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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3728, DFM Ryabkov meets Codel Tauscher: Iran, Missile Defense,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3728 2008-12-23 12:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO3476
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3728/01 3581207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231207Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1322
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003728 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT: DFM Ryabkov meets Codel Tauscher: Iran, Missile Defense, 
Bilateral Relations 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary: Meeting the Codel Tauscher delegation on 
December 16, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stressed that 
Russia wanted improved relations with the U.S., even as he 
acknowledged the "negative mindset" of the Russian public and the 
damage that issues like NATO enlargement had produced in the 
relationship.  He urged "bold moves" by the new administration 
towards Iran, and reiterated Russian arguments against further 
sanctions; pressed for an alternate approach, he indicated Russia 
might produce a "food for thought" paper on the way ahead, but 
judged the P5+1 proposal to still be relevant.  He discounted 
Iranian statements on missile development as fodder for the domestic 
audience.  Ryabkov stressed the "great disconnect" over missile 
defense and reviewed GOR opposition to the Polish and Czech sites. 
Noting there was no easy antidote, he urged re-engagement.  While 
Ryabkov was skeptical of "total change" under the next 
administration, he welcomed any moves away from "fait accompli 
diplomacy."  End Summary 
 
U.S.-Russia Relations 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  In a December 16 meeting with Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), 
Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA), Rep. Doug 
Lamborn (R-CO), staff members, and the Ambassador, DFM Ryabkov 
welcomed intensified congressional exchanges, noting they comprised 
a "vital core" to the bilateral relationship.  Ryabkov stressed that 
Russia was "very, very focused and engaged" on the future of 
U.S.-Russian relations, which were indispensable both for Russian 
interests and Russia's place in the world.  While the agenda was 
complex and the "history not easy," Russia was prepared to look 
forward; rather than focusing on differences, Russia sought 
increased understanding.  Government and congressional ties could 
achieve a more positive agenda.  Ryabkov said that Moscow was not 
simply "reflecting" on the relationship in advance of the change of 
U.S. administration, but continuing to engage, whether on piracy and 
the Middle East peace process, or CFE negotiations in Geneva on 
December 17.  As the new administration settled into place, Ryabkov 
predicted that the level of engagement would only intensify. 
 
3.  (SBU)  In response to the Members' emphasis on the importance of 
U.S.-Russian relations, the need to restore trust and move forward 
on overlapping strategic interests, and their reaffirmation of U.S. 
intent to counter an Iranian nuclear threat, but hope that Russia 
could be a partner in missile defense, Ryabkov reiterated that the 
prospect of closer U.S.-Russian relations was "very attractive to 
everyone here," while conceding that anti-Americanism had grown over 
the last several years.  Ryabkov reiterated that Russia's ability to 
project power and play a responsible role would in part be defined 
by its relationship with the U.S.  Nevertheless, the negative 
mindset of the Russian public would be difficult to transform, with 
issues like NATO enlargement negatively influencing overall Russian 
attitudes to the U.S.  Ryabkov charged that the U.S. had acted in a 
way that neglected or ignored Russian core interests over the years, 
with the result that trust had eroded. 
 
