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Viewing cable 08KYIV2354, UKRAINE'S MEDIA MONITORS DECRY CURRENT STATE OF MEDIA IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KYIV2354 2008-12-02 05:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kyiv
VZCZCXRO3555
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHKV #2354/01 3370522
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020522Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6826
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0413
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002354 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UMB, EUR/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PINR PINS PNAT PGOV KPAI KPAO RS UP
 
SUBJECT:  UKRAINE'S MEDIA MONITORS DECRY CURRENT STATE OF MEDIA IN 
UKRAINE; TENTATIVE RESOLUTION REACHED ON BAN OF RUSSIAN TELEVISION 
CHANNELS 
 
REF: KYIV 2186 
 
1. Summary: At a November 20 luncheon hosted by Ambassador Taylor, 
ten Ukrainian media monitors and observers shared their views on the 
current state of media in Ukraine.  Participants agreed that, 
despite great expectations, Ukraine's media development had been 
disappointingly slow in the years since the 2004 Orange Revolution. 
Media monitors listed the media's financial dependence on media 
outlet owners (mostly oligarchs) and owners' influence on media 
coverage and content as a primary concern and described the corrupt 
practice of buying and selling media access as another key concern. 
On a related matter, monitors predicted that the GOU would find a 
way to remedy the recent ban of three Russian language cable TV 
channels (see reftel) and suggested the solution would likely 
involve the creation of a Ukrainian intermediary entity and the 
payment of fees.  (Note:  this is exactly how the matter was 
resolved - see para 7.)  Finally, a few monitors expressed the fear 
that if the next election resulted in a less democratic government, 
censorship in the media could result.  End Summary. 
 
2.  The media experts acknowledged that, in general, Ukraine's media 
environment had changed for the better since the Orange Revolution 
in 2004.  At a minimum, they emphasized, today's media presents 
diverse political views.  They agreed that in comparison with 
Russia, where journalists receive instructions from government 
officials on how to cover events of interest to the Russian 
government, such as the war with Georgia, Ukraine is much better 
off.  Most of the monitors agreed that Ukraine aims to achieve 
European media standards in line with Finland, Poland and the 
Baltics but that political and economic difficulties have stunted 
the media's development in Ukraine.  Several participants stated 
that "tabloidization" and a "dumbing down" of the media is 
increasing in an effort to expand circulation/numbers of viewers and 
that public trust in media to report accurate information is 
decreasing.  They added that outside Kyiv, regional media is held in 
low regard by local populations due to strict control exercised by 
both local politicians and media owners over content. 
 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECTS MEDIA 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  The media experts described how Ukraine's current financial 
crisis is affecting the media. According to one guest, out of 30,000 
officially registered print and broadcast media outlets, only 8,000 
are considered to be in operation, and only a few hundred in all of 
Ukraine are considered fully functional.  In Ukraine as a whole, 
media profits have plummeted by 60 percent in 2008.  Many regional 
media outlets are undergoing partial closures or are cutting back on 
personnel due to financial difficulties, and close to 50 percent of 
all regional media are going through partial or full changes in 
ownership.  In rare cases, this has been a positive change.  In one 
example, mentioned by the Director of the Academy of the Ukrainian 
Press, Valeriy Ivanov, a regional newspaper was going to close due 
to financial difficulties when the leaders of two opposing political 
parties worked to draw up a new ownership agreement which resulted 
in unbiased political coverage.  But Ivanov added that examples of 
bipartisan cooperation are extremely unusual.  A majority of the 
participants predicted that the current economic situation would not 
improve any time soon and that the closing of publications would 
leave a large number of journalists looking for work. 
 
