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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA1105, IMF, GDRC APPEAL TO DONORS FOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA1105 2008-12-15 14:14 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO6492
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1105/01 3501414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151414Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8900
INFO RUCNSAD/SADC COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0109
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001105 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.     12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EAID EINV PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: IMF, GDRC APPEAL TO DONORS FOR 
         EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 
 
REF:     (A) KINSHASA 1100; 
         (B) KINSHASA 918; 
         (C) 07KINSHASA 1133 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Both the IMF and Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (GDRC) have appealed to donors to provide 
emergency support as the DRC confronts a significant economic 
downturn as a result of the global financial crisis.  During a 
briefing to donors on December 10, the visiting IMF Staff Mission 
described a worsening macroeconomic situation, including a $500 
million balance of payments gap and a $250 million financing gap for 
2009.  The IMF hopes to provide emergency support to the DRC through 
its Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), but needs donors to bolster 
this assistance with additional funds. Prime Minister Muzito met 
with donors on December 11 to outline the GDRC's 2009 budget and 
development strategy and pitch a similar appeal for additional, 
immediate support.  Without additional external financing, the DRC 
could face a financial crisis as early as the second quarter of 
2009. End Summary. 
 
IMF WARNS OF LOOMING FINANCIAL CRISIS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The IMF Staff Mission led by Brian Ames, visiting Kinshasa 
from December 10-20, briefed donors on December 10.  The IMF last 
visited the DRC in September and returned in December, rather than 
their planned February time-frame, due to growing concerns over the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the DRC (ref A).  Ames 
presented a deteriorating macroeconomic situation, including 2009 
GDP growth in the 5 to 6 percent range (compared to earlier 
projections of over 11 percent), a $500 million balance of payments 
gap, a financing gap of $250 million, and deteriorating terms of 
trade.  The IMF projects FDI to decline by 11 percent of GDP as a 
result of lower commodity export prices and tightened global credit. 
 Ames warned that, absent the intervention of donors, the DRC could 
be facing a financial crisis.  The IMF will brief donors again on 
December 19. 
 
3.  (SBU) Ames stated that the DRC was facing an "exogenous shock" 
as a result of the global financial crisis.  Options for the GDRC to 
address the crisis in the short term are limited -- a reduction in 
spending, for example, would risk disruptions to basic social 
services.  The IMF described the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), 
for which the DRC is eligible, as a mechanism to respond quickly to 
the DRC's financing needs.  Under the ESF, the DRC would be eligible 
for up to $200 million (equivalent to 25 percent of its quota). 
While the ESF requires countries to commit to policies to address 
the shock, they do not need to have them implemented immediately. 
Ames stated that the DRC must, however, address previously noted 
concerns by the IMF regarding mis-reporting of emergency spending 
before the IMF would provide any new assistance.  This was, 
according to Ames, fundamental for the IMF. 
 
4.  (SBU) To address concerns on emergency spending, the GDRC would 
need to show a positive track-record that emergency spending was 
in-line with established procedures.  While generally a six-month 
track-record would be required, Ames stated that the IMF could be 
flexible and reduce this requirement to two or three months.  Ames 
indicated a possible March time-frame for the ESF assistance to come 
before the IMF Board. The Sino-Congolese agreement (refs B and C) 
represented an additional possible sticking-point for ESF 
assistance.  However, Ames stated that the GDRC, at the highest 
level, had changed its position regarding renegotiation of the 
agreement.  Specifically, the GDRC had agreed to renegotiate the 
agreement immediately, rather than waiting until the completion of 
the feasibility study, scheduled for the end of March, 2009.  This 
would include lifting of the sovereign guarantees and ensuring 
concessionality of the loans.  For the ESF, the GDRC could provide 
the IMF a letter of intent that it would renegotiate the Chinese 
agreement in line with debt sustainability. 
 
5.  (SBU) Ames noted that the IMF could not respond alone to the 
crisis and called on other donors present to provide support.  IMF 
staff have been in discussions with the USED at both the IMF and 
World Bank, as well as the French and Belgium governments on 
possible emergency support.  The World Bank could reprogram $100 to 
$120 million in resources planned for specific sectors such as 
energy.  However, the African Development Bank (ADB) has no 
mechanism to address exogenous shocks.  Since ESF assistance would 
only cover the balance of payments gap (the IMF could not provide 
budget support in the absence of a formal IMF program), Ames 
appealed to donors to cover the remaining gap.  A variety of 
mechanisms could be used, including line-item budget support. 
 
