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Viewing cable 08BOGOTA4335, PYRAMID COLLAPSE BURYING THIRD TERM PROSPECTS?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BOGOTA4335 2008-12-05 16:07 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #4335/01 3401607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051607Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5936
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1392
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC PANAMA 2748
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 7494
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4704
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS BOGOTA 004335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON EFIN
SUBJECT: PYRAMID COLLAPSE BURYING THIRD TERM PROSPECTS? 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 2558 
     B. BOGOTA 4134 
     C. BOGOTA 4201 
     D. BOGOTA 4261 
     E. BOGOTA 4263 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) The results of a recent Invamar-Gallup poll show 
Uribe maintains high public approval ratings in spite of a 
host of political and economic troubles.  Still, public 
support for a third term has dropped from 74% to 54% since 
last July.  In southern departments--areas hard-hit by the 
pyramid collapse--62% of respondents oppose a third term. 
Invamar-Gallup president Jorge Londono told us Uribe's 
remarkable popularity--while remaining positive--is likely to 
continue to slide in 2009 as the international economic 
crisis deepens. Uribe supporters continue to push to amend 
the Constitution to allow Uribe to run again, but Londono 
predicted that the pyramid scandal has definitely ended the 
possibility of a third Uribe term in 2010. End Summary. 
 
Two Terms Sufficient, Thank You 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) In a recent Invamar-Gallup poll, President Uribe 
maintains an enviable--though falling--approval rating. 
Seventy percent of the country approves his job performance, 
a drop from 86% after the daring Operation 'Jaque' last July, 
which rescued fifteen FARC hostages.  Over his six years in 
office, Uribe has enjoyed an average popularity rating of 
65%.  Pundits call Uribe's steady approval rating in the face 
of  political adversity--including the ongoing parapolitical 
scandal, the pyramid scheme collapse and the GOC's 
controversial intervention, extrajudicial killings by 
Colombian Armed Forces, and severe natural disasters--the 
"Teflon effect."  Lodono predicted that Uribe's approval 
ratings would remain positive, but would continue to slide as 
the international economic crisis deepens early next year. 
 
3.  (U) The Gallup poll also indicates that Uribe is losing 
support for a third term.  A majority of the general public 
supports a 2010 reelection, but the number of supporters has 
dropped by 20%--falling from 74% to 54%--since the high point 
in July.  The decline tracks with a public shift in focus to 
economic, rather than security, issues (Reftel A).  When 
asked if the situation in Colombia is getting better or 
worse, the majority of respondents (58%) replied things are 
getting worse.  The number of people who considered the 
situation in Colombia to be getting better dropped from 73% 
in July to 30%.  These are the worst numbers registered 
during Uribe's six years as president. 
 
4.  (U)  Londono noted that the GOC's handling of the recent 
pyramid collape--including allegations that Uribe's sons were 
connected to the companies involved and that these firms also 
helped collect signatures for the reelection effort--has 
exposed popular distrust of the banking sector and eroded 
public confidence in GOC institutions as well as Uribe.  Many 
victims find GOC accusations of criminal activity against DMG 
founder Daniel Murcia less than convincing, noting that GOC 
agencies dealt with DMG for years before the intervention. 
Uribe felt compelled by the accusations against his children 
to hold a press conference to defend their integrity. 
 
Southern Dis-Connection:  Uribe Low in Public Opinion 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
5.  (U) The poll shows respondents in the southern 
departments of Putumayo, Narino, and Cauca were hit hardest 
by the closing of DMG and have bleaker views of President 
Uribe.  Only 45% approve of Uribe's job performance. 
Seventy-seven percent believe the situation in Colombia is 
getting worse.  Seventy-three percent--16% more than in the 
country as a whole--believe Colombia's most important problem 
is the economy.  The majority of southerners (54%) disagree 
with the GOC's decision to intervene in DMG.  Fifty-one 
percent agreed with the statement that DMG had created an 
ingenious business model to help people.  Protests against 
the GOC's decision to close DMG continued in Putumayo, with 
protesters chanting "no more Uribe, free Putumayo." An Uribe 
town meeting in Huila went badly, with the audience loudly 
protesting the GOC's actions. 
 
6.  (SBU) A majority of southerners (62%) oppose a second 
reelection.  As a result of constituent protests, two 
Conservative Party coalition members from Narino and 
Putumayo--former supporters of a 2010 reelection--were forced 
to abstain on the November 9 third-term referendum vote in 
the First Commission.  An editorial in the Bogota daily El 
Tiempo suggests that if the 2010 election were to make it to 
referendum, the estimated one million people who lost money 
in the pyramid schemes would join forces with the opposition 
to block a third term.  Pro-Uribe supporters continue to push 
the reelection referendum in Congress, but Londono predicted 
that the pyramid scandal has definitively ended any 
possibility of a possible third Uribe term in 2010. 
 
 
NICHOLS