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Viewing cable 08ATHENS1668, GREECE/TURKEY TALKS ON ILLEGAL MIGRANTS: LITTLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ATHENS1668 2008-12-12 13:23 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #1668/01 3471323
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121323Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2919
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2018 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PHUM PTER TU IZ SO AF IT GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/TURKEY TALKS ON ILLEGAL MIGRANTS: LITTLE 
PROGRESS AS NUMBERS GROW 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 1387 
     B. 07 ATHENS 2305 
 
Classified By: DCM Deborah McCarthy for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (SBU) A Greek delegation visited Ankara in mid-November 
for the third round of discussions aimed at improving 
implementation of the protocol the two countries signed in 
2001 on re-admission of illegal migrants.  Over the last two 
years, the number of migrants using Greece's Aegean islands 
as an entry-way to Europe has grown dramatically, and Greek 
officials have repeatedly expressed frustration to us that 
Turkey takes only a small portion of them back, despite the 
commitment to re-admit that Turkey undertook in 2001.  Greek 
participants told us the talks were amicable but the Turks 
were unwilling to seriously discuss the main Greek objective: 
opening up the port of Izmir as a return point for the 
migrants.  Izmir is listed in the protocol as a return point, 
but the Greeks say their Turkish interlocutors ruled out any 
re-admission on the Anatolian coast for unspecified "security 
reasons."  Some returns do occur at the land border between 
the two countries, but Greek officials say the logistical and 
bureaucratic hurdles involved in transferring aliens detained 
at sea to the land border make it very difficult to get them 
there within the three-month period specified in the 
protocol.  End Summary. 
 
No Breakthrough in Ankara 
------------------------- 
2. (C) We received readouts of the talks from two Greek 
participants: Coast Guard Security Directorate Commander 
Yannis Chortis on November 28 and MFA C4 Directorate (Justice 
and Home Affairs/Schengen) First Counselor Ioannis Raptakis 
on December 4.  They were also joined in Ankara by a 
representative of the Hellenic Police.  Chortis and Raptakis 
came back with the same impression of the talks: the Turks 
were nice interlocutors who made some positive comments about 
speeding up Turkish bureaucratic procedures to respond to 
Greek requests for re-admissions, but they were entirely 
closed to the one change the Greeks consider most important 
to making re-admissions happen -- the use of Izmir port. 
Chortis and Raptakis are deeply concerned about the increase 
in illegal migration though the Aegean in the last two years. 
 The Greek Coast Guard has already detained well over 100,000 
illegal migrants this year, with nearly all arriving in 
Greece after transiting through Turkey en route from such 
places as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia.  The numbers have 
all but overwhelmed local Greek authorities on the islands, 
leading to overcrowding and poor conditions at detention 
centers, political tensions within Greece, and a steady 
stream of onward migration by these migrants to Italy and 
elsewhere in Europe (ref A).  There is also a danger that 
terrorists from conflict zones in the Middle East could use 
this wave of immigration to infiltrate into Europe. 
 
3. (C) The bilateral protocol was seen as a major achievement 
when it was signed, but as Raptakis explained to us it has 
never functioned fully.  The protocol identifies three 
re-admission points in each country; for Turkey they are 
Izmir port, the land border crossing at Ipsala, and Istanbul 
Ataturk Airport.  In practice, however, the Turks have only 
permitted re-admissions at Ipsala.  This makes the process 
much more difficult for the Greeks, Raptakis and Chortis 
explained, because the Coast Guard must hand the migrants 
over to the police who process them through Athens.  Raptakis 
said that it has typically taken the Turks 30 to 40 days to 
respond to Greeks requests to re-admit specific individuals. 
Given this time lag and the logistical requirements, Raptakis 
said, a migrant is unlikely to be turned over to the Turks 
within the required three-month limit even if the Turks agree 
to the re-admission.  Raptakis acknowledged that his Turkish 
interlocutors had indicated they would try to accelerate 
their internal process, but he was skeptical about whether 
this would really happen.  In the meantime, he said, the 
Turks dismissed Greek requests to do re-admissions at Izmir, 
citing "security reasons" that they would not further 
explain.  When Raptakis suggested finding another port if 
Izmir was a problem, the Turks responded that they were not 
ready to accept any re-admissions on the Anatolian coast. 
 
4. (C) Raptakis said the Turks accept migrants only from 
countries with which Turkey has a re-admission agreement, 
primarily Iraq and Iran.  In these cases, the Turks say they 
are accepting the migrants "for transit," and they charge the 
Greeks a 71-Euro fee to return each person to Iraq or Iran. 
Raptakis said the Greek police pay this fee, albeit 
unhappily.  He said the Turks refuse to accept Afghans, 
Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, or other nationalities entirely. 
Raptakis said he argued to the Turks that if their two 
countries enforced the protocol more effectively, word would 
 
quickly circulate among the smugglers and the immigrant 
communities, with the result that fewer migrants would be 
likely to try to use the Aegean route to enter Europe. 
Raptakis said the Turks seemed unmoved by this argument. 
 
Comment 
------ 
5. (C) Greek officials have continued t raise the 
implementation of the protocol with the Turks at levels from 
the Foreign Minister (ref B) on down, and the next round of 
talks on the issue is scheduled to take place within six 
months.  Despite their frustration over the problem, Greek 
officials believe there would have to be political will in 
Turkey to make significant progress on re-admission.  Chortis 
acknowledged to us that the Turks face an even bigger problem 
with illegal migrants than Greece does.  For both countries, 
there is undoubtedly an incentive not to try too hard to stop 
the aliens from moving on, passing the burden to the next 
country on the route (for the Turks, Greece; for the Greeks, 
Italy and Western Europe).  There are also difficult 
questions about human rights; both Greece and Turkey received 
strong criticism in a recent Human Rights Watch report on 
treatment of the migrants.  Nevertheless, it seems clear to 
everyone -- and certainly to the Greek officials we have 
engaged on this issue -- that the current system is broken. 
As the numbers of migrants increase, the system's failure to 
manage the flow will likely have even greater consequences. 
 
SPECKHARD