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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3592, DFM RYABKOV ON RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS - MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3592 2008-12-12 11:30 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO4757
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3592/01 3471130
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121130Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1108
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003592 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT:  DFM RYABKOV ON RUSSIA-U.S. RELATIONS - MEETING 
WITH CODEL DELAHUNT 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  In a December 6 meeting with 
Representatives Bill Delahunt and Dana Rohrabacher, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Ryabkov explained that while the GOR looked 
upon the advent of a new U.S. administration as an 
opportunity to improve bilateral ties, Moscow did not 
necessarily expect a sea change to occur in Washington.  He 
agreed with the Representatives' observation that Russia 
needed to better present itself in Washington, but thought 
it unlikely that the GOR could lobby the Hill in the same 
manner as other countries.  Ryabkov stressed that Russian 
foreign policy would continue to be based upon the "defense 
of national interests," and that the GOR would act 
pragmatically to strengthen ties with other countries.  He 
hoped for deeper economic relations with the U.S., which 
would help "stabilize" the bilateral relationship, while 
noting that corruption limited Russia's political and 
economic development.  Ryabkov agreed that civilian nuclear 
energy was a potential field for Russia-U.S. cooperation, 
which argued for passage of the 123 agreement.  End summary. 
 
An Opportunity for Improved Relations 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) In a December 6 meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Ryabkov told Representative Bill Delahunt (D, MA), 
Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R, CA), and the Ambassador, 
that the GOR "understood" that a new U.S. administration 
presented an opportunity for some level of change in 
bilateral relations, but Moscow did not expect an "overall 
review of policy toward Russia."  Nonetheless, he explained 
that when meeting with American visitors, Russian officials 
urged them to be "as pragmatic as possible" in thinking 
about ways to move the relationship forward. 
 
3. (SBU) Representatives Delahunt and Rohrabacher observed 
that Russia was poorly represented in Washington, where its 
Ambassador failed to meet with Members of Congress in order 
to present the Russian perspective on Georgia.  Ryabkov 
agreed that the GOR "definitely has a problem" in this 
regard, which he attributed to differences between Russian 
and American political culture.  In the case of the Georgian 
crisis, he thought it "inconceivable" that in the midst of 
the "emotional" events of August, Moscow could dispatch 
instructions to a Washington lobbyist the way that Tbilisi 
appeared to have done. 
 
4. (SBU) Ryabkov appreciated Representative Rohrabacher's 
comment that the U.S. bore much of the blame for the poor 
state of bilateral ties, and had improperly accused Russia 
of causing the Georgian crisis.  Ryabkov said that that 
while it was impossible for Russia and the U.S. to avoid 
"complications" in their relationship stemming from the 
situation in the Caucasus, it was now "irrelevant to figure 
out who was right and who was wrong" and more important to 
"move forward." 
 
Russia Will Defend its Interests 
-------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Ryabkov stressed that no matter where bilateral 
relations were headed, the U.S. needed to understand that 
Russian foreign policy would continue to be based upon the 
"defense of national interests that are clearly defined and 
around which there is a national consensus."  Furthermore, 
Russia would be "pragmatic" in taking advantage of 
opportunities to advance these interests.  He offered the 
example of Medvedev traveling to Latin America to deepen 
ties with the region during a rocky period in Russia-U.S. 
relations. 
 
Economic Ties Can Improve 
------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Ryabkov expressed appreciation for the efforts of 
the Bush Administration and Congress to improve Russia-U.S. 
relations where possible.  He took note of the "sea of 
difference" in the atmosphere Russian and American 
businesses now find compared to even five years previous, 
but thought there was still "a way to go" to reach the level 
of private sector connectivity Russia and Europe currently 
enjoy.  A degree of "interdependence" would be healthy for 
the Russia-U.S. relationship, according to Ryabkov, who 
thought that closer economic ties would have a "stabilizing 
impact." 
 
7. (SBU) Ryabkov agreed with Representative Delahunt's 
observation that corruption hindered Russia's political and 
economic development, and lamented that Russia "will not be 
a modern society" unless it can bring this problem under 
control. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00003592  002 OF 002 
 
 
Nuclear Cooperation 
------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Ryabkov expressed interest in Representative 
Rohrabacher's vision of Russia and the U.S cooperating on 
the provision of nuclear power to developing countries that 
could not meet their energy needs.  He noted that the U.S. 
and Russia were on the same page in the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group when it came to lifting prohibitions on India, but 
added that, for the time being, the U.S and Russia were 
likely to remain competitors in selling nuclear power plants 
to other countries.  When the Ambassador commented that it 
was necessary for Congress to pass the U.S.-Russia 123 
Agreement, Ryabkov said that while the GOR understood the 
political reason behind the Bush Administration's decision 
to withdraw the agreement from Congress, eventual passage of 
123 was "crucial." 
 
9. (U) The delegation has not cleared this cable.