Iran: Bold U.S. Initiative Required 
----------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU)  While reiterating Russian opposition to a nuclear Iran 
and the leadership's "tremendous efforts" to persuade Tehran to meet 
its international obligations, Ryabkov argued that Iran has "less 
than zero" confidence in the U.S.  Similarly, the U.S. had no faith 
in the Iranian regime, underscoring the need for greater 
transparency and engagement between the two.  Acknowledging that 
engagement was no panacea, Ryabkov noted the historically complex 
relations, but urged renewed American leadership in reaching out to 
Tehran.  "Bold openings" by the President-elect could change the 
calculus, he argued, and tap into those elements of the leadership 
looking for a different paradigm of engagement.  Ryabkov underscored 
Russian opposition to further sanctions, repeating that it 
consolidated public support behind the regime, and allowed Tehran to 
play on anti-U.S. and -Israeli sentiment.  Russia did not accept 
that economic sanctions produced positive political change. 
"Psychological traits and national providence" produced a further 
rallying around the leaders, whenever Iran was cornered.  Further 
deadlock would be the outcome.  The Ambassador interjected that if 
Russia believed sanctions were a dead end, it should propose 
alternate strategies to preclude the emergence of a nuclear Iran. 
Ryabkov took the point and suggested that Russia would offer a food 
for thought paper. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Ryabkov judged that the P5+1 proposal was still relevant 
and welcomed a possible mid-level meeting before the December 
holidays.  Acknowledging that the Iranians could "replay their 
melodies" while waiting for the next administration, Ryabkov argued 
again for a "bold move" and urged that engagement with Iran on a 
variety of regional issues be held out, if the leadership 
demonstrated it was serious about a freeze-for-a-freeze.  Ryabkov 
noted that Russia constantly stressed engagement over sanctions, 
 
MOSCOW 00003728  002 OF 002 
 
 
because the latter were constantly "mis- and over-interpreted." 
Noting the "extraordinary speculation" prompted by UNSCR 1835, 
Ryabkov concluded that there was no alternative to engagement with 
the Supreme Leader and Ahmedinejad.  Ryabkov urged the offer of a 
"reasonable alternative" to the development of enrichment 
capabilities, commenting that there was still no proof of advanced 
missile technology.  While Tehran trumpeted its missile 
achievements, the statements were aimed at a domestic audience.  The 
Iranians underestimated the extent to which their statements 
solidified U.S. and European opinions, with Ryabkov reiterating that 
Iranian boasts were designed to show a domestic audience that the 
country was advancing. 
 
Missile Defense: The Great Disconnect 
------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU)  Ryabkov stressed the "great disconnect" in perceptions 
over what missile defense represents, the threat it targeted, and 
the means for resolving the dispute.  He underscored that missile 
defense changed the security environment in Russia's neighborhood 
and listed Russian concerns: the GOR could not be certain of future 
enhancements, remained unhappy with "the geography chosen," was "not 
ready to be satisfied" by the transparency and confidence building 
measures offered, which were weaker than those first proposed during 
the October 2007 2+2 meeting, and did not believe that this was just 
about Iran.  The absence of trust in U.S.-Russian relations 
intensified the belief that the increasing strands of U.S. missile 
defense activity "visible in many regions" would lead to a "very 
different configuration" in the future. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Ryabkov said there was no easy antidote to the standoff. 
The U.S. had engaged in "fait accompli" policymaking over the last 
years and had wasted opportunities to engage with Russia.  If that 
trend continued, he warned, trust and confidence in the U.S. would 
worsen.  Ryabkov acknowledged without elaboration the perception 
that Russian behavior had also worsened, pushing again for "early 
and frequent" engagement.  While the extraordinary was not 
achievable just by leaders meeting or experts negotiating, Ryabkov 
urged rejuvenation of a process that would move both countries away 
from a legacy of "mistrust and mutual discomfort." 
 
What Next Under the Obama Administration? 
------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  Ryabkov polled the Representatives for their views on 
what Russia should anticipate under the next administration, noting 
his personal belief that any policy changes would be evolutionary, 
the result of "adding and subtracting," with "total change not 
possible."  While the Representatives underscored that the U.S. 
strategic objective of preventing Iran from becoming nuclear power 
would not change, they suggested a change in tone, a greater use of 
soft power, a willingness to listen, an interest in reengagement 
with Russia, and a move away from foreign policy fait accompli 
should be expected.  Ryabkov welcomed the advice, ranging from "be 
very optimistic" to "don't be overly optimistic, but optimistic 
nonetheless," adding that more dialogue would produce the greater 
confidence required to generate the reasonable solutions to the 
challenges on the U.S.-Russian agenda. 
 
9.  (SBU)  The delegation cleared this message. 
 
RUBIN