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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA587, IAEA PROGRAM SUPPORT COSTS - A BUDGET ISSUE THAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA587 2008-11-06 15:23 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
Usha E Pitts  11/26/2008 11:26:08 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Usha

Cable 
Text:                                                                                                                                                       
UNCLAS        UNVIE VIENNA 00587
CXUNVIE:
    ACTION: IAEA_UN
    INFO:   AMB_UN DCM_UN CTBT_UN

DISSEMINATION: IAEAUN
CHARGE: UNVI

APPROVED: AMB:GSCHULTE
DRAFTED: IAEA:UPITTS
CLEARED: GPYATT, LHILLIARD, HASTWOOD, BHOFFHEINS, MSCHELAND

VZCZCUNV643
OO RUEHC RUEHXX RUEHII RUEHRO RHEBAAA RHEGGTN
RUEHFR RUCNDT
DE RUEHUNV #0587/01 3111523
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061523Z NOV 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8639
INFO RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0363
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEGGTN/DEPT OF ENERGY GERMANTOWN MD PRIORITY
RUEHFR/USMISSION UNESCO PARIS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1385
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000587 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR ISN/MNSA, IO/T; DOE FOR NA-24, NA-25, NA-21 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IAEA OTRA KNNP TRGY AORC UN PREL AS CA
SUBJECT: IAEA PROGRAM SUPPORT COSTS - A BUDGET ISSUE THAT 
FESTERS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The IAEA has no clear policy on the 
application of Program Support Costs (PSCs) to extrabudgetary 
contributions.  In recent months, however, the Secretariat 
has dabbled with implementing a universal fee of 7 percent. 
The U.S. and Australia have so far refused to pay the 7 
percent, and one Australian contribution is in limbo as a 
result.  Australia has proposed a paper, repeated below, 
which Geneva Group states are considering for presentation to 
the IAEA to advance the dialogue on this issue.  The letter 
conforms to U.S. policy, supports the goals of the UN 
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI), and has 
broad support from the Geneva Group.  There is a risk, 
however, that forcing the issue into the public realm will 
lead to a messy repeat of past battles with the G-77.  There 
are also concerns among some USG agencies and IAEA technical 
staff that PSCs are a thinly-veiled &money grab8 by IAEA 
administrators that will divert money away from valuable 
technical programs.  Despite these concerns, Post supports 
the broader goal of budgetary transparency and requests 
authority to convey the paper, together with the UK as Geneva 
Group co-chair, to Deputy Director General Waller by the 
Geneva Group,s November 11 target (para 7).  Text attached. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Program Support Costs (PSCs) are loosely defined as 
charges to cover the direct and indirect costs of 
implementing extrabudgetary programs.  A growing consensus 
has emerged that PSCs should be harmonized across the UN 
system, and the topic has become a focus of the UN High-Level 
Committee on Management.  In general, the UN and its 
technical agencies charge PSCs of 13 percent, while the UN 
humanitarian agencies charge 7 percent.  The IAEA, on the 
other hand, has no clearly-defined policy on the application 
of PSCs, but began levying such expenses on a 
&case-by-case8 basis beginning approximately one year ago 
(the charge ranges between 0, 3, 7 and 12 percent, depending 
on the donor and program).  The U.S. has thus far declined to 
pay PSCs to the IAEA, partly in recognition of our 
significant extrabudgetary contributions, many of which 
include a cost-free expert (CFE).  The U.S. also objects to 
the lack of any clearly-defined policy outlining how PSC 
rates are determined and levied. 
 
3. (SBU) Emerging best practice, including UNTAI, stipulates 
that international organizations apply PSCs in a fair and 
transparent manner in order to accurately reflect the real 
costs of running programs.  Attempts by Member States to 
implement such a policy at the IAEA have failed in the face 
of G-77 resistance (G-77 countries usually pay only 3 percent 
and do not wish to see any changes to the arrangement).  A 
policy battle at the time of the June 2008 Board of Governors 
meeting ended with the Secretariat,s agreement to conform to 
the status quo and continue applying PSC on a 
&case-by-case8 basis. 
 
Turbid Policy 
------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Following the June dust up, the IAEA Secretariat 
took steps to circumvent the deadlock among Member States by 
apparently &universalizing8 PSCs at 7 percent.  The 7 
percent is charged retroactively to all projects submitted 
since July 1, 2008.  In partial confirmation of these rumors, 
a high-ranking IAEA official told DCM that two middle income 
countries (Pakistan and one of the Baltic States) had been 
initially charged only 3 percent in PSCs, but that DG 
ElBaradei had turned down the projects &until they agreed to 
the full 7 percent.8  The official (who spoke in confidence) 
did not indicate whether the policy would apply to the U.S., 
nor did he mention the U.S. refusal to pay PSCs on a recent, 
USD 1.5 million DOE donation to the Nuclear Security Fund. 
(Note: The Australians have also refused to pay PSCs.  As a 
result, funds for an Australian project have been in limbo ) 
sitting in an IAEA bank account ) since early this summer. 
The Japanese, on the other hand, are resigned to paying PSCs, 
and the European Union recently accepted that 7 percent of 
its planned 5 million Euro contribution to the Nuclear 
Security Fund would go to PSCs.  End Note.) 
 
5. (SBU) Contrary to what we have heard from the Secretariat, 
other rumors indicate that a tiered structure remains in 
place whereby G-77 Members pay 3 percent for government 
cost-sharing projects, OECD countries pay 7 percent, and 
contributions for junior professional officers (JPOs) are 
charged 12 percent.  For example, a Mexican diplomat (and new 
participant in Geneva Group meetings) questioned the high 
rate charged on a Mexican JPO, given it amounted to &free 
labor8 for the IAEA.  Canada and the U.S. are in a similar 
position. 
 
