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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1828, SUDAN: 2008 Country Report on Terrorism

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1828 2008-12-22 13:47 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1828/01 3571347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221347Z DEC 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2582
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001828 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT - R SHORE, NCTC, and AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EFIN KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR SU
SUBJECT:  SUDAN:  2008 Country Report on Terrorism 
 
REF:  STATE 120019 
 
------------------ 
General Assessment 
------------------ 
 
1. (SBU) Sudan remains a cooperative partner in the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT), and the outlook for continued cooperation is 
positive.  During the past year, the Sudanese government continued 
to pursue terrorist operations directly involving threats to U.S. 
interests and personnel in Sudan.  Sudanese officials have indicated 
that they view their continued cooperation with the USG as important 
and recognize the benefits of U.S. training and information-sharing. 
 While the CT relationship remains solid, hard-line Sudanese 
officials continue to express resentment and distrust over actions 
by the USG and question the benefits of their continued cooperation. 
 Their assessment reflects disappointment that Sudan's cooperation 
on CT has not resulted in its removal from the list of State 
Sponsors of Terrorism.  Despite this, there is no indication at this 
time that the Sudanese government will curtail its current level of 
CT cooperation despite bumps in the overall bilateral relationship. 
 
 
--------------------- 
Safe Haven Assessment 
--------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Al-Qaida-inspired terrorist elements, elements of the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), HAMAS, and the Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) remain in Sudan.  In light of the continuing hybrid UN-AU 
deployment to Darfur, various terrorist threats against this mission 
have emerged, and the Al-Qaida leadership has called for jihad 
against UN forces in Darfur.  In the early hours of January 1, 2008, 
attackers in Khartoum sympathetic to Al-Qaida shot and fatally 
wounded two U.S. Embassy staff members:  an American and a Sudanese 
employee, both of whom worked for the U.S. Agency for International 
Development.  Sudanese authorities cooperated closely with agencies 
of the U.S. government in investigating this terrorist crime.  Five 
alleged conspirators were arrested on February 1 and put on trial 
for murder on August 31.  Their trial was ongoing at end of 2008. 
Other extremist groups also have threatened attacks against Western 
interests in Sudan.  The July 14 request by International Criminal 
Court Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo for an arrest warrant against 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges related to atrocities 
committed in Darfur has further inflamed tensions.  Therefore, the 
terrorist threat level remains critical in Khartoum and Darfur, and 
potentially other parts of Sudan. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Terrorist Groups/Organizations 
------------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) Elements of designated terrorist groups remain in Sudan. 
With the exception of HAMAS, whose members the Sudanese government 
considers to be freedom fighters rather than terrorists, the 
government here does not appear to openly support the presence of 
extremist elements in this country.   The Sudanese government has 
taken steps to limit the activities of these organizations.  For 
example, Sudanese officials have welcomed HAMAS members as 
representatives of the Palestinian Authority (PA), but have limited 
their activities to fundraising.  The Sudanese government has also 
worked hard to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan as a 
logistics base and transit point for Jihadists going to Iraq. 
However, gaps remain in the Sudanese government's knowledge of and 
ability to identify and capture these individuals.  There is some 
evidence to suggest that individuals who were active participants in 
the Iraqi insurgency have returned to Sudan and are in a position to 
use their expertise to conduct attacks within Sudan or to pass on 
their knowledge.  There is also evidence that Sudanese extremists 
participate in terrorist activities in Somalia, which the Sudanese 
government has also attempted to disrupt. 
 
4. (SBU) The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony 
continued to operate from its base in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and threaten the tri-border area (DRC, Sudan, and 
Uganda).  The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has worked to 
mediate peace between the LRA and the Government of Uganda; by the 
end of 2008, however, Kony had failed to sign the Final Peace 
Agreement.  Following Kony's repeated failure to sign a draft peace 
agreement, on December 14 the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force, with 
cooperation from the GoSS and DRC, attacked LRA bases along the 
border of South Sudan and the DRC. As of late 2008, this Ugandan 
military operation against the LRA continued. 
 
------------------------------ 
Foreign Government Cooperation 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) Sudanese officials regularly discuss counterterrorism 
issues with U.S. counterparts.   Sudan is generally responsive to 
international community concerns about counterterrorism efforts. 
 
6. (SBU) Embassy Khartoum Point of Contact is Economic Officer John 
Struble.  His e-mail address is strublejw@state.gov and his 
telephone numbers are 249-183-774-700 (Embassy) and 249-912-167-881 
(cellular phone). 
 
ASQUINO