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Viewing cable 08WINDHOEK367, NAMIBIA: INCSR PART II, MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08WINDHOEK367 2008-11-17 10:46 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Windhoek
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWD #0367/01 3221046
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171046Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0161
UNCLAS WINDHOEK 000367 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN KCRM KTFN SNAR WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: INCSR PART II, MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL 
CRIMES 
 
REF: STATE 103815 
 
- - - - 
NAMIBIA 
- - - - 
 
1. (SBU)  Although Namibia has one of the most highly developed 
financial systems in Africa, it is not considered a regional 
financial center. In addition to the Bank of Namibia (the central 
bank), Namibia has four commercial banks. 
 
2. (SBU)  The major sources of potential money laundering in Namibia 
are related to both regional and domestic criminal activities.  The 
regional activities include falsification or misuse of identity 
documents, customs violations, trafficking in illegal drugs, and 
stolen vehicles, mostly from South Africa.  Organized crime groups 
involved in smuggling activities generally use Namibia as a transit 
point -particularly for goods destined for Angola.  Namibia does not 
appear to have a significant informal domestic market for smuggled 
goods. Domestically, real estate as well as minerals and gems are 
reportedly used as a vehicle for money laundering.  Namibian 
authorities believe that the proceeds of these activities are 
laundered through Namibian financial institutions, but such money 
laundering takes place on a small scale. 
 
3. (SBU)  Financial institutions are generally quick to react when 
they suspect money laundering.  There is little evidence of 
significant laundering/terrorist financing within the banking 
system, within an offshore financial center or free trade zone, or 
in the non-bank financial system (e.g. exchange houses) or via 
alternative remittance systems, such as hawala, hundi, or other 
systems.  There is also little evidence to suggest that financial 
institutions engage in currency transactions involving international 
narcotics trafficking proceeds that include significant amounts of 
U.S. currency or currency derived from illegal drug sales in the 
United States or that otherwise significantly affect the United 
States. There are indications but no hard evidence that trade-based 
money laundering occurs. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (SBU)  Namibia is not considered an offshore financial center. 
Since it has no offshore sector the government has no separate 
agency to regulate offshore activities - such as the licensing of 
offshore banks and businesses.  While gambling and casinos are legal 
within Namibia, offshore casinos are prohibited under Namibian law. 
There is one internet gaming site, although online gaming sites are 
not regulated under Namibian law. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
FREE TRADE ZONES 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
5. (SBU)  The Namibian government has set up Export Processing Zones 
(EPZ) which act in many ways as free trade zones, but there are 
differences.  The Ministry of Trade and Industry's Offshore 
Development Company (ODC) is responsible for the monitoring, 
regulation and promotion of EPZs.  According to ODC, "Namibia's EPZ 
regime is unique in that it is not location-bound. EPZ registered 
companies are free to locate themselves anywhere in the country and 
are not restricted to specific geographical zones. Specially 
designated industrial zones and parks have been established at 
Walvis Bay, Oshikango and Katima Mulilo."  According to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, "EPZ enterprises operate outside the normal 
foreign exchange regime in Namibia. . .[via]" two types of banking 
accounts [that] have been tailor-made to the needs of enterprises 
operating in the Namibia EPZ."  There is no indication that EPZs are 
being used in trade-based money laundering schemes or by the 
financiers of terrorism. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
LEGAL FOUNDATION OF AML REGIME 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (SBU)  In 2004, Namibia criminalized money laundering with the 
passage of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA). Money 
laundering under POCA applies to all serious crimes and not just 
drug trafficking.   In July 2007 the Financial Intelligence Act 
(FIA) was passed.  The FIA will serve as the cornerstone in 
Namibia's anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing 
(AML/CTF) regime in concert with the POCA and the 2003 
Anti-Corruption Act, as well as the Drug Control Bill and the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill, both of which still need to be enacted.  All 
these acts will need to be harmonized, especially the POCA and the 
FIA which overlap considerably, including the definition of money 
laundering and requiring the reporting of suspicious transactions. 
Implementation of POCA has been delayed in order to pass amendments 
to the act to harmonize it with FIA.  POCA will be implemented once 
the recently proposed amendments to it are enacted and its 
regulations are issued. 
 
 
7. (SBU)  Besides suspicious transaction reporting, the FIA has 
additional reporting requirements, such as large cash transactions, 
electronic funds transfers, and cross-border conveyances of 
currency; and it strengthens the Government's ability to investigate 
and prosecute money laundering crimes. The 2003 Anti-Corruption Act 
provides for the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission. The 
Anti-Corruption Commission was inaugurated in 2006.  The Commission 
appoints investigators, who have full and wide powers to investigate 
allegations of corruption. 
 