6. (SBU) In addition to the confusion over PSC rates, rumors 
allude to internal dissension at the IAEA, with some 
high-level officials pushing for universal PSCs, and others 
adhering to tiered structures.  Even the DG,s supposed 
support for universal PSCs has not been put to the test 
publicly.  A number of Member States, notably Japan and 
Australia, are irritated by the obfuscation and have 
encouraged other Members to support them in pressuring for a 
policy that is fair, universal and transparent. 
 
Request for Guidance 
-------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Australia has recently drafted a paper requesting 
clarity on the PSC policy (sections of the document are 
lifted from a previous U.S. statement on the issue).  In an 
UNVIE-hosted meeting of Geneva Group members November 5, 
there was near-consensus that the paper should go from the 
Geneva Group as a whole to Director General David Waller. 
Post requests authority to convey the paper, together with 
the UK as Geneva Group co-chair, to DDG Waller by the Geneva 
Group,s November 11 target. 
 
8. (SBU) Comment: Two issues affect the decision to co-sign: 
1) If donor countries force the Secretariat to &admit8 
publicly to a universal PSC policy, it could lead to G-77 
pushback and a potential showdown at the Board of Governors 
that merely repeats past struggles.  In other words, we could 
win the battle of transparency, but lose the war of 
establishing a fair PSC policy if the DG ultimately caves in 
to G-77 pressure for a lower rate for some projects.  2) U.S. 
support for universal PSCs could increase the proportion of 
resources going to IAEA administration (PSCs on top of CFEs) 
and decrease the remainder available for priority programs in 
the areas of safety and non-proliferation.  (Canada is in the 
same position and has stated off the record that universal 
PSCs would likely end their CFE program.)  Skeptical 
observers within the USG and even the IAEA go so far as to 
suggest that the move to levy PSCs amounts to little more 
than a &money grab8 by IAEA administrators that will siphon 
money away from the real work of the Agency.  Recognizing 
these risks, post recommends signing the letter as a means to 
advancing our long term goal of transparency in international 
organizations.  End Comment. 
 
9. (U) Australian Draft Letter to DDG Waller 
 
The Geneva Group supports in principle the application of 
Programme Support Costs (PSCs) to extrabudgetary 
contributions. 
 
In June 2008, the Board debated a Secretariat document 
setting out a specific policy on the application of common 
PSCs to extrabudgetary contributions. 
 
Several Geneva Group countries (as well as the EU as a group) 
indicated they still had some concerns about the precise 
modalities of how the charge would be applied, and requested 
the Secretariat to delay broader implementation. 
 
Several members also emphasised that any such mechanism could 
only be applied in an equitable and non-discriminatory 
manner. In The Geneva Group's view, if a program support cost 
policy is to be implemented, it should be transparent and as 
consistent as possible. 
 
We are concerned at indications the Secretariat has been 
moving to make acceptance of extrabudgetary contributions 
received after 1 July 2008 contingent on the levying of a 7 
per cent PSC, despite its statement at the June Board that 
"it would continue to apply Programme Support Costs on 
extrabudgetary contributions on a case-by-case basis, as is 
currently the practice." 
 
We note that there are a number of issues to be clarified 
regarding how the Agency intends to implement the policy, 
including: 
 
-     effects on extrabudgetary activities for which funding 
for management and administration is already available; 
 
-     confirmation that the introduction of a common PSC 
policy will be cost-neutral, e.g. that it would not lead to 
an augmentation of MTBF (budget and finance) staff levels 
simply to administer the PSC mechanism itself; 
 
-     advice of the quantity of funds already raised through 
the levying of PSCs, the purpose to which these funds have 
been put (or will be put), and the point at which such funds 
may begin effectively subsidising - or creating savings in - 
the Regular Budget. 
 
We also note that some Member States continue to suggest a 
discriminatory approach whereby certain lines of 
extrabudgetary funding should be exempted from the common PSC 
policy. 
 
Our understanding of the Secretariat's reference at the June 
Board to "a case-by-case basis, as is currently the practice" 
was based on paragraph 3 of its "Policy on the Application of 
Programme Support Costs", according to which PSCs have been 
applied in the case of a few voluntary contributions in 
agreement with donors, or otherwise arranged through the 
provision of cost-free experts." 
 
Based on discussion at the June Board, it was our expectation 
that streams of extrabudgetary funding previously subject to 
PSCs would continue to have PSCs applied, and that PSCs could 
be charged on new streams of extrabudgetary funding subject 
to the agreement of the donor (n.b. Rule 108.02 of the 
Agency's Financial Rules provides that the Agency may charge 
PSCs only with the agreement of the contributor). 
 
We also understood that the Secretariat "could even find 
itself in the position of having to decline extrabudgetary 
funding" if administrative resources were not available in 
specific cases. 
 
However, until such time as Member States can see an 
official, transparent and equitable PSC policy applicable 
across the Agency, the Secretariat should not make its 
acceptance of new extrabudgetary contributions contingent on 
donor agreement to PSCs. 
 
In this context, we note that several donor agencies have 
already approved certain extrabudgetary contributions on the 
understanding that the entirety of the contribution would be 
used for direct project costs such that the retrospective 
application of PSCs would require administratively burdensome 
re-approval of the contribution. 
 
The Geneva Group is prepared to continue working with the 
Secretariat toward a fair, equitable and transparent common 
PSC policy. 
SCHULTE