4.  The experts pointed out that to avoid bankruptcy, media outlets 
rely on financial support from wealthy sponsors (often oligarchs). 
Too often, they said, freedom and diversity in reporting is the 
price of such sponsorship. The monitors noted that Ukrainian 
businessmen who invest in media outlets use the outlets as a 
personal political tool to stay in the good graces of those in power 
who can in turn favor their business.  Victoria Siumar, Institute of 
Mass Information, and Serhiy Harmash, Research Center for the Social 
Perspectives of Donbas, agreed that Ukrainian media has become a 
"blind tool in the hands of those in power used for nobody's benefit 
but their own."  Editors-in-chief, they said, are subject to direct 
and indirect coercion by their owners and the media's loyalties are 
driven purely by monetary concerns and by individual politicians or 
businessmen. 
 
5.  One expert pointed out that media bankruptcies could result in a 
collection of larger, more financially independent and profitable 
media outlets.  The monitors agreed that the strongest and most 
popular publications would survive the financial crisis and form a 
solid foundation for what has the potential to become a more 
economically independent and free press in Ukraine.  Some monitors 
suggested that the economic crisis creates more competition among 
media outlets forcing those who want to stay afloat to strive to 
 
KYIV 00002354  002 OF 002 
 
 
attain a higher standard.  There was general agreement among the 
guests that for media to thrive in Ukraine there needs to be 
political stability. If elections continue to take place every year, 
they said, media will continue to be nothing more than a political 
tool for oligarchs and politicians. 
 
"DJYNSA" - A CORRUPT MEDIA PRACTICE 
----------------------------------- 
 
6.  The media monitors discussed a common practice called "Djynsa" 
(Jeans): a clearly biased, paid-for political advertisement 
presented as actual news.  In the past year, Djynsa has become a 
popular tool used by politicians and businessmen to exert their 
influence over the media - particularly print publications.  To an 
unsuspecting reader, a Djynsa article - published alongside regular 
daily news -- may look normal, but the article contains propaganda 
or presents a skewed view and should rightfully be labeled an 
advertisement.  Though editors realize that these "Djynsa" articles 
should be either marked as a paid political advertisement or 
published in a different section of the paper, they don't do this 
for fear of losing their jobs.  The participants noted that 
journalists are often poorly paid, making such offers hard to turn 
down.  The experts emphasized that TV stations are also subject to 
political pressure and influence and program content is adjusted 
accordingly.  The overall effect of the "Djynsa" phenomenon, they 
added, has been to decrease public trust in the media and decrease 
morale among serious journalists. 
 
THE ROLE OF UNSPOKEN CENSORSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
7.   Media monitors complained about severe, but unspoken, 
restrictions regarding the criticism of public figures.  They said 
that some reporters admit to feeling demoralized due to the 
pressures from editors-in-chief.  The monitors said that there had 
been an increase this year in cases of reporters being forced to 
choose between writing the truth and keeping their jobs.  Television 
is also subject to corruption.  The recent ban of three Russian 
cable channels, originally explained as enforcing international 
standards regarding the re-transmission of TV broadcasts as well as 
a 2006 Ukrainian law on broadcasting, turned out to be a financial 
issue between the television channels and Ukraine's National Council 
for Television and Radio.  The Russian channels have tentatively 
agreed to register with a newly-created Ukrainian legal entity 
(described as an intermediary) and in some areas of the country, at 
least one of the stations is back on the air.  Several of the 
monitors commented that if upcoming Parliamentary elections result 
in a less democratic government, censorship could be a reality once 
again in Ukraine. 
 
8. Comment: In comparison to the state of Ukraine's media prior to 
the Orange Revolution, when the government exercised strict control 
over the media, the picture today is much brighter.  However, there 
is an urgent need to restructure the financial basis of media 
outlets, which depend primarily on private investment from the 
country's oligarchs, who pressure the outlets to cater to the 
investors' political and business interests.  Many young Ukrainian 
journalists who are graduates of recently-opened schools of 
journalism strive to achieve Western standards in their reporting, 
but these inexperienced and poorly-paid journalists often become 
victims of "Djynsa."  Unfortunately, improvements to Ukraine's media 
environment will probably not take place until the country enjoys 
some political stability.  Ukraine media's best hope is a strong 
democratic government that will encourage and support a free and 
independent media. End Comment. 
 
TAYLOR