8. (SBU)  Namibia has financial secrecy laws. But such laws do not 
prevent disclosure of client and ownership information to bank 
supervisors and law enforcement authorities. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
9. (SBU)  The Bank of Namibia (BoN) supervises and examines the four 
commercial banks operating in Namibia. The Namibian Financial 
Institutions Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA) supervises and examines 
non-banking financial institutions, such as securities firms and 
insurance companies.  The BoN has established the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC) to carry out the Bank's AML duties and 
responsibilities.  The FIC is located within the BoN.  The BoN has 
appointed the FIC's Director, and the FIC appears to be adequately 
staffed with two deputy directors and five analysts.  It has some 
operational and budgetary independence, but the BoN should grant the 
FIC more independence through a delegation order.  The FIC receives 
its budget from the BoN. 
 
10. (SBU)  Once in effect FIA will require both bank and non-bank 
financial institutions to identify customers and to report 
suspicious transactions to the Central Bank and provide relevant 
documents and other information to government authorities for use in 
criminal investigations.  FIA also requires such institutions to 
report transactions above threshold limits, namely cash 
transactions, electronic funds transfers, and cross border 
conveyances of cash. The threshold limits are under study and have 
not yet been established by regulation.  There is no threshold 
amount for suspicious transactions. 
 
11. (SBU)  Once FIA is implemented, banks and other financial 
institutions will be required to maintain records for five years. 
This is intended to allow FIC to reconstruct significant 
transactions through financial institutions in order to be able to 
respond quickly to information requests from appropriate government 
authorities in narcotics-related or other money laundering or 
terrorist finance cases. 
 
12. (SBU)  Under FIA, AML/CTF controls will be applied to non-bank 
financial institutions (NBFIs) and designated non-financial 
businesses and professions (DNFBPs), such as exchange houses, stock 
brokerages, cash couriers, casinos, dealers in jewels and precious 
metals, insurance companies, pawn shops, realtors, high-worth 
dealers in art and vehicles, and to intermediaries, such as lawyers, 
accountants, notaries, or broker/dealers. 
 
13. (SBU)  Reporting individuals (bankers and others) are protected 
by law with respect to their cooperation with law enforcement 
entities. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU)/INVESTIGATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
14. (SBU)  The FIC is the administrative body that has regulatory 
and analytic (but not investigative) duties and responsibilities 
under the FIA. Under FIA, the FIC will have access to government and 
financial institution records and databases.  The FIC has not yet 
formally entered into MOUs or other mechanisms for domestic and 
international information sharing, but it has authority to do so 
under the FIA. 
 
15. (SBU)  Since the FIA is not yet in effect, no suspicious 
transaction reports (STRs) were received in 2008 under the new 
formal AML regime.  However, over the years, a handful of STRs have 
routinely been received by the Bank under directives and the like 
exercised under its supervisory powers. 
 
16. (SBU)  The Commercial Crime Unit of the Namibian Police (NAMPOL) 
and the Office of the Prosecutor General are responsible for 
formally investigating financial crimes.  The Office of the 
Prosecutor General appears to be adequately staffed and fairly well 
trained, but NAMPOL, while somewhat adequately staffed is generally 
regarded as being poorly equipped and trained. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ASSET FORFEITURE AND SEIZURE LEGISLATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
17. (SBU)  There have never been any arrests or prosecutions for 
money laundering. Money laundering was not a criminal offense under 
Namibian law until POCA, and POCA is not yet fully implemented. 
 
18. (SBU)  Namibia is still waiting to implement its laws (POCA and 
FIA) that criminalize money laundering or the financing of 
terrorism.  Once POCA is in effect money laundering will be an 
offense, and forfeiture will be a mechanism for responding to a 
laundering infraction.  POCA provides for both civil and criminal 
forfeiture.  Amendments to POCA appear to have cleared most hurdles 
in Parliament and are expected to be signed into law soon, thereby 
clearing the way to place POCA itself into effect. 
 
19. (SBU)  Under POCA, the Government will be able to seize assets 
and intangible property such as bank accounts, including the 
instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, as well as substitute 
assets. Namibia does not yet have a law similar to the RICO Act 
under U.S. law that would permit the seizure of a legitimate 
business if used to launder money or support terrorist activity. 
The major provisions in POCA regarding asset forfeiture and seizure 
are: 
 
- Asset confiscation or asset forfeiture. 
 
- Restraint Orders -- A High Court order which restrains persons 
from dealing with the property which is the subject of the order. 
 
- A Criminal Assets Recovery Fund into which the proceeds of 
confiscated assets and certain other funds are to be deposited. 
 
- Search/investigative powers which are useful for obtaining 
property information from third party custodians of information 
(such as banks or other financial institutions). 
 
