Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3616, Scenesetter for Senator Lugar's Visit to Russia
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW3616.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08MOSCOW3616 | 2008-12-15 06:55 | 2011-08-24 01:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Moscow |
VZCZCXRO6035
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3616/01 3500655
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 150655Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1169
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 003616
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAGR MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Senator Lugar's Visit to Russia
Welcome to Russia
-----------------
¶1. (SBU) Your visit to Moscow comes at a time of real disconnect
in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Disagreements over European
security, Russia's role in its neighborhood, and the Kremlin's
creeping authoritarianism were followed by the rupture over Russia's
decision to send forces into Georgia and to recognize the breakaway
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Having tapped into
substantial public disapproval of U.S. policies on Iraq, Kosovo,
NATO enlargement, missile defense, and Georgia, President Medvedev
and Prime Minister Putin enjoy broad popular support for Russia's
more assertive foreign policy. In his November 5 address to the
nation, Medvedev sent an ill-tempered message to President-elect
Obama, reprising a litany of complaints against the U.S. and
threatening to deploy short-range nuclear missiles to Kaliningrad if
the U.S. proceeds with missile defense plans. However, both
Medvedev and Putin have left the door open to closer cooperation
with the new U.S. administration, with Medvedev using his December
12 meeting with Dr. Kissinger to express "optimism" about prospects
for relations with the Obama administration. Nevertheless, you can
expect to hear that the onus is on the U.S. to set a new tone and to
"return to realism." Never easy interlocutors, your Russian
counterparts will push for a new U.S. approach to outstanding
disputes and will ask for your estimate of the new President.
The Political Tandem
--------------------
¶2. (SBU) More than six months after Medvedev's inauguration,
questions remain about Russia's political succession. As Prime
Minister, Putin continues to play a dominant role, bestowing
legitimacy on Medvedev and heading the ruling party, which enjoys a
constitutional majority in the Duma. Putin used a December 4
national press conference to dismiss rumors of early elections, but
declined to speculate about his possible return to the Kremlin in
¶2012. While Medvedev has focused on foreign policy, Putin has taken
full responsibility for guiding Russia through the economic crisis.
It is an open question whether the political passivity that marked
Russia's last eight years of constantly expanding wealth and
economic growth will erode as Russians confront the reality of
rock-bottom energy prices, plummeting foreign direct investment, and
increasing unemployment. At present, both leaders enjoy high
popularity, with Putin at 70 percent and Medvedev at 54 percent
approval; 59 percent of Russians express "trust" in Putin and 44
percent in Medvedev.
¶3. (SBU) While Medvedev campaigned on an agenda of economic and
political modernization, Russia's democratic development remains
stalled, with no institutional check on a powerful elite
concentrated in the White House and Kremlin. Civil society and
human rights activists are under pressure to scale back their
interaction with foreign donors and to restrict or curtail activity
that questions the legitimacy or the decision-making authority of
leaders. "Opposition" political parties are loyal to the Kremlin,
and the "real" opposition is both scarce and consumed by
in-fighting. Television is state-owned or controlled and provides a
diet of pro-government reports. While small-circulation newspapers
and magazines provide critical coverage and the Internet remains
unfettered, journalists throughout the country have been threatened,
beaten and sometimes killed for exposing corruption. (Yuliya
Latynina, a journalist at Ekho Moskvy Radio -- where you will be
interviewed -- received the Defender of Freedom Award by the
Secretary for bucking self-censorship on the tough issues of
leadership corruption and Georgia.) The Russian Orthodox Church,
which is in the process of naming a new leader following the death
of Patriarch Aleksey II, remains the dominant religious entity in
the country, enjoying close ties and support from the government.
The revival of religious association since the collapse of the
Soviet Union has been striking, with 71 percent of Russians
identifying themselves as Orthodox.
The Georgia Rupture
-------------------
¶4. (SBU) While concerns over the economy have pushed Georgia into
the background for the average Russian, the August conflict left an
indelible imprint. Russians rallied behind the government's
decision to go to war against Georgia, outraged by the killing of
Russian peacekeepers and South Ossetian civilians, as well as by the
absence of international condemnation of Georgian actions.
