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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3776, GENERAL BUZHINSKIY MEETS CODEL TAUSCHER: MD COOPERATION TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3776 2008-12-31 12:38 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO7884
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3776 3661238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311238Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1403
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MOSCOW 003776 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT: GENERAL BUZHINSKIY MEETS CODEL TAUSCHER: MD COOPERATION TO 
BUILD TRUST 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Meeting the Codel Tauscher delegation on December 
16, Lt. Gen. Buzhinskiy argued the U.S. and Russia could cooperate 
on short- and medium-range MD systems, but not if the U.S. also 
moved forward with plans to deploy a long-range MD system in Poland 
and the Czech Republic.  He told the CODEL that the MD talks held 
with U/S Rood earlier that day achieved little, and he hoped that 
the incoming Obama administration could find a solution to the MD 
issue.  He told the CODEL that the GOR would like to have all 
nuclear warheads included in official tallies in a post-START 
document, and the GOR would also like to continue the destruction of 
delivery vehicles.  Buzhinskiy said little trust was left between 
the U.S. and Russia, and the U.S.'s proposed transparency and 
confidence-building measures did little to fix this.  He pointed to 
what he saw as U.S. backtracking on commitments to Russia as having 
eroded trust between the USG and GOR.  He posited that the GOR did 
not think Iran would acquire a missile system capable of striking 
the U.S. or its NATO allies anytime soon, and the GOR felt the 
proposed MD system to be place in the Czech Republic and Poland 
could pose a threat to Russia security.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Short and Medium Range MD Cooperation Possible 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a December 16 meeting with Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), 
Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA), Rep. Doug 
Lamborn (R-CO), and staff members, First Deputy Chief of MOD's Main 
Directorate for International Cooperation Lieutenant-General 
Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy said that the U.S. and Russia could cooperate on 
short- and medium-range missile defense (MD) systems.  He argued the 
U.S. Aegis and PAC-3 missile systems, along with the Russian S-400 
were excellent systems and could, together with the Gabala radar 
site, form the core of a joint U.S.-Russian short- and medium-range 
MD system.  He cautioned, however, that the GOR would not work with 
the U.S. on short- and medium-range MD systems if the U.S. continued 
to pursue a long-range MD system. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MD Talks Yielded Little, GOR Wants To Retain Elements of START 
----------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Buzhinskiy said that MD talks held with U/S John Rood 
earlier that day yielded little.  According to Buzhinskiy, U.S. and 
Russian approaches to MD were so different that he saw little 
possibility for an agreement to be reached soon.  He expressed his 
hope that the incoming Obama administration could find a solution. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Buzhinskiy reiterated to Rep. Tauscher the Russian goal of 
including all warheads in official tallies of arsenals for the U.S. 
and Russia in the post-START agreement.  He said the GOR would also 
like to retain requirements for the destruction of delivery vehicles 
from the START Treaty as well.  Buzinskiy also posited that the GOR 
does not need another "purely symbolic" document such as the Moscow 
Treaty. 
 
------------------- 
A Question of Trust 
------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Buzhinskiy argued that there was not enough trust left 
between the U.S. and Russia to achieve meaningful cooperation on MD. 
 "The proposed transparency and confidence-building measures 
proposed by the U.S. did little to build trust," he asserted. 
Buzhinskiy pointed to what he saw as a "slippery slope" of 
statements made by the USG as having eroded trust between the U.S. 
and Russia.  According to Buzhinskiy, senior USG officials told him 
in 2005 the U.S. would not deploy MD systems outside the United 
States.  They subsequently said the U.S. would deploy MD sites 
outside of the United States, but not without consulting with Russia 
first, he posited.  Buzhinskiy argued that the U.S. has not actually 
consulted with Russia on MD, but rather simply made decisions and 
informed the GOR of them. 
 
6. (SBU) Buzhinskiy said Iran currently has missiles with a range of 
about 2,500 km, and the GOR did not expect Iran to pursue 
longer-range missiles or threaten the U.S. any time soon.  This 
shortage of trust and differing assessment of Iranian capabilities 
contributed to the GOR view that the proposed MD sites in Poland and 
the Czech Republic could pose a threat to Russian security. 
 
7. (SBU) The delegation did not clear this message. 
 
BEYRLE