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Viewing cable 08NAIROBI2806, SOMALIA - Ambassador Hosts Humanitarian Roundtable

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAIROBI2806 2008-12-16 15:37 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO7584
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #2806/01 3511537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161537Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7961
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002806 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER 
STATE PASS TO USAID/EA 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID SOCI PGOV PREL SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Ambassador Hosts Humanitarian Roundtable 
 
REF:  A) Nairobi 2769   B) Nairobi 2429 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Ambassador Ranneberger hosted a roundtable 
meeting at Embassy Nairobi on December 10 with some of USAID's 
Somalia implementing partners.  The discussion focused on the 
increasingly challenging operating environment in which aid 
assistance is being delivered in Somalia and the representatives 
echoed many of the themes outlined in reftel.  Emphasis was placed 
on the unprecedented fragmentation of groups on the ground and the 
complete unpredictability of the daily operating environment.  Most 
of our partners had either had one or more of their staff members 
killed or abducted this year.  Some USAID partners have been forced 
to close life-saving operations.  Participants in the meeting 
included UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, International Republican Institute, 
MedAir, Merlin, CARE, Mercy Corps and Interpeace.  The exchanges 
were frank and the organizations offered useful recommendations and 
the Ambassador decided to hold these meetings on a more regular 
basis.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
The Dilemma of Saving Lives 
--------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The organizations represented at the roundtable echoed the 
ethical and moral dilemmas in humanitarian assistance outlined in 
Ref A.  Aid agencies must determine the extent of risk they are able 
to manage in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. 
The World Food Program (WFP) lost two staff members in the past 
three months, and is in the process of determining its tolerance 
threshold - how many staff killed will be the tipping point to force 
the organization to close.  Unfortunately, two of USAID's partners, 
CARE and the International Medical Corps (IMC), have been forced to 
close down operations in South/Central Somalia following threats 
from al-Shabaab.  While WFP and ICRC are temporarily taking over the 
delivery of emergency food aid for CARE, assistance in other 
critical sectors previously provided by CARE has come to a halt. 
For example, UNICEF was relying on IMC to feed severely malnourished 
children in Baidoa, with IMC forced to close, UNICEF is unable to 
reach these children and has anticipated that children may have 
already died because lack of access to critical care. 
 
----------------------- 
Walking on a Tight Rope 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Aid agencies feel their association with the political 
process puts them at greater risk and compromises their neutrality. 
This is particularly challenging for the UN, which is the largest 
provider of humanitarian assistance and at the same time the largest 
supporter of the political process.  The UN representative explained 
that the increased risk stems from the perception of the average 
Somali that the political process is occurring outside the country 
and excludes too many parties.  Striking a balance between the 
political process and humanitarian and development assistance is 
becoming an increasingly difficult act for USAID implementing 
partners. 
 
-------------------------- 
Securing Aid Delivery 
In an Insecure Environment 
-------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) WFP commented that at best, the combined efforts of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the 
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) might control 10 percent of the 
territories in south/central Somalia.  It is within this context 
that WFP manages a massive food aid delivery program.  While WFP has 
the supply side fairly under control, especially with the new 
European Union escort system established for food aid shipments, the 
actual delivery is quite complex.  The biggest challenge for WFP is 
moving food out of the port of Mogadishu and to areas north of the 
capital.  WFP recently had 35 trucks looted on this route.  While 
AMISOM secures the port, it does not have the capacity to secure 
anything beyond this area to assist in the delivery of aid.  WFP 
appealed to the US to pressure the TFG into allowing its contractors 
to move with armed security escorts (Ref B).  While WFP operated in 
this manner in the past, the TFG banned armed security over a year 
ago.  A request was made to the TFG and acknowledged but there has 
been no movement on the issue.  WFP urged quick action in this 
regard if the distribution capacity is to be maintained. 
 
------------------------ 
 
NAIROBI 00002806  002 OF 002 
 
 
To Brand or not to Brand 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Many USAID partners have sought waivers due to the risks 
associated with visibly marking their programs as being U.S.-funded. 
 While the US is the largest bi-lateral donor to Somalia, 
particularly due to its large humanitarian aid package, few Somalis 
are aware of this.  Often U.S. representatives hear complaints from 
Somali officials that no one is aware of the extent of U.S. 
assistance.  They agreed that the fact of U.S. support for Ethiopia 
was less relevant than the widespread belief that Ethiopia is acting 
at the behest of the U.S. government. Ethiopia's presence in Somalia 
is opposed by the majority of Somalis.  One participant noted that 
in the context of the propaganda campaign launched by the hard-line 
Islamists, symbolism plays a very big role and they are alleging a 
Ethiopia-U.S. link to sway public opinion. 
 
--------------------------- 
Risks of Minimum Monitoring 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) USAID has been working in Somalia by "remote control" for 
the past three years since staff have been denied travel to the 
country.  We rely on international NGOs and UN staff to monitor 
activities.  Now even USAID implementing partners are operating 
through "remote control" meaning they have pulled out all expatriate 
staff from south/central Somalia and have a minimum of national 
staff employed.  In many cases because of security, the national 
staff are sequestered in their homes and rarely venture to office 
compounds.  In some instances, for example with the Center for Peace 
and Dialogue (CRD), national staff have been forced to flee 
Mogadishu and Kismayo altogether.  Undoubtedly, accountability 
issues will arise that the U.S. and others will have to address. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Our partners offered some concrete recommendations, 
agreeing that despite perceptions on the ground, the U.S. must 
continue its efforts to support the political process.  They said 
that al-Shabaab is exploiting a vacuum that currently exists in 
leadership and governance.  They also believed that the U.S. should 
encourage an Ethiopian withdrawal, along the terms outlined in the 
Djibouti Agreement.  They asked for help in drawing a distinction 
between political and development assistance on one hand and 
humanitarian assistance on the other, in order to preserve the 
neutrality of aid workers.  Our partners also discussed the idea of 
using the NGO consortium to exert leverage against armed 
anti-government groups.  One participant recommended a greater focus 
on programs in Somaliland, which can operate with minimal 
disruption.  They asked for U.S. assistance in outreach to Gulf 
country donors and how to coordinate with Gulf-based NGOs. 
 
8.  (SBU) The participants welcomed the opportunity to meet with the 
Ambassador and the Somalia Unit in addition to USAID.  They shared 
valuable perspectives from the ground and offered ideas on ways we 
could better support their efforts.  The forum was useful and we 
will plan to meet on a more regular basis with our partners 
operating inside Somalia. 
 
RANNEBERGER