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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA1448, NICARAGUA AVIATION UPDATE - AIRLINES TSA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA1448 2008-12-04 15:02 2011-08-19 20:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1448/01 3391502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041502Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3477
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 
TAGS: ASEC EAIR ECON PTER NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA AVIATION UPDATE - AIRLINES TSA 
COMPLIANT, BUT CONCERNS REMAIN 
 
REF: A. (A) MANAGUA 01275 
     B. (B) MANAGUA 02618 
     C. (C) MANAGUA 01180 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affaires, a.i. Richard M. Sanders, 
reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The security situation at Managua,s Augusto 
C. Sandino International Airport is mixed.  From October 20 
to 24, 2008, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
conducted a successful inspection of airlines and cargo 
carriers that fly directly from Sandino International Airport 
to the U.S.  TSA found air carrier security procedures to be 
in compliance with TSA-mandated security programs.  Airline 
representatives, in addition, report some recent improvement 
in security.  Nonetheless, Post's experience has been that 
cooperation by GON airport officials with Embassy Managua 
personnel has deteriorated sharply.  In September, the 
Nicaraguan airport authorities canceled all existing Embassy 
airport access passes and limited the issuance of new passes. 
 Not long before, local newspapers had reported that Managua 
airport security officials facilitated the transit of members 
of the FARC, entering Nicaragua from Venezuela at the 
invitation of President Ortega, through the airport without 
immigration or other documentation checks.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
TSA AIR CARRIER SECURITY INSPECTION RESULTS POSITIVE 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
2. (U) From October 20 to 24, 2008, TSA conducted a 
successful inspection of airlines and cargo carriers, 
receiving good cooperation on the part of the Nicaraguan 
civil aviation and airport authorities.  TSA inspected all 
air carriers flying directly from Managua,s Augusto C. 
Sandino International Airport to the United States.  After 
observing all U.S.-bound flights from American, Delta, 
Continental, Spirit and TACA airlines, TSA found them to be 
in compliance with the Aircraft Operator Standard Security 
Program and the Model Security Program. 
 
3. (U) The inspection focused on air carrier control of 
passenger processing, screening and movement; baggage 
security; boarding processes and control of access to the 
aircraft; airport ID display and challenge procedures; and 
security controls on cargo, mail and catering supplies. 
There was also a special focus on liquid, aerosol and gel 
security procedures. 
 
4. (U) Managua,s Augusto C. Sandino International Airport is 
a Class II airport, based on flight volume and other factors, 
and is subject to an airport security inspection by the TSA 
every two years.  TSA,s recent inspection was not an 
inspection of airport security, but of air carrier security. 
Sandino Airport was last inspected by TSA in late 2007, and 
is due for another inspection in 2010.  The date of the next 
inspection may be moved up if requested by Post.  Because TSA 
relies on the cooperation of host country officials during an 
overseas inspection, a surprise inspection is not possible. 
Consequently, both airport security officials and airline 
officials were aware of the inspection by the time it took 
place. 
 
-------------------- 
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE 
-------------------- 
 
5. (U) On October 8, 2008, prior to the TSA inspection, the 
Embassy hosted its quarterly meeting with representatives of 
airlines with direct flights to the U.S.  The airlines 
reported a general improvement in previous problematic areas. 
 Luggage theft had declined significantly since the 
identification and arrest of a gang of six airport military 
security officers responsible for a rash of pilfering (Ref 
B).  Other concerns, such as the security provided by the 
Nicaraguan Army and auditing pressure from the Nicaraguan Tax 
Administration, had abated or been resolved.  With respect to 
the effect of the global economic crisis on their operations 
in Nicaragua, airline officials are cautiously optimistic. 
Summer 2008 was a strong season, but business is way down and 
the future is uncertain.  A decline in fuel prices has 
helped, but carriers may still have to go to smaller planes 
with less capacity if economic conditions continue to 
deteriorate.  Cargo traffic, particularly northbound, is 
already declining. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
AIRPORT COOPERATION WITH EMBASSIES DETERIORATES 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6. (C) The cooperation afforded to TSA contrasts starkly with 
the recent and sharp deterioration of cooperation by GON 
airport officials with Embassy Managua personnel.  Post's 
ability to observe airport security and facilitate official 
visits on a day-to-day basis has been severely limited by the 
cancellation of all existing airport access passes and 
limited issuance of new passes (Ref A).  Diplomatic missions 
are now allowed a maximum of three passes per mission, no 
matter the size of the mission, which must be applied for on 
a daily basis.  In early 2008, President Ortega installed 
former Nicaraguan National Police Commissioner Denis Perez, 
an Ortega loyalist, as head of security at the airport, 
undermining the authority of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces 
Defense Information Directorate, which by Nicaraguan 
regulation is responsible for airport security. 
 
7. (C) More worrisome are newspaper reports and information 
gathered by Post that Managua airport security officials have 
facilitated the transit of individuals who may be unfriendly 
to the U.S., such as members of the FARC who entered 
Nicaragua from Venezuela in July at the invitation of 
President Ortega, without immigration or other documentation. 
 Media reports and Post reporting indicate that the GON has 
most likely issued genuine Nicaraguan identification 
documents to individuals traveling under false pretenses, 
including to at least one FARC-related individual (Ref C). 
Although TSA,s mandate in Managua was to inspect airline 
security, and not airport security, post met twice with the 
TSA team to relay its concerns about undocumented travelers 
moving through Sandino International Airport.  TSA,s 
conclusion, based on its inspection, was that air carrier 
security procedures at Sandino Airport, which include 
passenger manifest checks and instant communication with 
DHS/CBP,s Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), were 
sufficient to prevent undocumented or unchecked individuals 
entering the U.S. on an aircraft from Nicaragua. 
 
8. (C) Comment: Without unfettered access to secure areas of 
the airport as it had in the past, Post's Regional Security 
Office is unable to observe the airport for security issues, 
and to assist appropriately with official visits.  The lack 
of airport access also hinders the Embassy's ability to 
manage routine operations relating to air shipments and 
diplomatic pouches.  Moreover, the GON has demonstrated its 
disregard for security procedures and immigration checks when 
it comes to ushering individuals from Venezuela or the FARC 
into and out of the country.  Evidence suggests that the 
government may be issuing genuine Nicaraguan documents to 
these persons.  Such documents could provide a way for 
malafide travelers to circumvent APIS controls, and to travel 
to contiguous countries without serious impediment - all the 
way to Guatemala's border with Mexico.  We are glad that air 
carriers have maintained appropriate security procedures to 
make up for official failings.  But at this time, we are not 
confident in the GON,s commitment to airport security, and 
do not expect the situation to improve anytime soon. 
SANDERS