Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08NEWDELHI3267, MENON SAYS INDIA TO DECIDE ON INFORMATION-SHARING WITH PAKISTAN, OPPOSED TO SPECIAL ENVOY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08NEWDELHI3267.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NEWDELHI3267 2008-12-31 11:33 2011-05-21 01:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
Appears in these articles:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article2035576.ece
VZCZCXRO7827
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #3267/01 3661133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311133Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4897
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7290
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 1099
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1422
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5768
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3007
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1439
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6017
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1708
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7437
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003267 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS PK IN

SUBJECT: MENON SAYS INDIA TO DECIDE ON INFORMATION-SHARING WITH PAKISTAN, OPPOSED TO SPECIAL ENVOY 

REF: A. NEW DELHI 03265      B. NEW DELHI 3251      C. FBI CABLE //1317/01495/365/006      D. NEW DELHI 3249 

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) 

1. (C) SUMMARY.  Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon told Ambassador Mulford December 31 that the Indian government would make a decision later in the day on whether and how much information from the Mumbai terrorist attack investigations to share with Pakistan and other countries. Menon emphasized that India had been tough on Pakistan with regard to accountability, but restrained in its rhetoric and actions.  He explained that India opposes a special envoy with a mandate that includes Kashmir.  Finally, Menon said India is ready to sign its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and is waiting for the IAEA to commence negotiation on an Additional Protocol, perhaps in late January.  Counter-terrorism will be the top issue on India's agenda with the new government in Bangladesh once it has settled in.  A focused discussion on End Use Monitoring (EUM) is reported ref A.  END SUMMARY. 

India to Decide on Information-Sharing with Pakistan 
- - -
 3. (C) In response to Ambassador Mulford's review of his December 30 meeting with Home Minister Chidambaram (ref B), Menon said the Indian government would meet later in the day to "make the call" about whether to share information from the Mumbai terrorist attack investigations with Pakistan and, if so, to determine what evidence in particular to share. Menon characterized this as "a big step" and pledged to coordinate with the U.S. on what information they share with Pakistan.  He cautioned, however, that it is far too early to refer to any information-sharing with the U.S. and Pakistan as a "three-way" mechanism.  He said the government would also decide what evidence to share with "the rest of the world," implying that the information the Indians release to other countries whose citizens were victims of the Mumbai attacks would not be as comprehensive as what they are willing to share with the U.S. and UK. 

4. (C) The Indian government was also "very keen to get cooperation going" with the U.S. pursuant to the FBI investigation into the death of American citizens in Mumbai, according to Menon, and would also make a decision at the same meeting later in the day on the FBI's request to share parts of its findings on Mumbai with Pakistan (ref C).  Menon requested further information about the specific legal requirement and process the FBI follows in response to the death of American citizens in terrorist attacks overseas. (The Ambassador subsequently provided a non-paper prepared by LegAtt, which has also been emailed to SCA.) 

Indo-Pak: Menon Emphasizes The Dogs That Did Not Bark 
- - -
 5. (C) Ambassador Mulford reiterated the U.S. hope that India and Pakistan will tamp down war rhetoric, suggesting that India had every right to be tough on Pakistan with regard to accountability while remaining restrained in its rhetoric and actions.  Menon agreed, adding, "Please be sure to remind all those who accuse us of stirring things up of all the dogs that have not barked in the night, the whole series of things that could have happened."  Menon said India could "weather accusations of going soft on Pakistan," but added, "the pressures will be extraordinary if they end up doing nothing."  He confided, "Chances are Pakistan will not do much, but we have to try." 

India Opposed to Special Envoy for Kashmir 
- - -
 6. (C) Menon had spoken with Under Secretary Bill Burns the evening of December 30 and expressed India's "extreme 

NEW DELHI 00003267  002 OF 002 

 sensitivity" on the issue of a special envoy with a mandate to address the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir.  According to Menon, Indians are concerned about the possibility of a "narrow" deal in which the U.S. would tell Pakistan the Mumbai terrorist attacks will not "stick on you" as long as "you keep fighting in the West."  Menon confided that India needed to work to "update perceptions" because the concept of such a deal could only have originated from those with "out-dated views of the reality in Kashmir." 

7. (C) Menon agreed that the Kashmir elections showed that the people of Kashmir are managing their own destiny through the ballot box (ref D).  Menon shared that "we had come close to resolving the Kashmir dispute with (former Pakistan president) Musharraf, and it would be a tragedy to throw all that progress away."  He concluded that a special envoy would be deeply unpopular and could negatively affect the gains in our bilateral relationship made over the past eight years. Menon observed that "we have not heard a peep" from critics of a closer relationship with the U.S. about cooperation with the FBI following the Mumbai attacks, but added, "Kashmir is different; we do not want to feed the notion that the U.S. is messing about in Kashmir, especially in the next four months" in the lead-up to national elections. 

Civ Nuke: Ready to Sign Safeguards, Waiting for IAEA 
- - -
 8. (C) The Indian government is "ready" to sign its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and to begin negotiating an Additional Protocol, according to Menon, but is "waiting on the IAEA." Menon said the IAEA indicated it would not be ready to begin negotiating an Additional Protocol until late January at the earliest.  Menon seemed unsure of progress on the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).  He said its "last step" was with the Law Ministry, but then recalled that the Law Ministry had signed off on it.  He concluded, "I still have to push it." 

Bangladesh: Counter-terrorism Top Priority 
- - -
 9. (C) Asked about the Bangladesh elections and the prospect for counter-terrism cooperation, Menon said he would give the new government time to settle in.  He said India "has a package ready for them, and counter-terrorism is the number one issue on our agenda." 

 MULFORD