Saakashvili remains vilified as a war criminal, and few are
persuaded that the U.S. did not provide a "green light." In
provoking Georgia's attack, Russia secured its strategic objective
of thwarting Georgia's near-term NATO membership and laid down an
unsettling marker that it was prepared to use military means to
assert its "privileged" interests in its neighborhood. The failure
of any neighboring country to endorse Russia's recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia reflects the regional unease over a revanchist
Russia. Since the invasion, Russia has focused its diplomatic
MOSCOW 00003616 002 OF 005
efforts on "Old Europe" and encouraged French President Sarkozy's
diplomacy, calculating that Europe's significant economic ties and
energy interdependence will erode a policy of "no business as usual"
in response to the Georgia conflict.
¶5. (SBU) While Russia argues that Saakashvili "destroyed" Georgian
territorial integrity, our goal is to keep the parties engaged in
confidence building measures to improve security and provide for the
return of refugees that, over the long-term, will allow Georgia to
create the economic and political conditions to attract the
breakaway regions back into its fold. While Russia has participated
in the Geneva talks, with the next session scheduled December 17-18,
it has threatened to cut short the process and has done little to
rein in its clients on the ground, where security remains poor in
the areas adjoining both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with EU
monitors prevented from entering either territory.
The Foreign Policy Consensus
----------------------------
¶6. (SBU) We see no difference in approach on foreign policy
between Putin and Medvedev, especially over the basket of European
security issues, including missile defense, NATO enlargement, CFE,
and Kosovo. Medvedev's "European Security Treaty," which received a
chilly reception at the OSCE December Summit, is less a substantive
initiative than a shot across the Euro-Atlantic bow that Russia is
dissatisfied with the status quo. As you know well from your
previous visits, Russians across the political spectrum nurture a
grievance over their perceived humiliation during Russia's period of
acute weakness in the 1990's and argue that important gestures by
Putin, including acceding to the U.S. abrogation of the ABM treaty
and post-9/11 assistance in staging the war in Afghanistan, went
unreciprocated. Many Russians insist that the U.S. is intent on
weakening Russia, including by "encircling" Russia in waves of NATO
enlargement and by establishing U.S. basing and missile defense
sites that over time could erode Russia's national security.
¶7. (SBU) At the Carnegie conference and Spaso celebration marking
the 15th Anniversary of the Trilateral Agreement, you will have an
opportunity to engage the cardinals of Russia's arms control
community on next steps in our stewardship of nuclear weapons, as
well as to draw your interlocutors out on Medvedev's objectives in
advancing a new European Security Treaty. You will hear the
following arguments:
-- Post-START: There is almost unanimity within the Russian
strategic affairs community that arms control must resume its
central place in U.S.-Russian relations. The GOR maintains that
negotiating and ratifying a post-START Treaty is feasible by the end
of 2009 assuming cardinal changes in U.S. positions; Lavrov recently
reaffirmed that Russia does not want to rely on a five-year
extension of the existing START Treaty. In addition to seeking a
legally binding treaty, Russia wants all warheads and delivery
vehicles (including those being modified for conventional weapons)
to be counted, and insists that all strategic weapons be located
only on national territories. While Russia has called for further
cuts in nuclear inventories, as essential to maintain international
support for NPT leading up to the 2010 review conference, Lavrov has
maintained a healthy public skepticism of the Global Zero
initiative.
-- Missile Defense: Russia expects the new U.S. administration to
revisit missile defense plans in Europe, and will argue that its
offer of cooperation at the Qabala radar facility in Azerbaijan was
a missed opportunity to present a common front against Iran.
Russia's offer of cooperation was premised on the U.S. halting the
development of radar and interceptor sites in the Czech Republic and
Poland. Russia rejects the physics driving the geographic selection
of the two sites, and the U.S. decision to provide Poland with
Patriot batteries has been pocketed as evidence of the
"anti-Russian" nature of the program. Since October 2007, we have
proposed a number of transparency and confidence-building measures
to reassure Russia, providing extensive technical briefings on the
threat from Iran as well as on the characteristics of the system,
showing that it could not be effective against Russia's nuclear
arsenal. The latest round of talks will conclude on December 15,
with no breakthrough expected. Moscow continues to insist that
their experts be permanently stationed at the sites; something the
two host countries do not accept. Additionally, Moscow has balked
at the idea of reciprocal access to Russian sites for the U.S.,
Poles and Czechs.