KINSHASA 00001105  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
6.  (SBU) Assuming that the GDRC can satisfactorily address IMF 
concerns in the Sino-Congolese agreement and on emergency spending 
procedures, Ames provided the following possible time-line for IMF 
assistance to the DRC:  February/March-Article IV Consultations; 
March- Board reviews ESF assistance request; April-June (at the 
latest) -- Board reviews new PRGF.  Under an optimistic scenario, 
with a new PRGF approved in April and a first review in September, 
the DRC could reach HIPC completion point in December 2009.  Ames 
noted that this scenario would provide the GDRC with possibly two 
tranches of assistance through the PRGF in 2009.  An additional $250 
million in external financing could also come from the signing 
agreement ("pas de port") negotiated as part of the Chinese 
agreement.   (Note:  The signing agreement was included in the 
GDRC's 2008 budget, but has still not been provided by the Chinese. 
End Note.)  However, the most pressing financing needs will be in 
the first half of the calendar year, before IMF assistance would be 
available. 
 
 
PRIME MINISTER ENGAGES DONORS, SEEKS SUPPORT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Prime Minister Muzito met with donor country ambassadors 
on December 11 to discuss the current economic situation, the GDRC's 
2009 budget, and donor coordination.  The Prime Minister used the 
meeting to highlight the DRC's worrisome macroeconomic situation and 
seek budget support from donors.  The Prime Minister opened his 
remarks by highlighting the impact of the global financial crisis on 
the DRC, including deteriorating terms of trade and lower 
international prices for the key DRC exports of copper, cobalt and 
diamonds.  As a result, the DRC had weak international reserves 
levels, putting economic operators at risk.  In response, the GDRC 
is taking actions to create a more favorable environment for 
investors, including adherence to the Organization for the 
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) and completion of 
the mining contract review process. 
 
8.  (SBU) The Prime Minister noted the importance of a new IMF 
program and debt relief through HIPC.  To this end, the GDRC had 
decided to address IMF concerns over provisions in the 
Sino-Congolese agreement.  However, additional, immediate resources 
are necessary, the Prime Minister stressed.  He then asked for the 
donors present to assist in providing support.  Turning to the 
GDRC's 2009 budget, Muzito provided a review of past spending dating 
back to 2001, noting the positive trend in increasing revenues and 
spending through the most current budget.  He lamented that even 
with the significant increase in spending in the DRC's 2009 budget 
(ref A), it remained small compared with spending levels of the 
DRC's neighbors, despite the DRC's much larger population.  Spending 
for 2009 will focus on infrastructure, health, education, 
electricity, and water.  However, spending levels remain low given 
the needs.  The 2009 budget is based on the hypothesis of a new IMF 
program and HIPC debt relief, but also takes into account the global 
financial crisis.  Thus, Muzito stated that the GDRC would 
reevaluate the underlying assumptions for revenues. Muzito also 
spoke at length about challenges facing the agricultural sector and 
noted GDRC investments to support increased agricultural production 
such as the procurement of 700 tractors. 
 
9.  (SBU) Muzito described steps the GDRC's had taken to improve aid 
coordination and effectiveness, acknowledging that there had been 
weaknesses.  Under the GDRC's new structure, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs will lead on policy, the Ministry of International 
Cooperation would have lead responsibility for negotiating donor 
assistance, the Ministry of Plan would have lead responsibility for 
aid coordination, and the technical ministries would have lead 
responsibility for execution. 
 
10.  (SBU) Donor interventions included the French Ambassador (on 
behalf of the EU), CDA Steve Haykin for the United States, and the 
Resident Representative of the ADB, Mujomo Coulibaly (on behalf of 
the multilateral development banks).  The Belgium, Italian and UK 
Ambassadors also provided remarks, though the EU donor countries had 
agreed that only France would intervene at the meeting. 
 
11.  (SBU) Comment:  Donors in Kinshasa have grown increasingly 
concerned about a possible financial crisis in the DRC, particularly 
as the country continues to face a significant humanitarian 
situation in the east and enormous development challenges for the 
entire population.  The meetings with the Prime Minister and IMF 
confirmed what donors have already begun internally discussing:  the 
DRC needs additional external financing, and quickly.  While there 
 
KINSHASA 00001105  003 OF 003 
 
 
is no question the GDRC can and should take steps over the medium 
and longer term to ensure continued macroeconomic stability, the 
looming financial crisis is largely due to exogenous factors.  The 
GDRC's willingness to renegotiate the Sino-Congolese agreement and 
reestablish a PRGF reflects positive developments and a new 
willingness to engage positively with traditional donors.  However, 
as the IMF noted during its briefing, the GDRC is extremely limited 
in what actions it can take to address the immediate situation; 
thus, donors must fill the void.  Brian Ames has privately told post 
that the IMF Board will not support ESF assistance for the DRC 
unless other donors commit to additional emergency support. 
Additional or reprogrammed USG assistance in response to the IMF's 
and Prime Minister's appeals would both help the GDRC address its 
immediate financing needs and smooth the way for emergency IMF 
assistance. 
 
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