20. (SBU)  The Office of the Prosecutor General and NAMPOL are 
responsible for the tracing, seizing, and freezing of assets.  It is 
expected that the banking community will fully cooperate with 
enforcement efforts to trace funds and seize/freeze bank accounts 
once POCA is in effect. 
 
21. (SBU)  Namibia has not yet enacted any laws for the sharing of 
seized assets with other governments, but apparently could do so 
pursuant to an international agreement or treaty.  Namibia is not 
currently engaged in any bilateral multilateral negotiations with 
other governments to enhance asset tracing, freezing, and 
forfeiture.  However, Namibia did participate in the negotiations 
regarding the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
and signed and ratified the resulting Convention which deals 
extensively with seizure and forfeiture. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
TERRORIST FINANCING 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
22. (SBU)  There have been no known arrests or prosecutions for 
terrorist financing.  An Anti-Terrorism Bill has passed the legal 
drafting stage, but has still not been tabled in Parliament. Under 
the proposed counterterrorism law, the Government would be empowered 
to proscribe an organization if it commits or participates in 
terrorism; prepares for acts of terrorism; promotes or encourages 
terrorism; or is otherwise involved with terrorism. The proposed law 
would also prohibit individuals from providing money or other 
property with the intention or knowledge (or suspicion) that such 
money or other property would be used for the purposes of terrorism 
(regardless whether or not a terrorism act was committed).  Until 
the Anti-Terrorism Bill is enacted, there will be no system for 
freezing terrorist assets. 
 
23. (SBU)  Namibia is a member of the Eastern and Southern African 
Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Namibia served as the Chair 
of ESAAMLG from August 2001 until August 2002. Namibia is a party to 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In November 
2001, the GRN signed the UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and is making progress 
toward becoming a party. An Anti-Terrorism Bill is still in the 
drafting process and is not yet under consideration by Parliament. 
Until such a bill is passed, terrorist financing would not be 
considered a serious crime and a predicate offense for money 
laundering. 
 
24. (SBU)  The BoN routinely circulates to its financial 
institutions the list of individuals and entities that have been 
included on the UN 1267 sanctions committee's consolidated list as 
being linked to Usama bin Ladin, members of the Al Qa'ida 
organization, and the Taliban.  The BoN also circulates the list of 
terrorist organizations/financiers that the United States and the 
European Union (EU) have designated under relevant authorities. 
 
25. (SBU)  There is no evidence that indicates that value transfer 
systems are used in Namibia in lieu of the formal financial system. 
Namibia has not yet taken measures to thwart the possible misuse of 
charitable and/or non-profit entities that can be used as conduits 
 
for the financing of terrorism.  There is no government entity that 
regulates or supervises such sectors. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CROSS-BORDER TRANSPORTATION OF CURRENCY 
AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
26. (SBU)  The FIA has provisions for monitoring the cross-border 
transportation of currency and monetary instruments, namely, 
threshold reporting requirements for cross-border conveyances of 
cash. Once FIA is in effect the FIC will require (after a phase-in 
process) that Customs forward such reports to it for entry into FIC 
data bases. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
27. (SBU)  Namibia is a party to the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention). In November 
2001, the GRN signed the UN International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, but it has not yet 
ratified the Convention. 
 
28. (SBU)  Namibian law only permits the exchange of records with 
the United States on investigations and proceedings related to 
narcotics, all-source money laundering, terrorism and terrorist 
financing if there is a bilateral or multilateral treaty in place 
specifically providing for such cooperation.  Unfortunately, 
Namibian courts have ruled that the Palermo Convention does not 
trigger such law and thus the provisions of the Palermo Convention 
are not "self-executing" under Namibian law.  Namibia has not 
reached any bilateral agreement with the United States authorities 
on a mechanism for exchange of records in connection with such 
investigations and proceedings.  Furthermore, there are no current 
negotiations between Namibia and the United States to establish such 
an exchange mechanism.  Namibia does have such cooperative 
agreements with countries in the SADC Region. 
 
29. (SBU)  Namibia is not yet a member of the Egmont group.  It has 
not yet entered into any agreements with other FIUs because the FIA 
is not yet in effect.  The FIC is developing MOUs with other 
supervisory authorities to facilitate the exchange of supervisory 
information regarding banking and non-banking financial institutions 
in Namibia. 
 
30. (SBU)  Namibia has made substantial efforts to cooperate with 
the United States and other countries in the area of law 
enforcement, especially in the area of extradition.  There is no 
evidence that suggests the Namibian government has deliberately 
refused to cooperate with foreign governments. 
 
31. (SBU)  Namibia is attempting to adhere to all established 
relevant international money laundering standards, such as the 
recommendations of the FATF and the Basel Group by establishing the 
FIC and enacting the FIA and POCA. 
 
MATHIEU