-- NATO: Russia welcomed NATO's decision to resume engagement in
the NATO-Russia Council post-Georgia as a "return to realism,"
continuing its policy of demanding greater cooperation even as it
decries the security organization as an existential threat to
Russian security. While NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Declaration's
pledge that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members, your
Russian interlocutors will argue strongly that further enlargement
risks direct military confrontation. Ukraine remains Russia's
MOSCOW 00003616 003 OF 005
brightest redline, with Russian officials positing that NATO
membership and NATO bases in Ukraine (sic) means that Russia could
lose a conventional war. Seventeen years after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, we have yet to persuade the Russian body politic and
populace that NATO is not a threat, with Baltic and Polish rhetoric
reinforcing the impression here that NATO is still an alliance
directed against Russia.
-- Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Russians point to the CFE
as the archetypal outdated security structure, premised on the Cold
War division of Russia versus the rest of Europe. Russia continues
to maintain its December 2007 suspension of its Treaty obligations
and to press for ratification of the Adapted Treaty by the NATO
signatories, while insisting on changes to the Adapted Treaty, such
as elimination of the flank regime for Russia. The U.S. continues
to pursue a "parallel actions plan" that would culminate in
ratification of the Adapted Treaty; however, Russia's recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia repudiate our operating premise that all
Russian forces must leave all Georgian territory. Even prior to the
Georgia conflict, Russia rejected linkage of the Adapted Treaty to
political commitments to remove its forces from Georgia and Moldova,
and is playing on European concern over the absence of a viable CFE
to push for western compromise.
-- European Security Treaty: Medvedev has trumpeted the failure of
existing European security architecture to prevent the conflict in
Georgia as proof of the need for a new European Security Treaty, but
has yet to elaborate his concept. While officials argue that they
are not seeking to undermine NATO, the security gambit is clearly
aimed at foreclosing any further expansion of NATO towards Russia's
borders. Key elements of the initiative include "equal security
guarantees" for the states of the Euro-Atlantic area; development of
a "uniform interpretation of the principles of security" for states
and relations between them, including inadmissibility of the use of
force; the abandonment of claims by individual states or their
groups to exclusive rights to the maintenance of peace and security
in the Euro-Atlantic area; the determination of basic principles for
development of arms control regimes and military build-up; new
cooperation in countering the spread of WMD, terrorism, drug
trafficking and other kinds of transnational organized crime; and,
elaborating uniform approaches to the principles, procedures and
mechanisms of conflict prevention and settlement. How Russia's
invasion of Georgia squares with the inadmissibility of the use of
force has not been clarified by the Russian leadership.
The Economic Crisis
-------------------
¶8. (SBU) The international financial crisis has replaced the war
with Georgia as the defining issue for Russia's political class and
public, with the "real economy" now taking a hit. The precipitous
drop in oil, gas and other commodity prices, as well as the
withdrawal of massive amounts of foreign investment, exposed the
weaknesses in the Russian economy. Prior to August 2008, the
Russian economy had been growing fast, with real economic growth of
over 8 percent in 2007, a strong ruble, and record levels of foreign
direct investment--$41 billion in 2007 alone. Years of budget
surpluses and rising oil prices had lifted the country's foreign
currency reserves to almost $600 billion, third highest in the
world. August marked a clear turning point, when the stock market
began to drop sharply, in response to hostilities with Georgia,
slipping oil prices, and GOR statements intimating state
interference in the economy. Money began to flow out of the country
as investors sold their shares and Russians sold their rubles for
dollars. By mid-September, the default by a pair of high-profile
banks virtually froze lending activity, sending the stock market
into meltdown.
¶9. (SBU) The most optimistic expectations for 2009 are that the
economy will grow by 3 percent, although some experts are predicting
no growth or even negative growth should oil prices remain low. All
told, the GOR has committed more than $200 billion in short-term and
long-term funds to supply liquidity, recapitalize banks, and support
domestic securities markets. Nevertheless, tight credit markets at
home and falling demand globally have forced a growing number of
firms to cut production and staff. While Medvedev pledged with his
G20 partners to eschew protectionist measures in response to the
crisis, Putin clarified that Russia would take whatever steps
necessary to protect its national interests. Putin and Medvedev
regularly attribute the Russian economic crisis to U.S.
irresponsibility, and anti-Americanism could become a more prominent
theme as the downturn intensifies in Russia.
