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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1652, UKRAINE REQUESTS USG SUPPORT FOR UKRAINIAN-BRAZILIAN SPACE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA1652 2008-12-23 15:48 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3711
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1652/01 3581548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231548Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3155
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0003
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0387
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7282
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4824
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5994
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4310
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 1635
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6758
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4063
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7620
RUEHPO/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 1713
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2668
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0776
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8830
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7014
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3239
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//SCJ2-I/J5/HSE/DIA REP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001652 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA, IIP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 
TAGS: PREL ETTC KTIA TSPA TPHY NASA UP RS BR
SUBJECT: UKRAINE REQUESTS USG SUPPORT FOR UKRAINIAN-BRAZILIAN SPACE 
LAUNCH JOINT VENTURE AT ALCANTARA 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske, Reason 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
REF:  BRASILIA 1590 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  The Ukrainian Embassy in Brasilia is urging the USG 
to reconsider its earlier position and now support the 
Ukrainian-Brazilian space launch venture that will operate out of 
Alcantara, allowing U.S. satellite firms to benefit from these 
facilities.  While the Ukrainians noted some possible commercial and 
other benefits to the United States, they stressed that the principal 
reason for the USG to agree to this request is to help keep the 
Russians out of the space launch field in Brazil.  Post would 
appreciate Washington's guidance on how to respond to the Ukrainians 
about this request.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The Ukrainian Defense Attache in Brasilia, Brazil, requested a 
meeting with Embassy staff to discuss space cooperation. 
Accordingly, on December 12 Assistant Air Attache Mark Harrington and 
Science Counselor Richard Driscoll met with Ukrainian Ambassador 
Volodymyr Lakomov, Oleksandr Serdyuk, the General Director for 
Alcantara Cyclone Space (a Ukrainian-Brazilian joint venture), and 
the Rustam Akhunov, First Secretary at the Ukrainian Embassy.  The 
Ukrainians want USG support for the Alcantara project.  They noted 
that when Ukraine had raised the subject earlier with the USG that 
the response had been that we would not support (though not 
necessarily oppose it).  Now, Ukraine would like the USG to revisit 
that decision. 
 
3. (C) Serdyuk outlined three principal reasons why the USG should be 
supportive of the Ukraine-Brazil project.  First, he said that 
Ukraine could use its influence with the Brazilian Congress to obtain 
approval for the long-stalled U.S.-Brazil space cooperation agreement 
regarding Alcantara.  When asked to elaborate, he said there are many 
in the Brazilian Congress who are friendly towards Ukraine and he 
could win them over to support ratification of the agreement with the 
United States.  Second, he noted that Ukraine was working with a U.S. 
firm, Orbital Science, hinting that if this project ever got off the 
ground that the U.S. firm Orbital Science could benefit commercially. 
 Also, he said U.S. satellite firms may find it much less expensive 
to use the Alcantara facility than other options.  He estimated a 
cost savings of up to 30 percent.  Third, the Ukrainians repeatedly 
emphasized that if this space cooperation activity with Brazil did 
not start making some headway that the Brazilians would turn to the 
Russians waiting in the wings.  (SEE REFTEL ABOUT RUSSIAN PRESIDENT 
MEDVEDEV'S RECENT VISIT TO BRAZIL.) 
 
ALCANTARA UPDATE 
 
4. (C) The Ukrainians briefed Embassy officers on developments at 
Alcantara.  Serdyuk highlighted the ideal location of this launch 
facility, which was at 2.3 degrees South and so, less expensive for 
launching satellites into geostationary orbits.  The Ukrainians have 
a launcher, the Cyclone 2, which can carry a payload of up to 1,600 
kilograms or 5.3 tons into orbit.  Ukraine will provide the launch 
vehicles in this joint venture; Brazil will provide basic 
infrastructure, such as seaport, airport, and roads.  They both would 
work on construction of the launch site.  Following a serious 
accident at the Alcantara site on August 22, 2003, which put the 
joint venture on hold for years, both sides are now trying to move 
forward.  Brazil has been grappling with a land title problem because 
a local community descended from runaway slaves (called a quilombo) 
has claimed the original site.  Serdyuk reported that the Brazilian 
government has decided to construct a new launch site in a nearby 
locale, abandoning the initial site.  The Brazilian side of 
activities at Alcantara is handled by CTA, which is an entity of the 
Brazilian Air Force. 
 
5. (C) The Ukrainians are aiming to launch their first commercial 
payload from the new Brazilian site in 2011, which would be an 
 
BRASILIA 00001652  002 OF 002 
 
 
Argentine satellite, and expect another Argentine satellite in 2012, 
as well as some demand from Brazil Telecom. 
 
COMMENT 
 
6. (C) The Ukrainians want to know if the USG will reconsider its 
earlier decision and agree to support the Ukraine-Brazil joint 
venture by allowing them to launch U.S. satellites.  While the 
Ukrainians highlighted the benefits to the United States, their 
principle argument was that if the USG doesn't take this step, then 
the Russians will fill the void and become the chief partner for 
Brazil on space cooperation.  As noted in REFTEL, Brazil-Russia space 
launch cooperation has high level political support.  Ukrainian 
protestations notwithstanding, it is unlikely that Brazil sees 
cooperation with Ukraine and Russia as an either/or proposition. 
 
7. (U) Post would appreciate Washington's guidance on how to respond 
to the Ukrainian request for USG support or involvement in the 
Ukrainian-Brazilian space launch joint venture. 
 
KUBISKE