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Viewing cable 08QUITO1179, ECUADOR: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08QUITO1179 2008-12-22 21:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Quito
VZCZCXYZ0020
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #1179/01 3572124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 222124Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9807
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7898
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4060
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3321
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC LIMA 2962
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3999
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS QUITO 001179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT (RHONDA SHORE), NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV PREL EC CO
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 124815 
     B. STATE 120019 
 
1. (U) Embassy submits the narrative in paragraphs 2-7 for 
the 2008 Country Report on Terrorism: 
 
2. (U) Ecuador's greatest counterterrorism and security 
challenge remained the presence of Colombian narcotics and 
insurgent/terrorist groups in the northern border region.  In 
order to evade Colombian military operations, these groups, 
principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), regularly used Ecuadorian territory for rest, 
recuperation, resupply, and training, as well as coca 
processing and limited planting and production, thereby 
involving significant numbers of Ecuadorians in direct or 
indirect ways.  The porous 450-mile border and the lack of 
adequate licit employment opportunities for Ecuadorians in 
the region have made the area vulnerable to narcoterrorist 
influence and created a contraband economy.  Ecuadorian 
officials along the border believed the FARC,s economic 
impact allowed it to buy silence and compliance. 
 
3. (U) Ecuador stepped up its response to this threat, 
although it continued to face constraints on resources and 
limited capabilities.  The Correa Administration, while 
maintaining the country's traditional neutrality with respect 
to the Colombian conflict, has stated it opposed armed 
encroachments of any kind across its borders.  A Colombian 
attack in Ecuadorian territory on March 1 caused the 
destruction of a FARC camp and the death of FARC Secretariat 
member Raul Reyes.  Colombian analysis of documents contained 
within laptops recovered at the camp suggested elements 
within the Ecuadorian government had connections to the FARC. 
 The Correa administration strongly denied ties to the FARC, 
claiming that the only GOE contacts with the FARC were to 
negotiate the release of hostages.  The GOE has publicly 
expressed its desire to eliminate FARC presence within 
Ecuadorian territory.  The government shifted troops in 2008 
to the border region and continued to promote a domestic 
northern border development agenda in concert with 
international donors to spur economic development in the 
area. 
 
4. (U) Ecuador's security forces conducted operations against 
FARC training and logistical resupply camps along the 
northern border.  The Ecuadorian military significantly 
increased the number of operations in Ecuador's northern 
border region.  The operational tempo, which in early 2008 
was already higher than in previous years, increased even 
further after the March 1 attack.  A total of over 100 
battalion-level operations along the northern border led to 
the discovery and destruction of 11 cocaine producing 
laboratories, over 130 FARC facilities (bases, houses, and 
resupply camps), the eradication of nine hectares of coca, 
and the confiscation of weapons, communications equipment and 
other support equipment.  These operations also netted 
valuable information on FARC activities and infrastructure in 
and outside of Ecuador, and resulted in the detention of 20 
FARC members and the killing of one FARC member during the 
year.   Despite increasing successes in this effort, 
insufficient resources and the challenging border region 
terrain made it difficult to thwart cross-border incursions. 
 
5. (U) Ecuadorian police suspected several small and 
relatively minor Ecuadorian groups of domestic subversion and 
involvement in terrorism.  A handful of small radical 
Ecuadorian groups, including a self-proclaimed vestigial 
faction of the Alfaro Vive Carajo! organization, are reputed 
to have ties with and received support from Colombian 
narcoterrorists.  In 2007, Ecuadorian security forces 
conducted operations against this faction of the Alfaro Vive 
Carajo! organization in an attempt to minimize its capacity 
to conduct subversive, disruptive, or terrorist activities. 
In 2008, there emerged small but effective criminal units 
whose focus is on various stages of narcotics production and 
trafficking from within Colombia and through Esmeraldas, 
Ecuador.  Some elements of the FARC, National Liberation Army 
(ELN) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
paramilitaries, among others, have transitioned into pursuing 
purely criminal gang activity, including in Ecuador.  Other 
groups, although less active in the last couple of years, 
include the Popular Combatants Group (GCP), the Revolutionary 
Militia of the People (MRP), the Marxist-Leninist Party of 
Ecuador (PCMLE), and the Alfarista Liberation Army (ELA). 
 
6. (U) The Ecuadorian government continued to strengthen 
controls over money laundering through the Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU), which was established under a 2005 
Money Laundering Law.  The FIU is cooperating closely with 
the Anti-Narcotics Police Directorate, the Superintendent of 
Banks, the courts and the private banker association to 
identify suspicious transactions and develop information for 
the prosecution of cases. 
 
7. (U) Ecuador's judicial institutions remained weak, 
susceptible to corruption, and heavily backlogged with 
pending cases.  While the military and police have made 
numerous arrests, the judicial system had a poor record of 
achieving convictions. 
HODGES