The Agricultural Dimension
--------------------------
¶10. (SBU) While Russia produced a record grain harvest of more
than 102 million metric tons in 2008, the financial crisis is having
a significant impact. Forty percent of investments in agriculture
are dependent on credit, and several banks have stopped financing
MOSCOW 00003616 004 OF 005
new agricultural projects. Short-term credit for working capital is
scarce, and as a result some experts believe that by the spring of
2009 up to twenty percent of Russian agricultural enterprises might
go bankrupt, primarily small producers of crops and dairy products.
In addition to credit woes, domestic grain producers are suffering
from low prices due to Russia's record harvest and limited export
markets. Deputy Prime Minister Victor Zubkov has approved emergency
government measures including export subsidies, but the proposed
measures have not been finalized yet.
¶11. (SBU) Russian politicians recognize that the disruption in the
supply of agricultural or food products might have dramatic effects
on the economic and social stability of the country. In efforts to
restore confidence, Agriculture Minister Gordeyev took charge of a
working group consisting of the six largest banks financing the
agriculture sector. There is an agreement that banks will reduce
their loans to the agricultural sector, but priority projects and
funds to support production will continue. Furthermore, hoping to
reduce the impacts of the crisis, the Ministry of Agriculture has
spent 75 percent more (an additional $2.2 billion) than the original
2008 agriculture budget to subsidize credit, feed, fertilizer and
fuel.
¶12. (SBU) The current financial crisis may help the Russian
Ministry of Agriculture to push forward its efforts to secure more
control over the agricultural markets under the guise of food
security. While gross agricultural output in 2007 was estimated at
approximately RUR 2.02 trillion ($72 billion), a 3.3 percent
increase over 2006, Russia is lagging far behind its production
targets for meat, poultry and dairy products. The government
intends to undertake urgent measures to improve the situation for
these commodities. Some of the recent actions de-listing U.S.
poultry and pork facilities and the efforts to amend the meat TRQs
are consistent with Minister Gordeyev's desire to bolster domestic
production by managing import competition.
The Politics of Energy Dependence
---------------------------------
¶13. (SBU) The energy sector remains central, given Russia's
failure to significantly diversify the economy. Putin succeeded in
reasserting state control over the energy sector, arguing that
private and western interests had "taken advantage" of Russia in the
1990s. Today, the Russian government directly or indirectly
controls the majority of production assets and directly controls the
transportation networks. The move toward greater government control
over the sector included the high-profile bankruptcy and liquidation
of Yukos oil company and the forced sale to Gazprom of 51 percent of
the Sakhalin 2 consortium. A newly passed strategic sectors law
includes amendments that place many large oil and gas deposits
largely off-limits to foreign investors. Currently, Russia produces
just under 10 million barrels per day, second only to Saudi Arabia.
Since 2005, however, production has tapered off and will decline in
2008 due to inefficient state control and an onerous tax regime.
Russia is also by far the largest natural gas producer and has the
world's largest gas reserves. State-controlled Gazprom dominates
the sector, controlling 85 percent of production, all exports and
the gas transportation network. Gas production is stagnating as
Gazprom has failed to adequately invest in new production areas.
¶14. (SBU) As an "energy superpower," Russia banks on European
energy dependence to provide ballast to its relations with Europe,
otherwise buffeted by criticism over Georgia and human rights.
Russia supplies approximately one-half of European gas imports with
some European countries completely dependent on Russia for their
gas. Russia, for its part, is dependent on Europe for virtually all
of its gas exports, which provide some three-quarters of Gazprom's
revenues. Approximately 80 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe
travel through Ukraine, which itself has a tense energy (and
political) relationship with Russia. The Russian-European
interdependence in the gas area is a key factor in their broader
relationship as Europe seeks to diversify its gas supplies and
Russia seeks to diversify its export routes and markets.
