovery - reducing national security risks 
for the United States and its allies and terrorism risks in 
Iraq (SFA III, ICI 3.1.1) 
 
Should We Exploit This Window of Opportunity? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) S&T roundtable participants offered to (a) re-convene 
as needed to continue to offer advice on U.S. S&T engagement 
in Iraq and (b) assemble a small team of S&T experts, from 
the organizations represented at the roundtable and from the 
broader U.S. S&T community, to make one or more trips to Iraq 
to assist the GOI in establishing and developing an SRA.  The 
roundtable participants agreed, however, that before they 
could be of any further value, they needed more detailed 
information on the GOI's desires, intents, and priorities. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: The U.S. S&T community is prepared to help 
the GOI establish an SRA, but the community needs more 
information on the GOI's desires, intents, and priorities 
related to assistance in establishing an SRA.  Post's 
dialogue with the GOI could yield better understanding of how 
to use U.S. S&T engagement in Iraq's economic recovery and in 
development of an SRA.  The Department is prepared to assist 
Post in establishing this dialogue by sending an S&T 
community representative to consult with the GOI on how the 
community can best assist Iraq.  NEA/I-EAA officer Jeff 
O'Neal will consult with Post on the desirability and timing 
of such a visit.  End Comment. 
RICE