Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08CANBERRA1231, GOA REPLY TO DEMARCHE ON WAY FORWARD WITH IRAQ

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08CANBERRA1231.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08CANBERRA1231 2008-12-05 07:56 2011-08-25 00:00 SECRET Embassy Canberra
Appears in these articles:
http://www.wikileaks.elfaro.net/es/201108/notas/5468/
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBY #1231/01 3400756
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 050756Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0626
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0322
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0293
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1932
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR IMMEDIATE 0223
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0043
S E C R E T CANBERRA 001231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/ANP,NEA/I,S/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ ES RO AS EN
SUBJECT: GOA REPLY TO DEMARCHE ON WAY FORWARD WITH IRAQ 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 03794 
     B. STATE 126109 
     C. STATE 128040 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JAMES F. COLE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND 
D 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
1. (S)  The Australian government, while pessimistic about 
achieving a legally binding SOFA with Iraq, is actively 
exploring options for the continued employment of imbedded 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel serving in MNF-I, 
particularly those whose missions keep them within the 
confines of coalition bases. The Government of Australia 
(GOA) is constrained by Iraq's Prime Minister's fatigue with 
the legislative process and by the GOA's own insistence that 
any agreement have treaty status. Furthermore, PM Maliki's 
negotiating team is being overwhelmed by similar requests 
from five of the nations of the coalition. End Summary 
 
2. (S) Poloff and DATT delivered the demarche of December 4 
on the way forward for the GOA's negotiations with the 
Government of Iraq (GOI) (ref C) to Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Department of Defence 
counterparts. They reported the GOA's negotiating team in 
Baghdad, led by Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) First 
Assistant Secretary for International Policy Simeon Gilding, 
is actively looking for alternative ways to forge an 
agreement with the Iraqis. They are presently crafting a 
proposal around Article 16 of a 1979 Iraqi law on treaties. 
The Iraqis have questioned the sufficiency of this law to 
provide the level of protection that the Australians require. 
Australia's legal specialists in Baghdad are actively 
consulting their American and British counterparts in 
addition to Iraqi experts. 
 
3. (S) The Australians want a treaty-level agreement with the 
Iraqis in order to insure that their troops are provided the 
same legal protection as their American colleagues. Contacts 
in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ADOD 
and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet have 
told emboffs that PM Maliki pushed back on the GOA request 
for an agreement with treaty status, asking the Australians 
why they didn't jointly negotiate an agreement with the 
Americans.  They also have concluded that the Iraqi Prime 
Minister does not have the stomach to present any further 
bilateral agreements to the Council of Representatives this 
year. 
 
4. (S) The Australians expressed to us their concern that 
attempting to reach an agreement with Iraq is hampered by the 
limited manpower and logistics of the Iraqi negotiating team 
headed by Dr. Fadhel, Prime Minister Malaki's chief legal 
advisor. These constrain his ability to conduct simultaneous 
negotiations with Australians, British, Romanian, El 
Salvadoran, and Estonian delegations. This problem will be 
difficult to overcome regardless of whether the desired 
result would be a treaty or an MOU. There is, therefore, a 
need to craft a way forward that can be used in every case or 
there will probably not be any progress. However, see below 
concerning the special situation that the UK faces. 
 
5. (S) DFAT Iraqi Director Lloyd Brodrick told us the 
National Security Committee of Cabinet will take up this 
issue by Tuesday, December 9 (Monday, December 8, Washington 
time.) 
 
6. (S) Australian Brigadier Andrew Nikolic at the Department 
of Defense, told the DATT that Admiral Mullen, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in communication with the 
Qthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in communication with the 
Australians on this issue. 
 
7. (S) The DATT also learned from the British military 
attach in Canberra that the Australian Chief of the Defense 
Force (CDF), Angus Houston, has ongoing discussions with the 
British Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), Sir Jock Stirrup. 
 
8. (S) Separately, Embassy Pol/Officer has delivered the 
general points of the U.S. Government's Strategic Framework 
Agreement with Iraq as well as the Security Agreement that 
were approved by the Iraqi parliament on Nov 27 to the 
Government of Australia (GOA) (ref B). 
 
Comment: 
------- 
9. (S) It would be relatively easier for the GOA to redeploy 
its forces from Iraq at short notice because of their limited 
number, compared with the British, whose force levels would 
make quick movement unwieldy.  Therefore, the British 
negotiators will be feeling far more urgency to finalize an 
agreement, however inadequate, than will the Australians. A 
British solution to the dilemma may not be acceptable to the 
Australians, however, because the UK appears willing to 
accept a lower level of protections for its forces, according 
to the GOA. End Comment 
MCCALLUM