The Perennial Irritants: WTO and Jackson-Vanik
--------------------------------------------- -
¶15. (SBU) Russia is the last major world economy that is not yet a
WTO member. Russia's years-long accession process neared the end
game earlier this year, but has been derailed by the Georgian
conflict. Russia has completed bilateral market access talks with
all interested WTO members, except for Georgia. In Russia's
multilateral accession document, only a few key issues, such as
agricultural supports, remain unresolved. Following the outbreak of
hostilities with Georgia in August and with the realization that
Russia would not be able to complete its entry process during 2008,
senior GOR officials announced that Russia would reopen certain WTO
commitments that it had agreed to implement in advance of accession.
Russia already has reopened the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Agreement on
Meat (poultry and pork), with negative consequences for U.S.
MOSCOW 00003616 005 OF 005
exporters, and has indicated that it may reopen agreements on
harvesters as well.
¶16. (SBU) While both President Medvedev and PM Putin have recently
affirmed Russian interest in WTO, the Russian government's actions
in reopening previous agreements is a step in the wrong direction
and is making early accession less likely. Anger over the
protracted accession negotiations is matched by frustration over
U.S. inaction in repealing Jackson-Vanik. While repeal of
Jackson-Vanik would be essential for U.S. exporters to gain the full
benefits of Russia's WTO accession when it occurs, Russians view the
continuation of the Soviet-era amendment as a sign of U.S. lack of
respect. (The fact that Russia and Israel implemented visa-free
travel this year adds insult to injury.)
The CTR Pillar: Still Standing Strong
-------------------------------------
¶17. (SBU) Despite strains in bilateral relations, our longstanding
cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation remains strong. We have
made significant progress in our joint efforts to secure nuclear
materials, recover radiological sources, and minimize the use of
highly enriched uranium. In your meetings with General Verkhovtsev
and Rosatom Director Kiriyenko, you can note that we have completed
upgrades at more than 90 percent of the Russian nuclear warhead
sites of concern, including all 39 Russian Navy nuclear sites and
all 25 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites, with work underway at
nine 12th Main Directorate sites to be completed by the end of 2008.
In addition, we have secured 181 buildings containing hundreds of
metric tons of weapons-useable Russian nuclear material at 11
Russian Navy reactor fuel sites, seven Rosatom Weapons Complex
sites, six civilian (non-Rosatom) sites, and 12 Rosatom civilian
sites. This year, two Seversk weapons-grade plutonium reactors were
shutdown in April and June, six months ahead of schedule. We are
also actively pursuing the closure of the Zheleznogorsk reactor
ahead of the projected 2010 schedule, thereby eliminating a combined
total of 1.2 MT of plutonium annually and permanently shutting down
the last remaining plutonium production reactors in Russia. In
partnership with Russia, we have returned almost 765 kilograms
(enough for over 30 nuclear weapons) of Soviet-origin highly
enriched uranium from vulnerable sites around the world.
The Unfinished Business: 123
----------------------------
¶18. (SBU) Rosatom Director Kiriyenko understands that by pulling
the 123 Agreement from Congress, the Administration saved it from
congressional repudiation. Nevertheless, Kiriyenko was dismayed
that the decision was characterized in the White House statement and
press as punishment over Georgia. While we have reiterated that
cooperation on nuclear security and nonproliferation remains a top
priority, Kiriyenko will want to hear whether and when the U.S. will
be prepared to move forward with a 123 that can facilitate the
global nuclear partnership that we have explored undertaking.
The Bilateral Relationship
--------------------------
¶19. (SBU) You will have an opportunity to ask your Russian
interlocutors for their vision of U.S.-Russian relations under a new
U.S. administration, and how best to manage a relationship that will
be defined as much by cooperation as by competition. We share an
important agenda, with on-going cooperation in safeguarding and
reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles, preventing the emergence of a
nuclear Iran, countering terrorism, advancing peace in the Middle
East, pushing North Korea to wind down its nuclear program, and
working collaboratively in space on projects that advance health and
understanding of climate change. The expiration of the START Treaty
in December 2009 for better or worse will place arms control
squarely back on the U.S.-Russia agenda. We do not lack for a
positive agenda, but will need to rebuild an architecture to our
bilateral relationship that allows wide-ranging and candid
engagement on all issues of concern. The Russian leadership
appreciates the initiative and vision that you have brought to
U.S.-Russian relations, and we expect your visit to be a productive
one.
Beyrle